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ABSTRACT

Misata, Kelley K, Ph.D., Purdue University, August 2016. Gap Analysis Identifying the
Current State of Information Security within Organizations Working with Victims of
Violence. Major Professor: Dr. Eugene H. Spafford.
Around the world, domestic violence, human trafficking, and stalking affect millions of
lives every day. According to a report published by the Center for Disease Control and
Prevention in January 2015, every minute 20 people fall victim to physical violence
perpetrated by an intimate partner in the United States (US). As offenders use
advancements in technology to perpetuate abuse and isolate victims, the scale of services
provided by crisis organizations must rise to meet the demand while keeping a close eye
on potential digital security vulnerabilities. It has been reported in general media and
research that phishing emails, social engineering attacks, denial of service attacks, and
other data breaches are gaining popularity and affecting business environments of all
sizes and in any sector, including organizations dedicated to working with victims of
violence.
To address this, an exploratory research study to identify the current state of information
security within the US-based non-profit crisis organizations was conducted. This study
identified the gaps between a theoretical maximum level of information security and the
observed level of information security in organizations working with victims of violence
inspired by a recognized and respected framework, National Institute of Standards and

xv
Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework. This research establishes the critical
foundation for researchers, security professionals, technology companies, and crisis
organizations to develop assessment tools, technology solutions, training curriculum,
awareness programs, and other strategic initiatives specific to crisis organizations and
other non-profit organizations to aid them in improving information security for
themselves and the victims they serve.

1

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

1.1

Problem Statement

Around the world, domestic violence, human trafficking, and stalking affect
millions of lives every day. According to a report published by the Center for Disease
Control and Prevention in January 2015, every minute 20 people fall victim to physical
violence perpetrated by an intimate partner in the US. As offenders use advancements in
technology to perpetuate abuse and isolate victims, the scale of services provided by
crisis organizations must rise to meet the demand while keeping a close eye on potential
digital security vulnerabilities. For example, phishing emails, social engineering attacks,
denial of service attacks, and other data breaches affect organizations in many domains.
Though research has not revealed direct cyber attacks on crisis organizations, this does
not suggest that they are not invulnerable or immune to such attacks. A 2009 study from
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse stated
that non-profit organizations are most vulnerable to information security breaches that
lead to identity theft (Kolb & Abdullah, 2009, p. 103). The report went on to state that
from January 2005 to June 2007 a total of 155,048,651 records containing confidential
personal information were stolen from various websites, including non-profit
organizations (Kolb & Abdullah, 2009, p. 103). In addition, many who work in human
services organizations have the misconceptions that information security measures are
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costly, time consuming, and require implementation by technology exports.
Overwhelmed by the complexities, crisis organizations often ignore the potential risks.
Little is known about the online information practices of non-profit organizations
and how well they comply with best practices in information security (Hoy & Phelps,
2009, p. 72). In addition, researchers and security experts who ignore the information
security of organizations that work with victims of violence leave these organizations and
the people that they serve vulnerable to intrusion and attack. Research exists addressing
how powerful technologies are used as a tool against victims of violence. However, there
is a lack of research that evaluates how the organizations serving this sample struggle to
understand the risks and institute effective information security strategies.
The information security of organizations that work with victims of violence is at
risk for intrusion and attack, which perpetuates the lack of understanding around security
tools, processes, and policies. To address this gap, an exploratory research study to
identify the current state of information security within US-based non-profit crisis
organizations is needed. It is possible to identify the gaps between a theoretical maximum
level of information security and the observed level of information security in any given
organization. This study measured and explored the gaps by looking at absolute and
relative levels of information security preparedness using best practices inspired by a
recognized and respected framework. Exploration of the gaps also determined the likely
factors that correlate with the level of security preparedness. To be specific, the
exploration looked at the degree to which organization type, the level of funding, division
of labor with respect to information security policy implementation, and the number of
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security tools might be associated with security preparedness as measured by an index for
information security preparedness.
By identifying the current state, this study established the necessary foundation
for researchers, security experts, and crisis organizations to work together to develop
assessment tools, processes, and strategies specific for their environment and necessary to
improve information security. In addition, using a national standard as a guide facilitated
the development of assessment tools specific for crisis organizations to use in managing
ongoing information security risks, opportunities, and priorities. This study advances the
current state of research by assessing the information security ecosystems of crisis
organizations using a recognized standard, thereby setting a foundation for future
research in information security for crisis organizations as well as other non-profit
organizations. Future research is needed to continue this effort and to bring the results of
this study from theory to adoption
1.2

Purpose of Study

Crisis organizations are chartered to protect victims of abuse, trauma, and
violence. Technologies used by an organization’s staff, victims, and other legitimate
users bring with them the possibility of digital intrusion, eavesdropping, and attack. With
growing advancements in technology, crisis organizations and those they serve are at risk
both in online and physical environments. Staff and survivors often forget this risk (R.
Mednick, personal communication, August 2015). The collection, transfer, and storage of
sensitive information in a digital format add additional risk management complexities for
these organizations. Providing crisis organizations with viable strategies to improve their
current state of information security first requires an exploratory review of the
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information security paradigms, protocols, and points of vulnerability within these
environments by using a gap analysis approach. As a result, the problem this research
addresses is the identification of the current state of information security within crisis
organizations through the examination of the gaps between absolute and relative levels of
information security preparedness measured against best practices in a recognized
cybersecurity framework. As stated previous, this research establishes a long overdue
foundation for future research in the area of information security within crisis
organization as well as other non-profit organizations.
Research in the domain of organizations working with victims of violence has
focused on the use of technology by abusers and victims, stopping short of addressing the
information security needs of the organizations missioned to offer resources and support
to these victims. One example in which the use of technology by crisis organizations was
questionable is in the 2012 survey conducted by the National Network to End Domestic
Violence (NNEDV), which evaluated the use of technology by domestic violence
agencies as a part of victim services (NNEDV, 2012). Results included responses from
378 out of 700 US domestic violence agencies covering a range of topics regarding
technology used by staff, survivors, and abusers. Another study reporting on the
utilization of the Internet and wireless communication by two Midwestern domestic
violence shelters was conducted in 2002 (Kranz, 2002). This study involved a series of
interviews with Executive Directors and staff comparing the use of the Internet and
wireless communication in the service of domestic violence in urban and rural
environments (Kranz, 2002).
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In summary, the focus of existing research on how victims and abusers use
technology has resulted in an oversight by researchers and security experts in addressing
the challenges facing the organizations supporting victims of violence. Crisis
organizations face many of the same challenges regarding information security as other
businesses; however, the people they serve and the work they do creates unique
complexities. To understand these complexities requires a different focus paired with
academic rigor. In addition, by empowering crisis organizations with knowledge and
confidence in the complicated arena of information security has possibility to improve the
information security of the victims these organizations serve. As a result, the purpose of
this study was to provide a needed foundation for future research so that information
security within crisis organizations is no longer ignored
1.3

Research Question

As stated above, this research answers the question, what is the current state of
information security within crisis organizations as measured against best practices in a
recognized cybersecurity framework? The current state was identified by measuring the
gaps in information security preparedness using best practices inspired by a recognized
and respected framework. In addition, by conducting a gap analysis to address the above,
researchers, security experts, and crisis organizations, the researcher established the
necessary foundation to develop assessment tools, processes, and strategies to meet the
specific needs and challenges facing crisis organizations. The results of this research
made it possible to discover potential risks, opportunities for improvement, and priorities
that crisis organization can use to improve the security of their digital environment and
that of their victims.

6
1.4

Significance of the Study

The rise in the use of advanced information technologies and the adoption of the Internet
into daily life has changed the way people gather information, communicate, and seek
help. However, before the onslaught of smartphones, mobile applications, and social
networking, crisis organizations used other non-technical methods to reach and protect
the people they serve. Less than 20 years ago, domestic violence victims worked to keep
their names out of telephone books, off post-boxes, and doorplates. They used aliases to
pay bills. All of these protective measures were implemented to extricate themselves
from victimization and to safeguard their locations (Zorza, 1995). For the organizations
that support them, basic business functions, such as fundraising, community awareness,
and operations management were restricted to the people and systems that had direct
physical access to the organization and their communities. In today’s technology-centric
environment, new and creative approaches are required to protect crisis organizations and
the victims they serve from intrusion and possible attack.
According to the National Center for Charitable Statistics, there were 1,076,309
non-profit 501(c)3 public charities reported in the United States in 2015 including
hospitals, colleges, human services, museums, community foundations, and
neighborhood organizations (National Center for Charitable Statistics, n.d.). In addition,
83,768 social welfare 501(c)4 non-profit organizations including civic associations,
service clubs, advocacy organizations, and others were reported (National Center for
Charitable Statistics, n.d.). As the number of victims continues to rise, so does the
number of organizations and services needed to help them. As a result, a greater
challenge in addressing the information security of this growing sample of organizations.
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Research in the non-profit sector has suggested that information security
deployment began in the 1960s, but seemed to lag behind for-profit organizations (Zhang,
Gutierrez, Mathieson, & Wei, 2010). This early research identified some of the reasons
for this lag, which are the result of a) limited budgets, b) lack of management support, c)
insufficient training, and d) no technical support (Zhang, Gutierrez, Mathieson, & Wei,
2010). This research established the foundation to begin to identify whether non-profit
crisis organizations have lagged even further behind their for-profit counterparts as
technology has advanced, and if the reasons for the gap are the same.
Creating information security tools and protocols that are rife with complicated
technologies and processes can be overwhelming for some non-technical users. In
addition, for many users and organizations the belief is that security in a digital world is a
state of all-or-nothing. Therefore, when addressing information security in any
organizational environment it should be designed to serve the needs of the organization
while keeping pace with changes in technology and threats (Needleman, 2001). For crisis
organizations, information security strategies, tools, and processes should be designed to
be relevant to securing their unique environment while not intruding on the activities to
support and protect victims. The challenge is to help staff and clients use technology
safely while still having all the benefits (L. Montanaro, personal communication, August
2015).
This study was the first to identify the information security for crisis organizations
using a recognized framework. Using the gap analysis approach to assess the information
security preparedness of crisis organizations was expected to generate a residual benefit.
By raising the level of understanding and awareness by crisis organization staff provided,
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as a result, new protective insights around information security that can be transferred
with more confidence to victims, thereby improving their information security as well.
1.5

Operational Definitions

The following terms provide operational definitions for the purpose of this study.
They are defined below for clarity and consistency throughout this study.
Crisis organizations are physical or virtual non-profit, non-government agencies,
based in the United States, working with victims and survivors of domestic violence,
physical and cyber stalking, sexual exploitation, and human trafficking. The direct or
indirect services offered through these organizations may include medical, mental health,
social work, and advocacy.
Information Security is a term that is often interchanged with “cyber security.”
For the purpose of this study and to ensure clarity for the reader, “information security” is
used and defined as the practice of protecting information wherever it exists including
cyber space.
Policies are internal policies related to use of technology, mobile devices, social
media and other related operational policies concerning information security; also,
governmental or policies outside the crisis organization may be referenced in relevance to
this study.
Staff refers to employees (full and part-time), contractors, and volunteers working
inside the crisis organization; does not include third party service providers or partners.
Victims is a term that is often interchanged with the term “survivor” throughout
this study. Although a victim or survivor is often referred to in the feminine form, it is
recognized that women, men, and children can be victims of violence.
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Technology refers to computers, mobile devices, digital storage, communication
via the Internet, privacy-protecting software, social media, and other security tools.
1.6

Research Objectives

The lack of existing research illustrates the need for an analysis of the current
state information security within crisis organizations. To establish an achievable scope
for this foundational research, this exploratory research study identified the gaps between
a theoretical maximum level of information security and the observed level of
information security within United States based non-profit crisis organizations.
Expanding the scope of this research to international crisis organizations can be
addressed in future research initiatives. As stated above, this study measured and
explored the gaps by examining the absolute and relative levels of information security
preparedness using best practices inspired by a recognized and respected framework. The
objectives of this study initiated that process by identifying the current state of
information security within crisis organizations:
1. To document the gap between actual and ideal security policies and
procedures within crisis organizations;
2. To document the gap between crisis organization who provide services to
different categories of victims (e.g. domestic violence and human trafficking);
3. To document the gap across dimensions of security;
4. To examine if security preparedness is associated with information security
solutions usage; and
5. To examine crisis organization characteristics (e.g. funding, lack of resources,
lack of knowledge) associated with the gap.
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The applied value of this research lies in establishing a necessary foundation for
creating an accepted methodology that enables crisis organizations to raise awareness and
improve information security within their organizations. As observed and discussed with
crisis organizations during the National Network to End Domestic Violence Tech
Summit (July 2015), the feeling of being lost in the complexities of technology makes it
difficult for crisis organizations to help survivors safely navigate the growing technology
domain.
1.7

Standards for Information Security

For this study, the baseline against which to measure crisis organizations against
was established after a review of three recognized standards in information security:
1. International Organization for Standardization (ISO) ISO/IEC27001 –
Information Security Management (ISO Management System Standards, n.d.);
2. Information Systems Audit and Control Association (ISACA) Control
Objectives for Information and Related Technology (COBIT) 5 (ISACA,
2012); and
3. The NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) (NIST, 2014).
Each is considered an industry leader and a benchmark for best practices in information
security. Also, their messaging reinforces the importance of establishing and
implementing information security systems, processes, protocols, and conversations that
are grounded in the organization’s needs, objectives, security requirements, size, and
culture, all of which are consistent with the goals and objectives of this study. However,
to stay within the scope of this research, one standard has been selected as the most
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appropriate baseline for this study in respect to holistic view, simplicity in language and
content, and availability.
1.7.1

International Organization for Standardization, ISO/IEC27001

In 1992, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) in the United Kingdom
published a “Code of Practice for Information Security Management” (The History of
ISO 17799 and ISO 27001, n.d.). Over the next 13 years, updates and new revisions of
the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) family of standards were added.
In 2005, the ISO 27001 was published, replacing BS7799-2 and designed for information
security management systems aligning with ISO 17799 and compatible with ISO 9001
and ISO 14001 (The History of ISO 17799 and ISO 27001, n.d.). According to the ISO
website, ISO/IEC 27001 is considered one of the most well-known standards in the ISO
list of standards (ISO Management System Standards, n.d.).
The ISO/IEC 27001 provides the requirements for an information security
management system (ISMS). Created through consensus by experts in information
security, the ISO standard is considered a model to follow in “setting up and operating a
management system” (ISO Management System Standards, n.d.). The following
standards within the ISO family were reviewed in the context of the research objectives
of this study (see Table 1 for ISO Management System Standards and Titles).
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Table 1. ISO Management System Standards
ISO/IEC 27001
ISO/IEC 27002
ISO/IEC 27004
ISO/IEC 270013
ISO/IEC 270014
ISO/IEC 270015
ISO/IEC TR
27016
ISO/IEC 27003
ISO/IEC 27005
ISO/IEC 27006
ISO/IEC 27007
ISO/IEC 27008
ISO/IEC 27010

Information Management Systems
Code of Practice for Information Security Controls
Information Security Management – Measurement
Guidance on the Integration implementation of ISO/IEC 27001 and ISO/IEC
2000-1
Governance of Information Security
Information Security Management Guidelines for Financial Services
Information Security Management – Organizational Economics
Information Management Systems – Implementation Guidance
Information Security Risk Management
Requirements for bodies providing audit and certification of information security
management systems
Guidelines for Information Security Management Systems Auditing
Guidelines for Auditors on Information Security Controls
Information Security Management for Inter-Sector and Inter-Organizational
Communications

Some of the components within ISO/IEC 27001 were in alignment with the
objectives of this study. However, the other standards were outside the scope (ISO/IEC
2700, n.d.). Therefore, after review of the all the ISO standards above, it was determined
by the author that the ISO suite is too complex in language and approach for this study.
1.7.2

Information Systems Audit and Control Association, COBIT 5

The Control Objectives for Information and Related Technology (COBIT) 5, an
Information Systems Audit and Control Association (ISACA) framework for information
security, is designed for the “governance and management of enterprise information
technology” (ISACA, 2014, n/a). COBIT 5 is designed for technology professionals and
business executives for use in any industry with organizations of any size (ISACA,
2012). It provides organizations with a systematic approach and common language to
protect and manage information through five principles:
1. Meet stakeholder needs;
2. Cover the organization end to end;
3. Apply a single integrated framework;
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4. Enable a holistic approach; and
5. Separate governance from management (ISACA, 2014).
COBIT 5 promotes itself as “generic and useful for enterprises of all sizes,
whether commercial, not-for-profit or in the public sector” (ISACA, 2014, n/a). However,
the users of the framework are intended to be business executives and consultants in audit
and assurance, compliance, IT operations, governance, and security and risk
management. This is outside the scope of non-technical, often community-based crisis
organizations. In consideration of the unique qualities of crisis organizations, COBIT 5
does recognize the importance that “information security is a business enabler that is
strictly bound to stakeholder trust” (ISACA, 2014, n/a).
However, after reviewing the COBIT 5 system against the objectives of this study
and through initial conversations with crisis organizations to help identify their current
knowledge of information security and technology, it was determined that the framework
is too complex in language and approach for inclusion. For future research and
development of an assessment tool for crisis organizations, COBIT 5 should be
considered.
1.7.3

National Institute of Standards and Technology Cybersecurity Framework

In February 2013, Executive Order 13636, Improving Critical Infrastructure
Cybersecurity was the directive given to the NIST to develop a framework for critical
infrastructures to reduce cyber risk (NIST, 2014). The NIST was charged with enlisting
volunteer stakeholders in industry to provide input and validation to address the complete
landscape of cyber security across business sectors. According to one of those
stakeholders, the instructions were to design not a standard but a framework that was
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transformative and built from the collective wisdom of thought-leaders in industry and
government (T. Casey, personal conversation September 22, 2015). The goal of the NIST
was to establish best practices and a framework that would foster security conversations
at all levels within the organization. The NIST CSF was designed to provide a common
language and to bridge the gaps between security and business (T. Casey, personal
conversation September 22, 2015). “NIST’s future framework role is reinforced by the
Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014 (Public Law 113-274), which calls on NIST to
facilitate and support the development of voluntary, industry-led cybersecurity standards
and best practices for critical infrastructure” (NIST, 2015, para. 5).
In March 2016, Tenable Network Security reported the results from the Trends in
Security Framework Adoption Survey (Cieslak, 2016). The survey involved over 200
information technology and security professionals in the US (Cieslak, 2016). The results
reported that “84% of organizations across a wide range of sizes and industries already
leverage some type of security framework” (Cieslak, 2016, para. 2). Though large nonprofit organizations were included in the survey, it was not possible to determine if these
included non-profit crisis organizations as well (R. Gula, personal conversation, April 5,
2016). However, results from this survey did report “larger organizations (5,000
employees or more) are more likely to adopt the NIST CSF (37%), 17% of smaller
organizations surveyed (100 to 1,000 employees) also rely on this framework” (Cieslak,
2016, para. 6). Continued review of these survey results, including the barriers to
adoption, may be useful for future research and development of an assessment tool,
processes, and priorities for crisis organizations.
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The NIST CSF consists of three primary components including the Framework
Core, the Framework Profile, and Implementation Tiers. The CSF Core includes five
functions––Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, and Recover––that are intended to be
viewed in a concurrent and continuous manner (NIST, 2014). Each function identifies
categories and subcategories that map to existing standards, guidelines, and practices (see
Appendix A). The Framework Profile “represents the cybersecurity outcomes based on
business needs that an organization has selected from the Framework Categories and
Subcategories” (NIST, 2014, p. 5). Last, the Implementation Tiers exist to help “describe
the degree to which an organization’s cybersecurity risk management practices exhibit
the characteristics defined in the Framework (e.g., risk and threat aware, repeatable, and
adaptive)” (NIST, 2014, p. 5).
Each of the three components was reviewed, which resulted in the NIST CSF
being chosen for this study. It was determined through the extensive review of all three
frameworks reviewed for this study that the NIST CSF provided the best overall structure
to support this and future research in this area. The NIST CSF is expected to be the most
popular choice of security frameworks over the coming year (Dark Reading, 2016). In
addition, to the cohesive alignment to the ISO/IEM 27001, COBIT5, and other standards
not included in this review, the NIST CSF offers to best structure for this study and a
viable starting point.
1.8

Assumptions and Limitations

The potential reputational and physical damage inflicted when an organization
experiences a cyber attack can be devastating and have a permanent impact on the
organization (Petel, 2004). Crisis organizations focusing on providing services to
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survivors of trauma are not immune to this risk; however, they often lack the awareness,
experience, and resources to assess their current vulnerabilities and respond to them.
“Things are happening on our network or in our social media accounts, but we do not see
it and would not know what to do if it happened anyway” (L. Montanaro, personal
communication, August 2015). Crisis organizations are aware that cyber risks are all
around, but they do not know what they are or how to address something if it does
happen (R. Mednick, personal communication, August 2015). As a result, assumptions in
this study included the following:
1. Crisis organizations lack the knowledge, policies, risk management, and
business strategies regarding the use and risks of technology used by staff;
2. Crisis organizations are using technology, but have not identified the risk
versus reward as it pertains to organizational strategies and information
security; and
3. Crisis organizations have non-existent or limited policies and procedures
regarding information security.
Potential limitations to this research existed in two areas. First, the predominance
of research regarding survivor or abuser uses of technology helped to build the initial
framework for this research, but overlooked the unique needs of the crisis organizations.
Second, the level of technical understanding by crisis organization staff presented
challenges in assessing the information security ecosystem in the data collection process.
“Staff of agencies are social workers; they are not trained in information security or
technology in general” (R. Mednick, personal communication, August 2015). As a result,
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the development of the research methodology and survey for this study were designed
with non-technical users in mind, in efforts to mitigate these limitations.
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW

As stated in Chapter 1, information security in crisis organizations has been
overlooked by researchers and security experts. Extensive research across academic
research, literature, and general media as conducted to establish a baseline of the crisis
organization environment. This chapter summarizes this literature review and begins
with a search for crisis organizations that work, direct and indirect, with victims of
domestic violence, stalking, and human trafficking. Next, is an outline of information
security in the non-profit sector and the opportunities for risk management strategies that
can cross over in a relevant manner to crisis organizations. The chapter then addresses
some of the vulnerabilities unique to crisis organizations as compared to other
organizations in the non-profit and for-profit sectors
2.1

Technology

Advancements in technology have benefits for organizations working with
victims of violence. With ease of technology, crisis organizations are now able to provide
life-saving information, resources, support, counseling, and other services to victims
through email, websites, social media, and electronic connections. “The spread of new
media has also significantly increased non-profits ability to communicate with clients as
well as regulators, volunteers, the media, and the general public” (Lovejoy & Saxton,
2012, p. 338). Also, many standard business operations for crisis organizations including
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financial transactions, community outreach, and fundraising are now performed online.
However, for these organizations to be effective, victims must feel safe accessing the
website without the risk, for example, of leaving online traces for attackers and abusers to
manipulate. Knowing where the vulnerabilities might exist initiates the process of
identifying areas within the information security ecosystem that could be improved.
As in any business environment, even with a robust information security strategy
in place, the impact of a cyber attack or breach can be devastating for the organization far
beyond the event itself. “According to the World Economic Forum, a major critical
information infrastructure breakdown may have a global cost of 250 billion dollars, and
the probability of such an event ranges from 10% to 20%” (Armando, Costa, & Merlo,
2013, p. 253). However, a security strategy begins with understanding the business
environment and the parts of the network––flow, data, access––that require protection.
“The issue about controlling access to applications for particular users and searching for
threats is a fundamental problem with which security teams often struggle” (Tokuyoshi,
2013, p. 13). For crisis organizations, like other businesses, an information security
strategy must balance appropriate controls for the environment and the culture of the
organization, without affecting accessibility and services for victims. To assess the
information security needs and risks of crisis organizations, an assessment of their unique
environments was conducted for this study. This effort reinforced the importance of
knowing the organization’s environment and the people working within the system
before embarking on an information security assessment of the technology used by the
organization.
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2.2

Victims of Violence

Victims of violence span across many economic, demographic, geographic, and
cultural domains. Crisis organizations, though missioned in one area, often offer services
that meet the needs of victims across the spectrum. The scope of this study was narrowed
to address the crisis and resource organizations specifically missioned to assist victims of
domestic violence, stalking, and human trafficking in the US. Expanding the scope to
include international victims of violence was noted for future research.
2.2.1

Domestic Violence and Stalking

According to a report published by the Center for Disease Control and Prevention
in January 2015, every minute 20 people fall victim to physical violence perpetrated by
an intimate partner in the US (Center for Disease Control and Prevention, 2015).
Domestic violence is a “pattern of abusive behavior in any relationship that is used by
one partner to gain or maintain power and control over another intimate partner”
regardless of race, age, sexual orientation, gender, education level, or economic status
(US Bureau of Justice: Domestic Violence Cases, n.d.). Though it often refers to violence
between spouses (spousal abuse), it can include cohabitants and non-married intimate
partners (US Bureau of Justice: Domestic Violence Cases, n.d.). Domestic violence spans
across a spectrum that includes physical, sexual, emotional, economic, and psychological
abuse through behaviors involving intimidation, manipulation, isolation, frightening, and
humiliating (US Bureau of Justice: Domestic Violence Cases, n.d.). Similar, stalking is
defined by the US Bureau of Justice as a “pattern of repeated and unwanted attention,
harassment, contact, or any other course of conduct directed at a specific person that
would cause a reasonable person to feel fear” (US Bureau of Justice: Domestic Violence
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Cases, n.d.). The domestic violence crisis organizations reviewed for during the
preliminary research for this study indicated providing services for both domestic
violence and stalking victims. These services include emergency shelter, housing,
advocacy, referrals, court processes, children’s programs, and community education.
Understanding the scope of services provided initial points to investigate potential
information security vulnerabilities.
Though, existing research did not address information security within crisis
organizations there are a few examples of studies that address the use of technology by
victims in crisis organizations. One such study was conducted by the National Public
Radio (NPR). This study surveyed 70 domestic violence shelters to identify how
prevalent technology is used to stalk and abuse survivors (Shahani, 2014). According to
the study, some domestic violence shelters were conducting “digital detox” for victims
when they first entered the shelter. Recommendations included shutting off GPS and
WiFi and refraining from using Facebook (Shahani, 2014). In one survey, 85% of the
shelters involved in a survey indicated they were working with victims whose abusers
tracked them using GPS, and 75% of victims’ report abusers eavesdropped using hidden
mobile apps (Shahani, 2014). Several shelters in this report indicated they have a policy
against using Facebook on premises because of the risk that an abuser could pinpoint the
(physical) location of the organization (Shahani, 2014). This study, at minimum,
provided some useful insights to begin to understand how crisis organizations address
technology within their environments.
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2.2.2

Human Trafficking

Many around the world recognize human trafficking as a form of slavery and an
abomination of human rights. Human trafficking is an international enterprise of sexually
exploitation people pornography, sex tourism, mail order brides, and forced prostitution
(Corrigan, 2001). In 2001, researchers estimated that four million people are trafficked
around the world every year as part of a global business that produces profits of up to $7
billion in US dollars each year (Corrigan, 2001). Researchers agreed that while
trafficking patterns fluctuate with the global supply of and demand for trafficked victims,
trafficking originates in impoverished areas that lack viable economic opportunities for
victims (Corrigan, 2001). With advancing technologies, traffickers are now at a
significant advantage in being able to communicate and access potential victims to
expand their business operations; with the Internet, physical borders are often irrelevant
(Corrigan, 2001). However, as with domestic violence and stalking crisis organizations,
technology advancements aid crisis organizations in reaching victims and combatting
traffickers. “Every year, the illegal traffic of women for the sex trade puts multitudes of
women at risk of losing their personal freedom, suffering physical and emotional abuses,
and being sexually exploited for the profit of others” (Corrigan, 2001, p. 16).
The human trafficking crisis organizations reviewed during the preliminary
research for this study provided a variety of services to victims. Similar to domestic
violence and stalking crisis organizations, organizations dedicated to assisting victims of
human trafficking provide to victims’ assistance food, shelter, clothing, medical, legal,
job training, and education. However, more than domestic violence and stalking crisis
organizations, human trafficking organizations face additional challenges that are the
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result of political, international, and cultural complexities––an important element to
consider in future research.
2.3

The Non-Profit Sector

Researchers indicated that organizations in the non-profit sector are more at risk
for an information security breach or attack because, in part, the volume and sensitivity of
the data they capture and store on their systems (Biswas, 2015; Petel, 2004). For
example, in a study conducted in 2014, “over a four-year period, Citizen Lab looked at
more than 800 suspicious emails, and 2,800 malicious payloads and malware families
used to target the organization” (Kirk, 2014, para. 5). The results of this study showed
patterns that indicated the same China-based networks that attacked other government
and industry targets also attacked some non-profit organizations. As reported, “two of the
human rights groups, included one focused on Tibet, were struck by APT1, also known
as the Comment Crew” (Kirk, 2014, para. 7). Also, Singapore’s Personal Data Protection
Commission (PDPC) held the third annual data protection conference, which included
approximately 600 data protection officers from throughout the country of over 4 million
citizens (Pfeifle, 2015). During the conference, PDPC’s Leong Keng Thai was quoted
regarding data breaches, “it is not only personal data that is lost, but also reputations of
individuals and organizations are involved as well” (Pfeifle, 2015, para. 7).
Analysis of digital attacks against human rights groups showed that these
organizations are being targeted for the same types of intrusions as large commercial
organizations, but have far fewer resources to defend themselves (Kirk, 2004). Often
non-profit organizations work on limited budgets with staff that may not possess the
technical expertise and skills to best evaluate a given situation best (R. Mednick, personal
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communication, June 2015). In addition, it may be a situation where attacks are less
targeted or organizations are unaware they are even being attacked. Therefore, it is
important to continue to emphasize that, though an attack has not been reported or
realized, this does not mean it has taken place or will not occur. Crisis organizations are
not immune information security attacks; in fact, they may be more at risk as a result of
some of the vulnerabilities, which are outlined in the following section. As a result, it is
critical that they begin to understand what is at risk, both digitally and physically.
2.4

Vulnerabilities for Crisis Organizations

Similar to other business environments, crisis organizations are receiving
requests, answer questions, soliciting for donations, conducting business operations, and
providing services to victims utilizing various forms of technology every day. Therefore,
it has become necessary for staff within these organizations to become more aware of the
technical, process, and behavioral risks that may alert an attack. In addition, they need to
understand characteristics of malicious actors targeting crisis organizations. The
following provides a brief analysis for the purpose of this study; however, further
research to understand attacker personas is needed.
1. Abusers and traffickers are those controlling or abusing the victims;
2. Hackers are directed attackers interested in compromising the information
security system through denial of service (DoS), advanced persistent threats,
and other methods; and
3. Data mining attackers are those motivated by accessing aggregated user
information or specific personal information on clients, donors or other
stakeholders (Green, 2010).
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These attackers, like non-malicious actors, are aware that crisis organizational
websites provide a digital channel solicit information from victims, community members,
other service providers, and donors; however, staff may be unaware of how their web use
or browsing habits are being recorded.
We were looking at our Google Analytics and can see someone from Bangladesh
visiting our website with unusual frequency; we don’t have a way to know if that
is a problem or what to do about it if it was. (R. Mednick, personal
communication, August 2015)
It is common knowledge among security experts and researchers that Internet service
providers (ISP), hardware, software, how a website was accessed, which pages were
viewed and for how long all put user information at risk for an attack in this organizations
(Solve, 2011). Understanding the scope of what is being tracked through the
organization’s use of technology and online presence can help identify potential points of
vulnerability for attack. The following subsections offer a sample of other points of
vulnerability overlooked in the current crisis organization environment.
2.4.1

Data Breaches

As stated above, with advancements in technology being used perpetuate abuse
and isolate victims, the scale of services provided by crisis organizations must to rise to
meet the demand while keeping a close eye on potential data breaches. For example,
phishing emails, social engineering attacks, denial of service attacks, and other data
breaches affect businesses sectors both large and small. Though research has yet to reveal
data security breaches specific to organizations working with victims of domestic
violence, human trafficking, and stalking, it does not mean these organizations are
immune to a data breach. Across the broader non-profit sector, researchers have
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discovered cases of “non-profits who were either breached via a network compromise or
even experienced physical theft of devices that gave perpetrators access to databases
filled with valuable information such as names, addresses, and social security numbers”
(Weedon, 2014, para. 6). Considering the services crisis organizations provide victims
and the rise in media reports highlighting data breaches across business sectors, a data
breach within this environment has the potential to put not just data, but lives, at risk.
As we are learning after states began to pass laws requiring notification of data
breaches and the subsequent blizzard of data breach reports, security of
information in databases is often haphazard, a particular concern in the domestic
violence context since a breach can impact the safety of potentially hundreds of
victims. (Green, 2010, p. 280)
This study identified tools, processes, and protocols in which security safeguards
were present to minimize the risk of a breach; these include automatic log-out systems,
encryption, and an address-filtering firewall (Green, 2010). It also addressed tracking
mechanisms for administrators to track access and provides an audit trail; even those
credentials are at risk (Green, 2010). In addition, questions regarding the security of the
transmission of the data, the storage of the database, and the protocols when data is
purged from the organization were included in this study. For example, organizations
using cloud-based information storage and sharing applications, such as Dropbox,
revealed a key reason for using these technologies was the need for productivity-related
applications to service victims and stakeholders. Consistent with other business
environments, crisis organizations need to consider the productivity versus risk debate.
This debate presents ongoing challenges for security experts and researchers as they work
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to find safeguards for the usage of unmanaged, non-secure third party applications
(Citrix, 2015).
2.4.2

Fundraising

Financial support for non-profit organizations comes a variety of sources. Crisis
organizations are no different than other non-profit and human services organizations in
having to exist on financial donations and the trust of the communities they serve. The
organizations reviewed in the preliminary research for this study indicated on their
websites that fundraising is key to survival (see Appendix B). In a study by Hoy and
Phelps (2009) “online giving to the largest United States based non-government
organizations (NGOs) grew from $880 million in 2005 to $1.2 billion in 2006” (p. 71).
With the advancements in technology and payment processing, crisis organizations and
other non-profits conduct fundraising activities both on and off line. The ease and reach
to donors through online channels is attractive to many non-profit organizations. Crisis
organizations may be putting themselves at risk without knowing it. For example,
financial data is attractive to attackers motivated by identity theft, credit card theft, bank
account information, and other personally identifiable details of a mass of donors or more
targeted wealthy donors (Weedon, 2014). A simple website misconfiguration can expose
an organization’s database of donors and their personal information to a crisis.
Several of the organizations analyzed in the preliminary research for this study
utilized online bank and payment processing companies such as PayPal, while others
masked their payment methods, calling into question the level of security (see Appendix
B). Several redirected visitors to the donation page on their website using HTTPS.
Though HTTPS is one of the current web security protocols, it is rife with vulnerabilities,
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a topic for future research. Visitors were then required to complete a fill-in form
including personal identifiable and credit card information. None of the organizations in
this preliminary study provided an option to donate anonymously nor did any of them
state awareness around security, steps being taken to protect the identity of donors, or the
transactions (see Appendix B).
Last, it is important for crisis organizations to consider that information security
breaches that expose donor and staff details could open the organization to potential
ligation should they be compromised. Non-profit organizations may not comprehend the
risk of losses, direct and indirect, due to an information security failure until they face
legal action. (Kolb & Abdullah, 2009). Such an event could cause a small crisis
organization to go out of business.
2.4.3

Tracking Features

Organizations working with victims of domestic violence, stalking, and human
trafficking are familiar with tracking techniques and risks in the physical domain.
However, in a digital space, understanding the benefits and risks associated tracking
features embedded in technology can be confusing for non-technical users. For example,
cookies, in simple non-technical language, are small text files of code that are deployed
on a computer when a web page is downloaded. When a victim or a donor visits a crisis
organization website, an identifier is created in the cookie and stored on the user’s hard
drive. Web bugs, on the other hand, are hidden snippets of code that can gather data
about the user, such as the destination of emails and websites being visited; some more
malicious versions have the ability to access the target’s computer files (Solove, 2004).
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For non-malicious purposes, the organization can see where visitors spend their
time and provides information about how improve the site. From the perspective of crisis
organizations, this information can be useful in improving and refining the site. However,
this tracking capability can be leveraged by attackers as they can track their victims
within a crisis organization’s website, social media, and other channels. Gaining greater
understanding of these features, along with the risks and benefits to the organization,
become key in the analysis of the current state of information security within crisis
organizations.
Last, many crisis organization websites reviewed during the preliminary research
for this study have “escape” buttons that allow users to click to another page (see
Appendix B). However, in some instances cookies and images from all of their web
surfing remain on victim’s computers if other security measures are not taken. Navigating
to a new website does not erase these and does not guarantee that an abuser would not
later access the computer and view the victim’s Internet history. Consider a scenario
where an “escape” button on a crisis organization website is vulnerable in a manner that
an attacker can disable or redirect the “escape” feature, thereby putting victims at risk.
The examples outlined above are not intended to be exhaustive, but simply a baseline to
begin as advancements in technology also introduce other devices and fingerprint
technologies with better tracking features that should be considered for future research.
2.4.4

Mobile Devices

The influx of mobile devices used by staff, clients, and other stakeholders in
business environments has raised numerous concerns from security experts and
researchers. With the availability of interception and infiltration technologies on

30
smartphones and other advancing technologies, the entire business infrastructure is now
at risk as a result of bring your own device (BYOD) practices. Crisis organizations also
need to take these risks into consideration. Caller ID, call logs, text messaging
capabilities, online billing, and mobile devices are all points of concern when evaluating
an information security ecosystem (Cantwell, 2007). This is vital when evaluating the
crisis organization environment where 24-hour-a-day access to victims and other service
providers is essential. For many organizations, adopting comprehensive mobile security
protocols and policies does not suggest banning the technology, but rather incorporating
them with security in mind. According to the 2015 State of Endpoint Security whitepaper
from the Poneman Institute, “The biggest problem identified in this year’s research is the
negligent or careless employee with multiple mobile devices using commercial cloud
apps and working outside the office” (Poneman Institute, 2015, p. 2).
The Poneman Institute study goes on to reveal that 68% of 703 IT professionals
surveyed indicate that employee-owned mobile devices, such as Android, iPhones, and
Blackberry mobile phones, risk endpoint security (Poneman Institute, 2016). Figure 1
identifies the reasons for the rise in endpoint risk as reported by the Poneman Institute
study in 2016.
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Figure 1. Reasons for Endpoint Risk Increase as Reported by the Poneman Institute,
2016.

Unique to crisis organizations, staff and advocates are discovering that abusers are
getting savvy to technology and finding work-around solutions to track and control their
victims. For example, domestic violence abusers might give their children smartphones
installed with malicious and hidden tracking software to track their spouse (Shahani,
2014). By evaluating policies around BYOD, mobile and other endpoints security help
crisis organization to identify other points of vulnerability over which they may or may
not have control.
2.4.5

Endpoint Security

Endpoint security, including security for servers, desktops, laptops, smartphone,
printers, ATMs, and “point of sale” (PoS) devices, must also not be overlooked when
assessing the current state of information security within crisis organizations. Once again,
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the 2015 study conducted by the Poneman Institute highlighted the importance of looking
at endpoint security in any business environment (Poneman Institute, 2015). The results
relevant for this study included:
1. Employees are the greatest source of endpoint risk;
2. Mobile endpoints are an increasing target of malware;
3. Endpoint security is becoming a priority;
4. Web-borne malware attacks are increasing in frequency;
5. Adobe (e.g. Acrobat, Flash Player, Reader) (62 percent of respondents),
Oracle Java JRE (54 percent of respondents) and third-party cloud-based
productivity apps (e.g. WinZip, VLC, Vmware and VNC) are all considered
high risk;
6. Smartphones are the greatest risk to IT security; and
7. Governance and control process are the biggest gaps in preventing attacks
(Poneman Institute, 2015).
2.4.6

Monitoring and Eavesdropping Software

There is an increasing number of monitoring software applications available for
easy installation on computers, either remote or direct onto the device. Such applications
have the ability to record all e-mails, chats, instant messaging, websites visited,
keystrokes typed, and programs launched; they can also activate webcams and capture
user passwords––all of which can transmit this information from a victim to the
attacker’s device with ease and a degree of anonymity (Cantwell, 2007). Research
revealed that 75% of domestic violence organizations have indicated that they worked
with victims whose abusers eavesdrop on their conversation through hidden mobile apps
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(Shahani, 2014). As an example, Mspy is software that does location tracking, including
a map within the application that shows where the victim or staff member’s smartphone
is and even the route it took to get from point A to point B (Shahani, 2014). Mspy also
has an eavesdropping function that allows stalkers to listen in on incoming calls on their
victims’ phone.
The target gets an incoming call, that very second, their speakerphone gets
activated and starts recording. The victim doesn’t have to answer the phone. The
ringer could even be on mute, so you don’t know it’s ringing. But whatever
conversation is happening in that room — say the victim is talking with her sister
or her counselor — the smartphone feeds it back to the stalker. (Shahani, 2014,
para. 28)
The growing availability and ease of use with monitoring and eavesdropping
technologies have added to the open points of vulnerability for the crisis organizations
and the victims they serve. These technologies have the ability to put into the hands of an
abuser or trafficker safety plans, addresses, contact information, and other information––
also putting crisis organization staff at risk.
2.4.7

Online Communities

Building communities online has become a valuable tool used in every business
sector. It is not a surprise that crisis organizations and other human service agencies have
seen the importance of building online communities and using social media for visibility,
community education, information, referral services, online counseling, and advocacy
activities (Finn & Banach, 2000). For these organizations, online communities and the
social media platforms being used to facilitate them have become standard business
practice. For victims, these online communities that connect them to resources, help, and
others like them are also lifelines.

34
A 2012 study by Lovejoy and Saxton reported four categories in which the use of
social media contributes to fostering community within non-profit sectors and are
relevant in this study in crisis organizations:
1. Giving recognition and thanks;
2. Acknowledgement of current and local events;
3. Response to public rely messages; and
4. Response to solicitation. (p. 344 – 345)
Research has also shown that social media platforms used by crisis organizations
have also provided useful for online assessments, outreach to victims, victim groups,
victim art, and platforms for victim stories (Finn, 1996). “Our Facebook page is not
where clients go; it is where we try and update the community in Cambridge of what we
are doing and fundraising” (R. Mednick, personal communication, August 2015). As
preliminary research for this study, a brief analysis of the social media platforms being
used by a randomly selected group of 20 crisis organizations was conducted (see
Appendix B).
Each website varied in design, informational detail, and support available to
clients and other stakeholders online. The types of social media used also varied and
warrant additional research into how it they used, who uses them and when, and what
security measures (technical and policy) have been considered or instituted. However,
none of the websites mentioned privacy policies or practices regarding the use of social
media. Several also failed to mention privacy in regards to online donations as discussed
in section 2.4.2 Fundraising.
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There are positive attributes to building online communities, as indicated by
researchers, including broader and direct outreach, community engagement, and
survivors’ services. However, all this comes with significant risks, including threats to
personal safety, breaches of confidential information and conversations, compromises to
privacy, and challenges to service delivery (Banach & Bernat, 2000; Finn, 2000;
Waldron, Lavitt, & Kelley 2000). “Evidence from social networking sites may be the
evidentiary basis that a victim has for obtaining a protection order” (Baughman, 2010, p.
946). Also, “fraud is a widespread issue that has emerged regarding social networking
and is thus relevant when discussing the admission of social networking evidence”
(Baughman, 2010, p. 953). As breaches and security flaws through these channels
continue to mount, crisis organizations evaluate the risks versus the benefits. Do the
benefits of social media outweigh the risks to privacy, data, and reputation? Many
organizations suspect malicious activity is happening on their network and/or in social
media accounts. However, they do not have the skills or tools to recognize it and would
not know how to address it (L. Montanaro, personal communication August 2015).
2.4.8

Privacy

Privacy is the ability to control the circumstances in which personal, identifiable
information is captured and used (Hoy & Phelps, 2009, p. 72). To support fundraising
activities, community engagement, and victims’ services, crisis organizations rely on the
gathering of personal information from donors, volunteers, stakeholders, and victims in
person and online. However, any organization that collects personal information direct or
indirect has a responsibility to keep that information secure, which is a key area to
understanding the current state of information security within crisis organizations.
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“Although online consumer privacy has been an important issue for the commercial and
regulatory realm, non-profits did not begin to address these issues until much later” (Hoy
& Phelps, 2009, p. 72).
For victims of violence and the staff working with them, adding layers of trauma,
stress, and urgency brings additional challenges to issues of privacy and services. Some
crisis organizations may assume the information they are collecting would not appear to
be attractive to malicious actors (Rezgui, Bouguettaya, & Eltoweissy, 2003). However,
when looking at the risk through a wider lens, the information does present targets for
attack. To illustrate this further, a brief analysis of the areas within the crisis
organizations vulnerable to privacy intrusion was conducted. Though the headings
compiled for this list came from a research study conducted by Eltoweissy, Rezgui, and
Bouguettaya (2003), the analysis was customized for the objectives of this study and to
address the unique characteristics of information security within crisis organizations.
Access Control is the act of identifying other points of access when the focus is
on direct victim services may result in a vulnerability point not previously considered.
For example, what if a malicious actor were to gain access to an organization’s donor list,
including names, addresses, emails, credit cards, and other details? The processing of
donations and other business functions through their websites present a risk that can be
enormous and fatal for some crisis organizations. The consequences are even more
important when the attack target is a system containing sensitive information about
groups of people. For example, “In 2000, a hacker penetrated a Seattle hospital’s
computer network, extracting files containing information on more than 5,000 patients”
(Rezgui, Bouguettaya, & Eltoweissy, 2003, p. 4).
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The Collection of Data occurs when crisis organizations are unaware of how and
when their information is being collected. Harvesting user data and patterns; indirectly
collecting information can paint both accurate and inaccurate portrayals of users (Rezgui,
Bouguettaya, & Eltoweissy, 2003).
Information Brokers are individuals, attackers, or distributed information brokers
who collect personal and identifying information. These brokers can obtain information,
such as the current address of a victim. Information can be purchased in bulk, or
requested by brokers using the “darknet.” An abundance of information is available free
on the Internet through courts and other organizations as a matter of public information
(Cantwell, 2007).
2.4.9

Trust

For non-profits, in particular crisis organizations, trust “lies in the heart of
charity” (Sargennt & Lee, 2002, pg. 68) Trust is essential; however, the privacy concerns
and risks in relationship to information security have the potential to undermine trust
(Hoy & Phelps, 2009, p. 72). In its 1998 report Privacy Online: A Report to Congress,
the FTC described accepted fair information practice principles of Notice, Choice,
Access, and Security (Federal Trade Commission, 2000, pg. i). Relevant for this study,
under the Notice principal, the report stated:
The Web sites would be required to provide consumers clear and conspicuous
notice of their information practices, including what information they collect, how
they collect it (e.g., directly or through non-obvious means such as cookies), how
they use it, how they provide Choice, Access, and Security to consumers, whether
they disclose the information collected to other entities, and whether other entities
are collecting information through the site. (Federal Trade Commission, 2000, pg.
iii)
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Intrusions or breaches in physical security, information security, and privacy can
have dramatic impact on the trust held across staff, volunteers, victims, and the
community, thereby affecting services to victims. In addition, compromises in trust can
influence donors to give and victim to use the services offered by organization (Hoy &
Phelps, 2009, p. 80). A 2002 study reported that the reasons why donors stop giving to
non-profit organizations is a “perceived lack of trustworthiness” (Hoy & Phelps, 2009, p.
80). As a result, situations, such as information security breaches and attacks, that
comprise trust in crisis organizations can have direct impact to the organization to service
victims, to raise funds, and stay in business. Therefore, the importance of trust cannot be
minimized in any environment missioned to protect and save lives.
2.4.10 Other Risks
In recent years, the conversations around digital security, privacy, confidentiality,
and the mass collection of information have increased. For this study, crisis organizations
were asked to inventory the existing technologies they use. This list was formulated from
the preliminary research for this study and the outline of risks detailed below:
1. Facsimile machines operate through telephone lines that can be compromised,
often include sender details on the receiving transmission, and in some cases
keep a log of sent and received faxes on the device; all create points of data
breach vulnerabilities.
2. Teletypewriters (TTYs) provide assistance to clients and others with hearing
impairments by providing text-based phones. If used by a crisis organization,
it is important to consider how the content and logs of those conversations are
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being stored. In some cases, attackers can use this technology to impersonate a
victim (Cantwell, 2007).
3. Global Positioning Systems (GPS) make it easy for an attacker to monitor
location(s) of their victim(s) as well as staff. “Counselors in St. Paul, MN had
to call the police when an abuser banged on the safe house doors; he had
tracked down his wife using GPS” (Shahani, 2014, para. 12).
4. Webcams are a standard built-in feature on many phones, laptops, and desktop
devices. However, it is easy for abusers to turn on these cameras from remote
locations. Often undetected, the give the abuser the capability of conducting
video surveillance targeting their victim.
5. The Internet of Things (IoT) is the “networked interconnection of everyday
objects, which are often equipped with ubiquitous intelligence” (Xia, Yang,
Wang, & Vinel, 2012, pg. 1101). Conversations concerning the benefits and
risks of IoT are just beginning in the security community. However, the flux
of technologies across all aspects of life “leads to a highly distributed network
of devices communicating with human beings as well as other devices” (Xia,
Yang, Wang, & Vinel, 2012, pg. 1101). These connections need to be taken
into consideration for information security within crisis organizations.
2.5

Opportunities for Improvement

Researchers, security experts, and technology companies offer users numerous
tips, checklists, and suggestions to improve their security online. A consistent and
significant theme throughout is the importance of increasing awareness, training, and
ongoing education to improve information security within any business environment. For
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the purpose of this study and summarized from preliminary research in this area, the
following were determined as baseline theories and methods appropriate for crisis
organizations to improve information security:
1.

Dispel the myth that security is 100% effective 100% of the time;

2.

Direct staff, victims, and stakeholders on how to evaluate at their individual
security, including protecting personal information, email, deleting traces of
web access, personal firewalls, remailers, trace removers, encryption, and
anonymizers (Rezgui, Bouguettaya & Eltoweissy, 2003);

3.

Investigate network security solutions including VPNS, firewalls, IDS/IPS
technologies;

4.

Understand motives for attacks. Even though the reasons may not be
obvious, some crisis organizations can be targeted for attack because of
information that is attractive in a commercial market, thereby breaking a trust
network in the community, or for their contact database (Leach, 2014);

5.

Keep pace with technology. Determining whether the computer systems
(hardware and software) are up-to-date is a point of future research;

6.

Assume an attack will happen. Organizations or individuals cannot prepare
for every possible scenario lurking in a malicious attacker’s mind, so keeping
abreast of trends and risks is part of the challenge;

7.

Invest in protection that is reasonable for the risks. Crisis organizations may
overlook the fact that, like other NGOs, they exist because of financial
contributions and donations from individuals and institutions. As mentioned
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previous, this makes the organizations and their donors easy targets for
malicious actors (Leach, 2014);
8.

Build ongoing awareness and education and training programs for staff,
survivors, and stakeholders who interact with the crisis organizations;

9.

Identify and work to remove the weak links in the security landscape;

10. Educate staff and victims on different technologies, their use, the potential
risks, and how to be safe. For example, personal devices are anything that
connects to the Internet, including servers, tablets, cellphones, computers,
printers, copiers, and fax machines. Opportunities for future research include
educating non-technical users within crisis organization on remote
management features, anti-virus solutions, browser and application
protections, lock and erase functions, password management, device and
software maintenance, and procedures to follow when anomalies are
detected;
11. Connect. Connection refers to how, when, and where a device connects
online which will determine the level of protection needed and what could be
at risk. One aspect of research is determining if the organization is
knowledgeable as to the risks and rewards of using VPNs and other privacyprotecting technologies;
12. Identify vulnerabilities. Email has become a standard in communications and
often a certain point of vulnerability either from a possible data breach or a
violation of privacy policies. For example, using a service that automatically

42
strips IP location and metadata information could provide protection to the
crisis organization and the people they serve (Deflin, 2015); and
13. Implement the use of electronic documents, which require a digital vault to
keep critical information safe from eavesdroppers or malicious hackers.
2.6

Summary

Like other businesses, crisis organizations are not safe from current or future
information security attacks or breaches. However, since many attacks have not been
detected or reported, it is safe to assume that it is only a matter of time. Research in other
business sectors and the broader view of non-profits has documented the activities of
malicious attackers to disrupt websites, intercept emails, spam, send malware/viruses,
harass people, create false messages for help, and impersonate individuals. (McGregor,
2014; Peterson, 2015) “Data about more than 120 million people has been compromised
in more than 1,100 separate breaches at organizations handling protected health
data since 2009” (Peterson, 2015, para. 2).
This initial review of the crisis organization environment addressed a few
vulnerabilities to illustrate the complexities and challenges they face. However, other
challenges exist for both non-profit and crisis organizations that “struggle to acquire and
maintain information and communication technologies because of high prices for the
products themselves and the costs of training personnel” (Technology & Human
Trafficking, 2011, para. 24). As the results of this study are examined in the following
chapters and future research in this area commences, it will become evident that
identifying the current state of information security benefits both the crisis organizations
and the victims they serve by providing them with increased awareness, experience, and
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knowledge with security technologies, policies, and behaviors that improve physical and
online safety. For example, by not understanding the risks associated with using HTTPS
web content or by clicking “TRUST” when a certificate authority cannot be validated
puts staff and users at risk for eavesdropping and tracking.
The analysis of crisis organization environment, within the scope of this study,
has begun. However, continued research is needed to better understand the unique
characteristics of these organizations in regards to information security and advancing
technologies.
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CHAPTER 3. CONCEPTUAL MODEL

This chapter outlines the conceptual model for this study to address the gaps between
actual and ideal states of information security preparedness within crisis organizations. In
addition to the preliminary research, literature, and general media review conducted, this
initial analysis includes excerpts from in-person communication with the following:
1. Risa Mednick, Executive Director of Transition House Domestic Violence
Shelter;
2. Lauren Montanaro, Residential Advocate for REACH Beyond Domestic
Violence;
3. Kaofeng Lee, Deputy Director of the Safety Net Project and the National
Network to End Domestic Violence;
4. Leah Treitman, Program Coordinator at Thorn;
5. Delaney Workman, Demand Abolition Social Innovation Coordinator at
Hunter Alternatives; and
6. Dhakir Warren, Senior Manager, Social Innovation at Hunter Alternatives in
Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Their direct knowledge of crisis organizations and the challenges faced due to
advancements in technology provided useful insights to the approach for this study and
continued research and development of tools, processes, and strategies in this area.
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3.1

Crisis Organizations Defined

With the minimal amount of research available on the information security
ecosystem of crisis organizations, a preliminary research of two crisis organizations in
the Boston, MA area was conducted. First, Transition House, a 501(3) non-profit
domestic violence shelter and resource center has been serving survivors in Cambridge,
MA since 1997 (Transition House, n.d.). The organization offers “a full circle of housing
and holistic support for adults and children overcoming the trauma of family and partner
violence” (Transition House, n.d.). As with other crisis organizations, Transition House
provides safety planning, community education, and youth peer mentoring on healthy
relationship development to help prevent the cycles of abuse (Transition House, n.d.).
Conversations in preparation for this study were conducted with Risa Mednick, Executive
Director of Transition House in March 2015, June 2015, and August 2015. According to
Mednick, Transition House is facing two predominant challenges regarding information
security:
1. “When working with victims of violence and crisis, we are working in the
present psychological trauma. Teasing out how technology is playing a role is
even more difficult.”
2. “We are equally at risk as the people we serve when they enter our space
physically and online. I think that is often forgotten in a digital space” (R.
Mednick, personal communication, June 2015).
The second organization included in this study was REACH Beyond Domestic
Violence, serving 27 communities in the Boston, MA area. REACH’s mission is to
“advance the safety, healing and empowerment of those who experience domestic or
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relationship violence through direct services and education while promoting social justice
for individuals and families of all backgrounds” (Reach Ma | Building Healthy
Communities by Ending Domestic Violence, n.d.). REACH’s executive director, Laura
Van Zandt, provided an introduction to Lauren Montanaro, Residential Advocate as the
point of contact for these initial conversations in June and August 2015. REACH’s top
priority is having access to safe, affordable housing for survivors, then focusing on help
survivors manage finances including disability checks, job searches, and child care (L.
Montanaro, personal communication, June 2015).
Continuing, Montanaro identified several challenges to helping organizations
understand information security. For example, “getting people (within and outside the
organization) to take the issue of cyber security seriously; survivors and staff often
dismiss the risk they bring to the shelter through their devices” (L. Montanaro, personal
communication, June 2015). Second, “staff does not feel confident to talk about
technology and security, so they do not,” leaving the organization, the staff and the
survivors at risk (L. Montanaro, personal communication, June 2015).
In addition, initial discussions with representatives from Thorn and Demand
Abolition confirmed that organizations working with victims of human trafficking and
sexual exploitation share the viewpoints expressed above. Follow-up conversations with
all of these organizations will continue through this study and as research and
development continues.
3.2

Opportunities

As discussed in Chapter 1, recognized standards and frameworks to assist in
assessing and improving information security within businesses of all sizes and in various
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sectors are available. By using a recognized and respected framework not only provides
organizations with a roadmap to follow, but also common language to use in follow-up
conversations with researchers and security professionals. However, navigating through
the technical language and complexities of these recognized standards and frameworks
may prove to be overwhelming for crisis organizations challenged with limited staff,
minimal budgets, and inadequate knowledge of information security terminology and
systems.
The number of possible outcomes when using a robust framework can be
enormous and span a wide array of areas of opportunity. However, in alignment with the
objectives and scope of this study in identified the gaps of information security
preparedness within crisis organizations, three key opportunities for using the NIST CSF
have been identified. First, to establish the ideal state of information security as the
baseline for the gap analysis begins with building trust and confidence. Using the
terminology and flow of the framework for this and ongoing research initiated that
process with crisis organizations while increasing their familiarity of what is needed to be
secure (NIST, 2014). Second, by using the NIST framework, the risks, opportunities, and
priorities for improving their current state of information security were identified through
the gap analysis. Last, this gap analysis process identified the core baseline of an
information security assessment tool for crisis organizations to use with efficiency and
success.
Researchers from Alien Vault offer a useful list of 10 tips to help non-profit
organizations. However, the research failed to provide this information through the lens
of non-profits working with victims of violence (Biswas, 2015). Also, Confidentiality and
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Sexual Violence Survivors: A Toolkit for State Coalitions (2005) offered additional
useful questions for crisis organizations to consider. This study and future research
examined these and other “checklists” to determine which ones best suited the
environment of crisis organizations. As an example, the following list was adapted from
current research and was incorporated into the data collection for this study:
1. Have a plan;
2. Decide what information is critical;
3. Design backup systems;
4. Create education and training programs;
5. Stay current with technology, threats, and behaviors so that policies and
systems can keep step;
6. Invest in security technologies such as firewalls, encryption solutions, VPNs,
etc.
7. Restrict access to help reduce risk that may be inherent in someone not
remaining aware; and
8. Secure the entire environment including wireless networks, BYOD policies,
and ways to monitoring staff security behaviors (Biswas, 2015)
(Confidentiality and Sexual Violence Survivors, 2005).
3.3

Research Focus and Gap Analysis

In the 2012 NNEDV survey, crisis organizations identified their top concerns
regarding the use of technology in their agencies. The results included:
1. Survivor use of social media and Skype thereby compromising security,
location, and safety of the organization;
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2. Survivor sharing identifying details on Facebook and other social media
platforms;
3. Survivor making public statements online that could have a negative effect on
the organization;
4. Staff setting appropriate boundaries when using social media;
5. Mobile devices use in the shelter with GPS locators; and
6. Residents using mobile devices at the shelters (NNEDV, 2012).
However, what was lacking in this survey was a holistic view of the state of
information security within domestic violence, stalking, and human trafficking crisis
organizations. As a result, the focus of this study was to analyze the gaps between
absolute and relative levels of information security preparedness using best practices
inspired by a recognized and respected framework. Through this focused effort and
exploration of the gaps, this study reported on potential factors that correlated to
information security preparedness such as organization type, the level of funding,
division of labor with respect to information security policy implementation, and the
number of security tools used within the organization. In addition, due to the lack of
research with regards to information security within crisis organizations, this study also
identified the characteristics of crisis organizations (e.g. funding, lack of resources, lack
of knowledge) associated with the gap.
3.4

Summary

Research has shown the emphasis and importance of victims’ use of technology
and the complexities involving technologies, policies, and human behavior. Research also
demonstrated a minimal focus on the unique characteristics of organizations working
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with victims of violence. This research has the potential to provide benefits to society by
identifying the risks, opportunities, and priorities crisis organizations can address to
improve their current state of information security as measured against a recognized
standard. As crisis organizations develop the ability to defend against attacks, an added
potential benefit is increasing knowledge of information security and awareness among
the victims they work with every day.
Researchers and security experts have overlooked crisis organizations working
with victims of domestic violence, human trafficking, and stalking. With the growing
threat landscape across all industries, the rise in victims of violence around the world and
the prevalence of technology in society, the need to conduct research at the organizational
level is urgent. As observed by the author at the 2015 NNEDV Technology Summit,
crisis organizations are making some efforts to understand technology, policies, laws, and
behaviors that are putting survivors at risk in a digital domain. However, this research
took are more comprehensive view by identifying the current state of information
security within crisis organizations to identify risks, opportunities for improvement, and
priorities providing them with next steps for action.

51

CHAPTER 4. METHODOLOGY

Current research has revealed an emphasis on victim use of technology, with
minimal focus on the information security in crisis organizations. The urgency for this
research is evident in conversations with domestic violence organizations attending the
National Network to End Domestic Violence (July 2015) and personal conversations with
representatives from Transition House, NNEDV, Thorn, REACH Beyond Domestic
Violence, and Demand Abolition (K. Lee, personal communication, September 2015; R.
Mednick, personal communication, August 2015; L. Montanaro, personal
communication, August 2015; L. Treitman, personal communication, September 2015;
D. Workman & D. Warren, personal communication, October 2015). As a result, this
chapter provides a description of the research design, procedures, and analysis conducted
for this study. The methodologies chosen for this study support the research goal to
identify the gaps between a theoretical maximum level of information security and the
observed level of information security in any given organization, as well as, audiences for
which the results of this study could impact. It explored the gaps by examining the
absolute and relative levels of information security preparedness using three functions of
the NIST CSF, which are Identify, Protect, and Respond (NIST, 2014). The methodology
also allowed for characteristics of crisis organizations under the context of information
security to be documented for this and future research.
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4.1

Research Protocol

This study identified the current state of information security of a subset of crisis
organizations by observing and reporting their actual versus ideal state of information
security preparedness using the NIST CSF (NIST, 2014). An exploratory methodology
was selected to meet the research objectives of documenting the gap between actual and
ideal security policies and procedures within crisis organizations; the gap between crisis
organizations who provide services to different categories of victims (e.g. domestic
violence, human trafficking, etc.); and the gap across dimensions of security as identified
by the NIST CSF. The study also explored whether security preparedness is associated
with the application of information security solutions while identifying characteristics of
crisis organizations lacking in current research. Challenges did occur when working with
organizations in remote locations in the US, but were overcome because of the
commitment to this study by representatives at NNEDV, Thorn, and Demand Abolition.
As a result, the author was able to enlist a substantive pool of respondents that represent
the domains identified for this study.
4.2
4.2.1

Procedures

Survey Development

The survey for this study was modeled using the 2012 survey conducted by the
National Network to End Domestic Violence (NNEDV) and the NIST CSF (NIST, 2014).
As part of the research protocol, participating organizations were required to agree to an
online consent form and commit to answering all questions. The survey was designed
using Qualtrics Survey Software (see Appendix C). Throughout this study, there was an
emphasis on the intersection of technology, policies, and people as also supported by the
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NIST CSF core functions of Identify, Protect, and Respond (NIST, 2014). The functions
of the NIST CSF were not included; Detect and Recovery were identified as outside the
scope of this study because of the complexity of the subcategories and the level of
technical knowledge required for respondents to comprehend (NIST, 2014).
The sections of the NIST CSF included in the draft and final survey development
were:
1. Identify (ID):
a. Asset Management (ID.AM): The data, personnel, devices, systems, and
facilities that enable the organization to achieve business purposes are
identified and managed consistent with their relative importance to
business objectives and the organization’s risk strategy; subcategories 1, 2,
3, 5, and 6.
b. Business Environment (ID.BE): The organization’s mission, objectives,
stakeholders, and activities are understood and prioritized; this
information is used to inform cybersecurity roles, responsibilities, and risk
management decisions; subcategories 3 and 4.
c. Governance (ID.GV): The policies, procedures, and processes to manage
and monitor the organization’s regulatory, legal, risk, environmental, and
operational requirements are understood and inform the management of
cybersecurity risk; including subcategories 1 and 2.
d. Risk Management Strategy (ID.RM): The organization’s priorities,
constraints, risk tolerances, and assumptions are established and used to
support operational risk decision; including subcategory 1.
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2. Protect (PR):
a. Access Control (PR.AC): Access to assets and associated facilities is
limited to authorized users, processes, or devices, and to authorized
activities and transactions; including subcategory 1.
b. Awareness and Training (PR.AT): The organization’s personnel and
partners are provided with cybersecurity awareness education and are
adequately trained to perform their information security-related duties
and responsibilities consistent with related policies, procedures, and
agreements; including subcategories 1 and 2.
c. Information Protection Processes and Procedures (PR.IP): Security
policies (addressing purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management
commitment, and coordination among organizational entities), processes,
and procedures are maintained and used to manage the protection of
information systems and assets; subcategories 6.
3. Response (RS):
a. Response Planning (RS.RP): Response processes and procedures are
executed and maintained, to ensure timely response to detected
cybersecurity events; subcategory 1.
As discussed above, the following functions in the NIST CSF were not included
in the final survey; however, they will be incorporated in future research:
4. Identify (ID): Risk Assessment (ID.RA)
5. Protect (PR): Data Security (PR.DS), Maintenance (PR.MA), and Protective
Technology (PR.PT)
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6. Detect (DE): Anomalies and Events (DE.AE), Security Continuous
Monitoring (DE.SC), and Detection Process (DE.DP)
7. Response (RS): Communications (RS.CO), Analysis (RS.AN), Mitigation
(RS.MI), and Improvements (RS.IM)
8. Recovery (RC): Recovery Planning (RC.RP), Improvements (RC.IM), and
Communications (RC.CO) (NIST, 2014).
4.2.2

Snowball Sample

The sample for this study was identified using the snowball sample method, a
technique that helps to reach hard-to-find populations (Atkinson & Flint, 2001). Snowball
sampling benefits from established social networks of identified respondents providing a
wide set of potential contacts and from being placed within a larger set of connectiontracking methodologies (Spreen, 1992; Thomson, 1997). The sample was identified with
the research objectives for this study in mind, along with pre-defined groups and subgroups as identified outside the view of the author to protect the anonymity of the
respondents. The sample for this study was representative of the databases of NNEDV,
Thorn, and Demand Abolition, but was not intended to be a pure sample, only the best
method of engaging while protecting their identities. NNEDV, Thorn, and Demand
Abolition met the criteria for inclusion in this study, as the aim of this study was
“primarily explorative, qualitative, and descriptive, then the snowball sample offers
practical advantages” (Atkinson and Flint, 2001, pg. 2). Though snowball sampling is
typically conducted using interviews, a survey was used for this study. For future
research, the snowball sample may be applied to a more formal methodology for making
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inferences about the sample of crisis organizations (Faugier & Sergeant, 1997; Snijders,
1992).
4.2.3

Institutional Review Board (IRB)

As stated above, both the draft survey used with the pilot review and the final
survey distributed to crisis organizations were constructed using the 2012 NNEDV
survey and the NIST CSF (NIST, 2014). To ensure participants in the study were
protected, an IRB application and a formal consent form based on the IRB template were
submitted for review and approval (see Appendix D). After the completion of the pilot
review using the Delphia approach with two rounds of review (Hsu & Sanford, 2007), an
amendment to the original application was submitted, reviewed, and approved (see
Appendix D).
4.2.4

Pilot Review

The pilot group reviewed the draft of general survey for clarity, consistency, and
ease of use for the organizations identified in this study. The pilot review began with the
recruitment of 20 subject matter experts spanning information security and crisis
organizations (see Appendix E for a list of subject matter experts). These experts were
determined by the author, by authorship of journals, and prior identification of expertise
in this field. For this process, it was their mission to review the survey for clarity,
consistency, and ease of use for the general sample identified in this study. The pilot
review used the Delphia approach with two rounds of review (Hsu & Sandford, 2007).
Round one commenced by sending an email (see Appendix G for the round one email),
which included instructions regarding the role and responsibilities as a pilot survey
reviewer, a link to the online survey in Qualtrics, the survey in PDF form (see Appendix
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H), and an evaluation sheet attachment to record their feedback (see Appendix F). After
acknowledging agreement to the consent form, the participant took the survey and filled
out the evaluation form during or immediately following review of the online survey.
Pilot reviewers then sent their feedback forms back to the author for compiling and
distribution for the second round of review.
For round two, reviewers received a second email (see Appendix I). This included
the results from the first round (see Appendix J). At this time in the process, all reviewers
were asked to provide additional thoughts and feedback based on the responses of the
other participants. When comments from round two were received, participation from
the pilot reviewers was complete and the final survey was updated (see Appendix K).
4.2.5

Survey

To initiate the survey, an email invitation (see Appendix L) and link to the online
survey were sent to crisis organizations listed in databases owned and managed by
NNEDV, Thorn, and Demand Abolition. Based on information provided by these
organizations, it was estimated that 700 crisis organizations were contacted for this study.
At the start of the survey on Qualtrics, each participant was required to read and agreeing
to an online consent form. The respondent was considered the participant. After
acknowledging agreement to the online consent form, the participant took the survey. At
the end of the survey, the participant’s involvement was complete. The data needed to
conduct the gap analysis detailed in Chapter 5 were the responses to the survey from
participants.
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4.3

Participants

The above procedures relied on the open and active participation of the selected
pilot review and representatives from NNEDV, Thorn, and Demand Abolition, as well as
the survey respondents. If any individual or organization chose not to participate at any
point in the study, they could have done so without repercussions. As previously stated,
procedures outlined took into consideration the comfort level and time limitation of the
crisis organization staff. Individuals and organizations who participated in this study did
not receive compensation; however, they were recognized for their participation in the
final report.
4.3.1 Pilot Review Participants
Selection of pilot review participants was based on expertise in crisis
organizations, information security, NIST CSF, and non-profit organizations. They were
contacted via email and telephone to participate as a pilot survey reviewer (see Appendix
G). Invitations to 20 potential pilot review participants were sent; of the 20 invitations
sent, 13 agreed to participate in the review process (see Appendix E for a list of pilot
reviewers). Participants were high or executive-level decision makers in their
organizations, therefore they did not require additional permission to participate in this
study. Their expertise and opinions were necessary for this initial review of the general
survey. The researcher had all necessary contact information of the pilot reviewers and
communication throughout this study.
As outlined in the methodology section above, participants in the pilot review
were individually invited via email (see Appendix G). The researcher sent an email to
each participant with instructions for completing the evaluation, a link to the online
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survey, a PDF copy of the final survey (see Appendix K), and the evaluation form (see
Appendix F). This email reiterated that participation was voluntary and could be
concluded at any time by the participant without repercussion (see Appendix G). The
email indicated that there were potential benefits to current and future crisis organizations
by assessing the current state of information security against an established framework in
information security (see Appendix G). Participants were given 10 business days to
respond in round one. For round two, participants were given a deadline to update the
original response or provide additional feedback (see Appendix I). No response in round
two indicated no change in the participant’s initial feedback provided in round one. To
initiate round one, participants logged into a survey on Qualtrics. Upon arriving at the
Qualtrics site, participants were required to read through the consent form and select that
they agreed to the consent form before answering or reviewing any questions in the
survey and filling out the evaluation form (see Appendix F).
4.3.2

Survey Participants

The survey participants for this study included US-based crisis organizations
providing direct and indirect services to victims of violence. These organizations are
owned and managed in databases from NNEDV, Thorn, and Demand Abolition. The
inclusion criteria were people employed by direct or coordinated service organizations
working with victims of violence identified by NNEDV, Thorn, and Demand Abolition.
Representatives from NNEDV, Thorn, and Demand Abolition National facilitated the
distribution of the general survey by forwarding via email the invitation to participate and
the link to the online survey (see Appendix L). The invitation included instructions for
the online survey noting that their participation was voluntary and that they were
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welcome to opt out of the survey at any time with no repercussions (see Appendix L).
The invitation stated that the study sought input from organizations working with victims
of domestic violence, stalking, and human trafficking in the United States (see Appendix
L). Additional validation if the organization responding was US-based was not conducted
for this study as it was foundational in scope. The invitation outlined potential benefits to
current and future crisis organizations by identifying the current state of information
security with an established framework in cybersecurity (see Appendix L). Two reminder
emails were provided to NNEDV, Thorn, and Demand Abolition for their databases (see
Appendix L). Based on initial discussions with representatives from these organizations,
the total number of survey participants was estimated to be 700 crisis organizations (K.
Lee, personal communication, September 2015; L. Treitman, personal communication,
September 2015; D. Workman & D. Warren, personal communication, October 2015).
As with pilot reviewers, all survey participants logged into a survey on Qualtrics
and were required to read the consent form and select that they agreed to the consent
form before answering any questions in the survey.
4.4

Literature and General Media Review

Monitoring research, literature, and general media in the domain of domestic
violence, human trafficking, and stalking was conducted and as relates to the objectives
of this study. In addition, academic and general media key word and content searches
were conducted on the non-profit sector, not specific to crisis organizations, to ensure
relevant information within the scope of this study and future research was included.
Results from the literature and general media review were reported in Chapter 2.
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CHAPTER 5. GAP ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

The purpose of this study was to identify the current state of information security
within crisis organizations by examining the gaps between a theoretical maximum level
of information security and the observed level of information security preparedness. This
study measured and explored these gaps by looking at absolute and relative levels of
information security preparedness using three functions of best practices inspired by a
recognized and respected framework – the NIST Cybersecurity Framework (see
Appendix B for framework details). To report on these gaps and therefore, identify the
current state of information security within crisis organizations, data from survey
respondents was gathered using Qualtrics Survey Software (see Appendix N for detailed
survey results). The data was then analyzed, in support of the research objectives for this
study, in three core areas. First, as a result of the lack of research in this area, the study
provided foundational content for this and future research by documenting the
characteristics of crisis organizations through an explanatory. Second, a gap analysis was
conducted measuring respondent data against an information security preparedness index
developed for this study using the NIST Cybersecurity Framework (NIST, 2014). Third,
exploratory analysis was also conducted providing additional insights to the current state
of information security within crisis organizations again for this study and as a
foundation for ongoing research.
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5.1

Survey Respondents Summary

As indicated in Chapter 4, the sample for this study was identified using the
snowball sample method and support from NNEDV, Thorn, and Demand Abolition.
Based on communication with representatives from NNDEV, Thorn, and Demand
Abolition, the link to the online survey was distributed the estimated sample of between
500 and 700 crisis organizations, coalitions, agencies, and centers within the US. From
this estimated sample, 222 participants clicked on the survey link. Out of those, 221
agreed to the online consent form in question one thereby beginning the survey. One
participant opted out of the study for an unknown reason. As a result, the study began
with 221 respondents who consented to take the survey. After initial review of the survey
data, it was discovered that 63 of the 221 consenting respondents did not answer any of
the survey questions and therefore were not included in the analysis. In addition, though
15 respondents who consented to taking the survey did not answer all questions, to
support the objectives of this study every answer provided by a consenting respondent
was included. Therefore, the sample for this study included survey respondents who
consented, but did not answer all questions (15 respondents) plus respondents who
consented and answered all questions (143 respondents) for a total of 158 respondents.
The forthcoming analysis was based on N = 158 possible respondents. Refer to Table 2
for a summary of the number of survey respondents and Appendix M for complete survey
respond details.
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Table 2. Survey Respondents Summary
Survey Activity
Number of Respondents
Clicked on the survey link
222
Selected “Do Not Consent”
1
Selected “Consent”
221
Consented; Did Not Answer Any Questions
63
Consented; Not All Questions Answered
15
Consented; Answered All Survey Questions
143
Note: N = 158 comprised of Consented; not all Questions Answered plus Consented;
Answered All Survey Questions

5.2

Characteristics of Crisis Organizations

As a result of the lack of research regarding information security within crisis
organizations and the foundational focus of this study, this section examines the
characteristics of crisis organizations essential for this and future research. To support the
research objective and to examine the factors (e.g. funding, lack of resources, and lack of
knowledge) associated with the gap analysis, the analysis incorporated response data
from three survey questions. These questions included:
1. What type(s) of victims or survivors does your organization serve?
2. What is the size of your organization?
3. What is the total annual budget of your organization?
5.2.1

Type of Victims Served

First, of the 158 total survey respondents, 157 choose to answer the question,
what type(s) of victims or survivors does your organization serve? Respondents were
provided the opportunity to select all the services that apply through pre-set check box
options. There were also offered the opportunity to answer “Other” and provide a fillingin response. Some of pre-set options respondents could choose from included domestic
violence, stalking, human trafficking, and sexual abuse. Initial review of the data
indicated that out of the 157 respondents, 83.4% (131 respondents) reported servicing
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more than one type of victim. In addition, Table 3 illustrates that 96% survey respondents
serving victims and survivors of domestic violence with 73% servicing victims of sexual
assault and 70% servicing victims of stalking.
Table 3. Type(s) of Services Provided by Crisis Organizations
Type of Service(s)
Domestic Violence
Sexual Assault
Stalking
Human Trafficking
Refugee
Other

# of Responses
151
116
111
86
23
20

% of Respondents
96%
73%
70%
54%
15%
13%

Other types of organizations also reported included adult protective services and services
for homeless, immigrants, and victims of child sexual abuse (see Appendix N for fill-in
response details).
5.2.2

Size of the Organization by Resource Type

The size of crisis organizations participating in the study also provided an
important foundational content for this and future research. Survey respondents were
asked to identify the size of their organization by if they have full-time employees, parttime employees, and volunteers. Respondent selected the appropriate category(ies) for
their organization then were provided an opportunity to specify the number of people in
their organization by category. As with organizations who responded to what type of
services provided, out of 158 possible respondents, 156 organizations answered this
question. Therefore, out of the sample (n = 156), 97% reported having full-time
employees, 88% reported having volunteers, and 83% reported part-time employees.
Refer to Table 4 for details on responses by type of staff.
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Table 4. Number of Responses by Type of Staff
# of Responses % of Respondents
Full-Time Employees
152
97%
Volunteers
137
88%
Part-Time Employees
129
83%
As illustrated in Table 5, the frequency of respondents who reported having all
three categories, full-time, part-time, and volunteers, dominated the results with a total of
118. A minimal number of respondents reported having only full-time (10 respondents)
or only part-time (1 respondent) employees. No crisis organizations participating in this
study reported being staffed only with volunteers. However, 17 respondents reported
having both full-time employees and volunteers with no part-time employees. Refer to
Table 5 for details regarding the frequency of responses reporting full-time employees,
part-time employees, and volunteers.
Table 5. Frequency of Responses by Type of Staff

117

0.74

74.05

Cumulative
Percentage
Frequency
(c.%f)
74.05

FT Only

10

0.06

6.33

80.38

PT Only

1

0.01

0.63

81.01

Volunteers Only

0

0.00

0.00

81.01

FT and PT

8

0.05

5.06

86.08

FT and Volunteers

17

0.11

10.76

96.84

PT and Volunteers

3
156

0.02
1.00

1.90
100.00

98.73

Frequency
of Score
(f)
All

Relative
Frequency
(f/n)

Percentage
Frequency
(%f)

Further analysis of the number (fill-in) of full-time employees, part-time
employees, and volunteers reported by survey respondents provided additional
explanatory data for this and future studies. Out of the sample (n = 156) crisis
organizations 154 organizations completed the fill-in section of this question. The
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maximum number of employees and volunteers reported was 900 with the minimum
being 1. The first and third interquartile range for this data reported 17 for the first
quartile and 81 for the third quartile with no outliers observed. Additional observation of
the data revealed that 90 crisis organizations reported having a total organizational size of
50 employees or less (see Figure 2). Of 154 organizations who responded, 19% (30
respondents) reported an organizational size greater than 100 combined staff including
full-time employees, part-time employees, and volunteers illustrating that the majority of
crisis organizations in this study have a staff of less than 100.

# of Orgaizations

Number of Employees and Volunteers
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0

90

34
18

1-50

51-100

101 - 200

12

over 200

Total Number of Full-Time, Part-Time, and Volunteers

Figure 2. The size of crisis organizations as organized by total number of full-time
employees, part-time employees, and volunteers.

5.2.3

Budget Size

The final characteristic of crisis organizations examined was the size of budgets
within crisis organizations. Responses from the survey question, what is the total annual
budget for your organization, provided an important initial look at the amount of
financial resources available to crisis organizations and how it compares with information
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security preparedness. Respondents were required to select only one budget range. Of the
sample (N = 158), 55 (35%) reported annual budgets between $1,000,000 and $4,999,999
with 25 (16%) reporting between $500,000 and $999,999. In addition, although all
respondents in the sample answered this question, 26 (16%) respondents selected “Do
Not Know,” a point that will be addressed further in the discussion section of this study.
Refer to Table 6 for a summary annual budget size from all respondents.
Table 6. Annual Budget Size
# of Responses
% of Respondents
$1,000,000- $4,999,999
55
35%
Do Not Know
26
16%
$500,000 - $999,999
25
16%
$150,000 - $349,999
15
9%
$350,000 - $499,999
11
7%
$75,000 - $149,000
11
7%
Greater than $5,000,000
9
6%
Less than $75,000
6
4%
Total
158
100%
In summary, the data provided by survey respondents with regards to the type(s)
of services provided by the organization, the size of the organization based on full-time
employees, part-time employees, and volunteers, and annual budget allowed for the
examination of these factors against the information security preparedness index and
exploratory analysis. However, it also set the initial baseline for understanding the
characteristics of crisis organizations while providing the needed foundation for future
research.
5.2.4

Discussion

The analysis of crisis organizations characteristics in this study provided a needed
foundation and the initial insights for future research on information security within crisis
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organizations. From this analysis, a few pertinent insights emerged for continued
discussion and research. For example, 63 out of 221 respondents clicked consent, but did
not continue with the survey. This might suggest a few areas, such as survey length,
technical terminology, and concern over the subject matter, to investigate prior to future
surveys with these type of organizations. Next, with 83.4% (131 out of 158 respondents)
reporting that they service more than one type of victim, it is important to consider how
the different characteristics of these victims and the services they need may or may not
impact the level of information security preparedness across the organization. In addition,
it was observed that four organizations reported being run by part-time employees or
part-time employees and volunteers calling into consideration the information security
preparedness when no full-time employees are on staff. Last, after analyzing responses
from the question pertaining to budget size, it is important to note 26 (16%) respondents
selected “Do Not Know” as their response. These responses call into question whether
the person completing the survey had access to budget information or chose not to answer
the question for other reasons.
5.3

Gap Analysis on Information Security Preparedness Index

To create context for the analysis and to measure the gap of information security
preparedness within crisis organizations, an index for information security preparedness
was developed. The index provided a tool for this study and a foundation for future
research to identify gaps between the current state for information security policies and
procedures within crisis organizations and the ideal state by using best practices and
functions, Identify and Protect, from NIST Cybersecurity Framework (see Appendix B
framework details). Based on the survey questions created for this study the ideal state of
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information security equated to a score of 23. Though, the NIST CSF function, Respond,
was used in the survey, the results were determined, by the author, to be more suitable for
the exploratory section of this study. In addition, improving the current information
security preparedness index, as well as expanding it to include all five functions of the
NIST Cybersecurity Framework, could be a focal point for future research in this area.
When reporting the results of the survey, the researcher used the information
security preparedness index, which was organized to align with three out of five of the
research objectives for this study. First, responses from all consenting respondents were
measured using the index to document the gap between actual and ideal state of
information security policies and procedures as outlined by the NIST CSF (NIST, 2014).
Second, survey responses were categorized to examine the gap crisis organizations who
provide services to victims within two categories as determined by responses to the
survey question, what type(s) of victims or survivors does your organization serve (see
Appendix N for survey details). These categories included crisis organizations who
provide services to victims of domestic violence and human trafficking and those who
provide services to domestic violence but not human trafficking victims. Last, survey
responses were examined to document the gap of information security preparedness
across different dimensions of information security as outlined in Identify and Protect
functions of the NIST CSF (see Appendix B for a complete summary of the NIST
Cybersecurity Framework functions, categories, and subcategories).
Last, scores calculated using the information security preparedness index reported
frequency, mean (M), and median. As indicated in the detail below, reports on frequency
within the data provided descriptors to identify where on the index scale crisis
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organizations scored. Also, mean (M) and median provided indicators of central tendency
to help identify outliers. Future research studies would improve the survey and resulting
data to allow for the expanded use of statistical tools in identifying crisis organizations
who improve or weaken their information security preparedness index over time and for
what reasons.
5.3.1

Information Security Preparedness for All Respondents

As stated above, the information security preparedness index was used to measure
the current state of information security across all consenting respondents (N = 158).
Based on the survey questions aligned with the index, a score for information security
preparedness was 23 with a mean (M) 12. The range of possible scores was zero to 23
with observed scores ranging from one to 23.
Across the total sample of respondents (N = 158), two respondents scored a score
of 23 and one respondent scored a low of one. No crisis organizations participating in this
study scored zero for information security preparedness. Mean (M) and median scores of
12 were reported across all respondents. As a result, 156 respondents reported a score
less than the ideal state of information security preparedness. In addition, 49% (81) of
respondents reporting better than average scores. Further examination of scores across the
sample indicated that 74% of respondents scored between 18 and seven, with 11
respondents scoring at the mean (M) of 12. The interquartile range (Q3 – Q2) of 54.4%
was defined between a score of 17 and nine with no outliers. Refer to Table 7 for
information security preparedness scores for all consenting respondents.
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Table 7. Information Security Preparedness Index by All Consenting Survey Respondents
Frequency of
Score
(f)

Relative
Frequency
(f/n)

Percentage
Frequency (%f)

Cumulative Percentage
Frequency (c.%f)

23
22
21
20
19
18
17
16
15
14
13
12*
11
10

2
1
9
8
5
9
12
12
8
7
5
11
11
10

0.01
0.01
0.06
0.05
0.03
0.06
0.08
0.08
0.05
0.04
0.03
0.07
0.07
0.06

1.27
0.63
5.70
5.06
3.16
5.70
7.59
7.59
5.06
4.43
3.16
6.96
6.96
6.33

1.27
1.90
7.59
12.66
15.82
21.52
29.11
36.71
41.77
46.20
49.37
56.33
63.29
69.62

9

10

0.06

6.33

75.95

8
7
6
5
4
3
2

10
12
4
4
4
2
1

0.06
0.08
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.01
0.01

6.33
7.59
2.53
2.53
2.53
1.27
0.63

82.28
89.87
92.41
94.94
97.47
98.73
99.37

1

1

0.01

0.63

100.00

158

1.00

100.00

Score

Total

*mean (M) and median score

Figure 3 represents the frequency the all consenting respondents (N = 158) scored
by the information security index scores. This figures illustrates the greatest number of
respondents (12) reporting an information security preparedness score of 17, 16, or seven.
The fewest number of respondents reported scores on the ends of the scale including
scores 23, 22, three, two, and one. Although the data does not indicate a large skew, the
mean (M) of 13 and median of 12 are not equal. Future research would identify how
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changes in the information security preparedness index would or would not affect the
mean (M) and median.
Information Security Preparedness Index
14

Frequency (f)

12
10
8
6
4
2
0
23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9
Score

8

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

Figure 3. Information Security Preparedness of All Consenting Respondents. This figure
illustrates the frequency of respondents by index score.

5.3.2

Information Security Preparedness by Category

Additional analysis using the information security preparedness index was
conducted by categorizing the sample. This analysis utilized responses from survey
question, what type(s) of victims or survivors does your organization serve, to determine
categories in alignment with the objective of this study to document the gap between
crisis organizations who provide services to different categories of victims. As a result,
two primary categories of crisis organizations were identified for further analysis. The
first category included crisis organizations who provide services to victims of domestic
violence and human trafficking – n = 81 or 52% of the total sample. The second category
was comprised of crisis organizations who provide services to domestic violence not
including human trafficking victims – n = 70 or 45% of total sample. The information
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security preparedness indices for the remaining six organizations are included in the
discussion section.
5.3.2.1 Domestic Violence and Human Trafficking
In conjunction with the data of the entire sample, a score for information security
preparedness for crisis organizations servicing domestic violence victims and human
trafficking victims was 23 with a mean (M) of 12. The range for scores was zero to 23
with observed scores ranging from one to 23. Similar to results from all respondents,
respondents in this category (n = 81) identified two crisis organizations who scored a
score of 23 and one scoring a low of one. No crisis organizations participating in this
study scored zero for information security preparedness. Similar to all respondents, a
mean (M) and median score identical at 13 were reported. Also, observed was a gap of 76
respondents reported a score less than ideal state for information security for
organizations servicing victims of domestic violence and human trafficking.
During further analysis of the data revealed 76% of the sample (n = 18) scored
between 18 and seven, with four respondents scoring at the mean (M) of 13. In addition,
the interquartile range (Q3 – Q2) of 30% was defined between a score of 17 and 13.
Refer to Table 8 for information security preparedness scores for respondents servicing
domestic violence victims including human trafficking victims.
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Table 8. Information Security Preparedness Index: Servicing Victims of Domestic
Violence and Human Trafficking
Security
Preparedness Index

Frequency of
Score (f)

Relative
Frequency (f/n)

Percentage
Frequency (%f)

Cumulative Percentage
Frequency (c.%f)

23

2

0.02

2.47

2.47

22

1

0.01

1.23

3.70

21

2

0.02

2.47

6.17

20

4

0.05

4.94

11.11

19

3

0.04

3.70

14.81

18

5

0.06

6.17

20.99

17

6

0.07

7.41

28.40

16

6

0.07

7.41

35.80

15

5

0.06

6.17

41.98

14

4

0.05

4.94

46.91

13*

4

0.05

4.94

51.85

12

4

0.05

4.94

56.79

11

7

0.09

8.64

65.43

10

8

0.10

9.88

75.31

9

4

0.05

4.94

80.25

8

5

0.06

6.17

86.42

7

4

0.05

4.94

91.36

6

0

0.00

0.00

91.36

5

4

0.05

4.94

96.30

4

0

0.00

0.00

96.30

3

1

0.01

1.23

97.53

2

1

0.01

1.23

98.77

1

1

0.01

1.23

100.00

Total

81

1.00

100.00

*mean (M) and median score

Figure 4 represents the frequency by information security preparedness scores
within this category. The highest frequency reported eight crisis organizations scoring a
security preparedness index of 10; with 38 (46%) of organizations scoring above the
mean (M) of 13.
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Information Security Preparedness Index:
Servicing Victims of Domestic Violence and Human Trafficking

Frequency (f)

10
8
6
4
2
0
23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10
Score

9

8

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

Figure 4. Information security preparedness of organizations servicing victims of
domestic violence and human trafficking. This figure illustrates the frequency of
respondents by index score.
5.3.2.2 Domestic Violence not including Human Trafficking
The analysis of the second category, crisis organizations servicing victims of
domestic violence not including human trafficking victims, had a score for information
security preparedness of 23 with a mean (M) of 12. As with the above category and the
analysis of all respondents, the range for scores is zero to 23 with observed scores
ranging from three to 21. Across the total sample (n = 70) of respondents in this category,
the highest preparedness score reported was not ideal at 21 and was reported by seven
crisis organizations. The gap was all (n = 70) respondents do not fall within the ideal state
of information security preparedness. In comparison, the lowest score reported by this
category of respondents was three by one respondent. No crisis organizations
participating in this study scored zero for information security preparedness. Results
reported a mean (M) and median of 12.
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Although the index revealed respondent scores across a range of 21 to three, the
largest number of respondents (7) was observed across three different scores: the highest
reported score of 21, the mean (M) of 12, and a score of seven. A total of 32 (45%) of
respondents scored above the mean (M). In addition, the data displays the interquartile
range (Q3 – Q1) of 57% was defined between a score of 17 and eight. Refer to Table 9
for information security preparedness scores for respondents servicing domestic violence
victims not including human trafficking victims.
Table 9. Information Security Preparedness Index: Servicing Victims of Domestic
Violence not including Human Trafficking
Score

Frequency of
Score (f)

Relative
Frequency (f/n)

Percentage
Frequency (%f)

Cumulative Percentage
Frequency (c.%f)

23
22
21

0
0
7

0.00
0.00
0.10

0.00
0.00
10.00

0.00
0.00
10.00

20

3

0.04

4.29

14.29

19

2

0.03

2.86

17.14

18

3

0.04

4.29

21.43

17

6

0.09

8.57

30.00

16

5

0.07

7.14

37.14

15

2

0.03

2.86

40.00

14

3

0.04

4.29

44.29

13

1

0.01

1.43

45.71

12*

7

0.10

10.00

55.71

11

4

0.06

5.71

61.43

10

2

0.03

2.86

64.29

9

5

0.07

7.14

71.43

8

5

0.07

7.14

78.57

7

7

0.10

10.00

88.57

6

4

0.06

5.71

94.29

5

0

0.00

0.00

94.29

4

3

0.04

4.29

98.57

3

1

0.01

1.43

100.00

2

0

0.00

0.00

100.00

1

0

0.00

0.00

100.00

1.00

100.00

Total
70
*mean (M) and median score
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Figure 5 represents the frequency sample (n = 70) who provide services to domestic
violence victims not including human trafficking victims. As indicated above, the
greatest frequencies (7) were reported across three scores, 21, 12, and seven were the
fewest reporting a score of 13 and three. No organizations in this category scored a 23,
22, five, two, or one for information security preparedness.
Information Security Preparedness Index:
Servicing Victims of Domestic Violence not including Human Trafficking

Frequency (f)

8
6
4
2
0
23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10
Score

9

8

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

Figure 5. Information security preparedness of organizations servicing victims of
domestic violence not including human trafficking. This figure illustrates the frequency
of respondents by index score.

5.3.2.3 Discussion
The results documented above provide an initial view into the gap between the
ideal state of information security preparedness and crisis organizations who provide
services to different categories of victims. To summarize, the boxplot diagram in Figure 6
illustrates the upper and lower bounds of the interquartile range for each of the three data
sets analyzed above. The lower bounds, upper bounds, and median of the all respondents
and organizations servicing domestic violence and human trafficking were identical with
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one possible outlier at the lower bound. While the lower bound and median for
respondents servicing victims of domestic violence but not human trafficking were
different. The mean (M) for all respondents and crisis organizations servicing victims of
domestic violence not human trafficking was 12, while the mean (M) for crisis
organizations servicing victims of domestic violence and human trafficking was 13.

Information Security Preparedness
Index

25
20
15
10
5
0
All Respondents

Domestic Violence and Domestic Violence not
Human Trafficking
including Human
Trafficking

Figure 6. Interquartile range of the information security preparedness index for all
respondents, organizations working with victims of domestic violence and human
trafficking, and organizations working with domestic violence not including human
trafficking.

5.3.3

Dimensions of Security in the NIST Cybersecurity Framework

This section analyzes the survey data to document the gap across dimensions of
information security preparedness as outlined by the NIST CSF (NIST, 2014). Survey
results from this study were organized by NIST CSF function, category, and sub-
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category. Refer to Appendix L for a details on how survey questions were mapped to the
NIST CSF by function, category, and sub-category. In addition, as addressed in Chapter 1
and Chapter 4, three out of five core functions in the NIST CSF were selected for this
study – Identify, Protect, and Response. Out of the 45 survey questions 28 questions map
to the NIST CSF. The remaining 17 survey questions were developed using the 2012
NNEDV survey and for general purpose use (see Appendix C for a table outlining the
source of each survey question).
For the gap analysis survey data from the Identify and Protect functions were
used. Survey data from the Response function was identified relevant for the exploratory
analysis section of this study and has been included there. Consistent the above sections,
survey data from the Identify and Protect functions were analyzed by all consenting
respondents then also by organizations who provide services to domestic violence and
human trafficking victims and organizations who provide services to victims of domestic
violence not including human trafficking.
5.3.3.1 Identify Function
The objective of the NIST CSF function, Identify, was to “develop the
organization understanding to manage cybersecurity risk to systems, assets, data, and
capabilities” (NIST, 2014, pg. 6). A necessary first step in any process is to identify what
is known today, therefore, this first function helps organizations to identify critical assets,
operations, and areas where risk may exist. The Identify function is comprised of five
categories: Asset Management, Business Environment, Governance, Risk Assessment,
and Risk Management Strategy (NIST, 2014). Beyond these five categories is a total of
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24 subcategories (NIST, 2104). In concurrence with organizations and industry experts
who have used the NIST CSF, the Identify function is an important initial step in
understanding information security in relationship to the holistic business environment
(Atlas Vault, 2016). “This step is the pivot upon which the other four functions work”
(Atlas Vault, 2016, pg. n/a). In addition, for the purpose of this study, four of the five
categories from the Identify function were included: Asset Management, Business
Environment, Governance, and Risk Management Strategy (NIST, 2014). A map of
survey questions, NIST functions and categories, along with corresponding appendixes
can be found in Appendix M.
As with the above, a frequency analysis on the survey data corresponding to the
Identify function was conducted. This analysis included responses from 16 out of the 21
survey questions identified in the Identify function. Data from two out of the 21 survey
questions are addressed in the exploratory analysis. Important to note, three questions
were not included in the frequency analysis as responses are contingent upon the question
previous. Data from these questions may be used in future research initiatives. Refer to
Table 10 and the corresponding notations for further detail on the survey questions
mapped to the Identify function, categories, and subcategories.
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Table 10. Identify Function Categories Mapped to Survey Questions
Category

Survey question

Id.am-1: physical devices and
systems within the organization
are inventoried.

Do you know if your organization has a complete list
(inventory) of all computers, laptops, cell phones, and other
technologies belonging to the organization? *
Do you know if these items are insured against theft or loss?

Id.am-2: software platforms and
applications within the
organization are inventoried.

Do you know if your organization has a complete list
(inventory) of all computers, laptops, cell phones, and other
technologies belonging to the organization?*
Does your organization currently use any of the following
security technologies?
Is the software used by your organization inventoried?

Id.am-3: organizational
communication and data flows are
mapped.

Does your staff access internal electronic documents from
outside the premises?*
Who in your organization is responsible for managing the
organization's social media channel(s)?
Does your organization have human resources policies
regarding social media use by the following
Does your organization have policies for information
security?*

Id.am-5: resources (e.g.,
hardware, devices, data, and
software) are prioritized based on
their classification, criticality, and
business value.

Do you know if your organization has a complete list
(inventory) of all computers, laptops, cell phones, and other
technologies belonging to the organization?*

Id.am-6: cybersecurity roles and
responsibilities for the entire
workforce and third-party
stakeholders (e.g., suppliers,
customers, partners) are
established.

Who is responsible for information security for the
organization?*

Id.be-3: priorities for
organizational mission,
objectives, and activities are
established and communicated.

Where is the mission of your organization posted?***

Id.be-4: dependencies and critical
functions for delivery of critical
services are established.

Does your organization have policies or documented
policies for power or internet outages?

Has your organization identified what hardware and
software are critical to your operations?

Does your organization inform third-party vendors,
partners, and external stakeholders about your information
security policies and procedures?

Does your organization have policies for physical security?*
Does your organization have policies for information
security?*
If yes, which technologies do these policies include?**
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Table 10 continued
Id.gv-1: organizational
information security policy is
established.

Does your staff access internal electronic documents from
outside the premises?*
Does your organization have policies for information
security?*
If yes, which technologies do these policies include?**
Does your organization have policies for physical security?*

Id.gv-2: information security roles
& responsibilities are coordinated
and aligned with internal roles and
external partners.

Who is responsible for information security for the
organization?*

Id.rm-1: risk management
processes are established,
managed, and agreed to by
organizational stakeholders.

Has your organization identified areas or practices that may
be attractive targets or vulnerable for attack or breach?
Has your organization experienced a cybersecurity attack or
breach?***
Does your organization consider itself prepared to handle a
cybersecurity breach or attack?
Has your organization conducted information security
workshops or training with staff, volunteers, and other
stakeholders?
If yes or plan to soon, who will conduct the training?**

Notes:
*survey questions that map to more than one category within the identify function.
** survey questions not included in the information security preparedness index because response
data is contingent upon the response previous.
***survey questions not included in the gap analysis – included in the exploratory analysis.

5.3.3.1.1 Identify Function for All Respondents
The information security preparedness index was used to measure the current
state of information security within the boundaries of the NIST CSF Identify function
across all consenting respondents (N = 158). Based on the survey questions aligned with
NIST CSF Identify function, categories, and subcategories, a score for information
security preparedness was 16. The range of possible scores was zero to 16 with the
observed scores ranging from one to 16.
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Across the total sample (N = 158), three respondents scored a score of 16 and one
respondent scoring the lowest score of one. Thirteen crisis organizations reported scores
at the mean (M) and median of nine with 46% (74) scoring above the mean (M). No crisis
organizations participating in this study scored zero for information security
preparedness. The gap revealed 155 respondents reporting a score less than ideal for
information security preparedness. Further analysis of the results showed 72% (115) of
the sample (N = 158) scored between 13 and five, with the fewest respondents scoring at
the lower end of the index. The interquartile range (Q3 – Q2) of 54.4% was defined
between a score of 12 and nine and no outliers. Refer to Table 11 for information security
preparedness scores for all consenting respondents.
Table 11. Information Security Preparedness Index, Identify Function: All Consenting
Respondents

16

Frequency of
Score (f)
3

Relative
Frequency (f/n)
0.02

Percentage
Frequency (%f)
1.90

Cumulative Percentage
Frequency (c.%f)
1.90

15

6

0.04

3.80

5.70

14

7

0.04

4.43

10.13

13

15

0.09

9.49

19.62

12

15

0.09

9.49

29.11

11

15

0.09

9.49

38.61

10

13

0.08

8.23

46.84

9*

13

0.08

8.23

55.06

8

17

0.11

10.76

65.82

7

16

0.10

10.13

75.95

6

13

0.08

8.23

84.18

5

13

0.08

8.23

92.41

4

8

0.05

5.06

97.47

3
2
1

2
1
1

0.01
0.01
0.01

1.27
0.63
0.63

98.73
99.37
100.00

158

1.00

100.00

Score

Total

*mean (M) and median score
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Figure 7 represents the frequency scores within the Identify function across all
survey respondents (N = 158). The greatest number of respondents (17) reported a score
of eight, one point below the mean (M) of nine. Also illustrated within Figure 7 are the
majority of the scores being reported between five and 13

Frequency (f)

Information Security Preparedness Index - Identify Function
All Respondents
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Figure 7. Information security preparedness by the Identify Function of all respondents.
This figure illustrates the frequency of respondents by index score.
5.3.3.1.2 Domestic Violence and Human Trafficking
Continuing within the Identify function, frequency analysis was conducted across
organizations servicing victims of domestic violence and human trafficking and
organizations who services domestic violence victims and not human trafficking victims.
The results observed between the entire sample and organizations servicing victims of
domestic violence and human trafficking were similar. Though the number of
respondents who service victims of domestic violence and human trafficking was 81, the
highest possible score (16) was observed with two respondents. The majority of
respondents (11) scored a preparedness index of 13 (see Table 12). The mean (M) score
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of nine was reported by nine crisis organizations. The mean (M) and median were equal
(9) across the sample. Similar to the all respondents’ sample, results from organizations
servicing victims of domestic violence and human trafficking reported displayed an
interquartile range (Q3 – Q2) of 33.3% was defined between a score of 12 and nine.
Table 12. Information Security Preparedness Index, Identify Function:
Servicing Victims of Domestic Violence including Human Trafficking

16

Frequency
of Score
(f)
2

Relative
Frequency
(f/n)
0.02

Percentage
Frequency
(%f)
2.47

Cumulative
Percentage
Frequency (c.%f)
2.47

15

2

0.02

2.47

4.94

14

3

0.04

3.70

8.64

13

11

0.14

13.58

22.22

12

7

0.09

8.64

30.86

11

6

0.07

7.41

38.27

10

5

0.06

6.17

44.44

9*

9

0.11

11.11

55.56

8

9

0.11

11.11

66.67

7

10

0.12

12.35

79.01

6

8

0.10

9.88

88.89

5

4

0.05

4.94

93.83

4

2

0.02

2.47

96.30

3

1

0.01

1.23

97.53

2

1

0.01

1.23

98.77

1

1

0.01

1.23

100.00

Total

81

1.00

100.00

Score

*mean (M) and median score

The greatest number of respondents (11) reported a score of 13, one point below
the mean (M) of nine as illustrated in Figure 8. However, respondents in the category
reported scores across the index.
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Information Security Preparedness Index - Identify Function
Domestic Violence and Human Trafficking
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Figure 8. Information security preparedness by the Identify Function for crisis
organizations servicing victims of domestic violence and human trafficking.
5.3.3.1.3 Domestic Violence not including Human Trafficking
The final gap analysis within the Identify function was conducted by observing
organizations who services domestic violence victims and not human trafficking victims.
As with the above analysis, the total number of respondents for this analysis was N = 70
and an ideal information security preparedness score of 16. The highest possible score
(16) was observed with one respondent with the lowest score reported being three. The
mean (M) score of nine was reported by few crisis organizations (4) than the categories
above. In addition, the mean (M) (9) and median (10) were not equal therefore indicating
a small skew in the distribution. No other distributions in the study were skewed. In
addition, the frequency scores were distributed with the largest respondents scoring 11 or
5 for information security preparedness (see Table 13). The data also displayed an
interquartile range (Q3 – Q2) of 38%, which was defined between a score of 12 and 9.5.
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Table 13. Information Security Preparedness Index, Identify Function:
Servicing Victims of Domestic Violence not including Human Trafficking
Score

Frequency
of Score
(f)

Relative
Frequency
(f/n)

Percentage
Frequency
(%f)

Cumulative
Percentage
Frequency
(c.%f)

16

1

0.01

1.43

1.43

15

4

0.06

5.71

7.14

14

4

0.06

5.71

12.86

13

3

0.04

4.29

17.14

12

7

0.10

10.00

27.14

11

9

0.13

12.86

40.00

10**

7

0.10

10.00

50.00

9*

4

0.06

5.71

55.71

8

6

0.09

8.57

64.29

7

5

0.07

7.14

71.43

6

5

0.07

7.14

78.57

5

9

0.13

12.86

91.43

4

5

0.07

7.14

98.57

3

1

0.01

1.43

100.00

2

0

0.00

0.00

100.00

1

0

0.00

0.00

100.00

Total
70
1.00
*mean (M) **median score

100.00

Last, as illustrated in Figure 9, the greatest number of respondents (9) reported
scores of five and 11. No respondents within this category scored below an information
security preparedness score of three. As stated above, the distribution of this sample
shows a slight skew with the mean (M) (9) and median (10) not being equal.
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Figure 9. Information security preparedness by the Identify Function for crisis
organizations servicing victims of domestic violence not including human trafficking.
The Identify function within the NIST CSF helps organizations identify critical
assets, operations, and areas where risk may exist. To summarize, the boxplot diagram
(Figure 10) illustrates the upper and lower bounds of the interquartile range for each of
the three categories reporting information security preparedness within the Identify
function. The lower bounds, upper bounds, and median of the all respondents and
organizations servicing domestic violence and human trafficking were identical with one
possible outlier at the lower bound. In addition, the mean (M) across all categories was
consistent at nine, while the median for crisis organizations servicing victims of domestic
violence not including human trafficking reported a 10. As a result, the mean (M) and
median for crisis organizations servicing victims of domestic violence not including
human trafficking were not equal indicating a skewed distribution.
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Figure 10. Interquartile range of the information security preparedness index based on
the NIST CSF Identify function.
5.3.3.2 Protect Function
The next core function of the NIST Cybersecurity Framework included in this
study is Protect (PR). The objective of the Protect (PR) function is to “guide
organizations in the development and implementation of appropriate safeguards,
prioritized through the organization’s risk management process, and to ensure delivery of
critical infrastructure services” (NIST, 2014, pg. 6). The Protect function includes
categories and subcategories addressing Access Control, Awareness and Training, Data
Security, Information Protection Processes and Procedures, and Protective Technology
(NIST, 2014). For the purpose of this study, the Access Control and Awareness and
Training categories were included (NIST, 2014). A map of survey questions, NIST
functions, and categories along with corresponding appendices is in Appendix M.
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As with the analysis of questions mapping to the Identify function, a frequency
analysis on the survey data corresponding to the Protect function was conducted. This
analysis included responses from 10 out of the 11 survey questions identified in the
Protect function. Data from one question is addressed in the exploratory analysis. Refer
to Table 14 and the corresponding notations for further detail on the survey questions
mapped to the Protect function, categories, and subcategories.
Table 14. Protect Function Categories Mapped to Survey Questions
Category
PR.AC-1: IDENTITIES AND
CREDENTIALS ARE MANAGED FOR
AUTHORIZED DEVICES AND USERS.

Survey Question
Does your organization have policies for information
security?
Does your organization document who has access to
sensitive files, databases, and other electronic information?

PR.AT-1: ALL USERS ARE INFORMED
AND TRAINED

How is access to electronic files containing sensitive
information stored within your organization protected?*
Has your organization conducted information security
workshops or training with staff, volunteers, and other
stakeholders?
Does your organization inform or train new employees
about information security policies and procedures?
Does your organization inform third-party vendors,
partners, and external stakeholders about your information
security policies and procedures?

PR.AT-2: PRIVILEGED USERS
UNDERSTAND ROLES AND
RESPONSIBILITIES.
PR.IP-6: DATA SS DESTROYED
ACCORDING TO POLICY.

If your organization does use third-party vendors, do they
inform you of their information security policies and
procedures?
Who in your organization is responsible for the legal
requirements for information security?
Are the legal requirements listed in Question 28 regarding
information security understood by those responsible?
Does your organization have policies and procedures for the
destruction of electronic documents?

Does your organization have policies and procedures for the
destruction of storage devices? (e.g. DVDs, CDs, thumb
drives, etc.)
Notes:* Survey questions not included in the gap analysis – included in the exploratory analysis.
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5.3.3.2.1 All Respondents
The NIST CSF Protect function was used in the development of the information
security preparedness index to measure the current state of information security across all
consenting respondents (N = 158). A score for information security preparedness through
analysis of just the survey questions corresponding to the NIST CSF Protect function,
categories, and subcategories was 10 with a mean (M) 5. The observed range for scores
across all respondents was zero to 10.
In comparison to the analysis conducted above, the greatest number of
respondents reporting an information security preparedness score was reported in the
Protect function. However, results also reported the greatest number of respondents
scoring lowest score of zero. Across the total sample (N = 158) of respondents, seven
scored a score of 10 and 12 respondent scoring a minimal score of zero. A total of 151
respondents reported a score less than ideal resulting in a gap. Unlike other frequency
analysis in this study, the number of respondents across preparedness scores less than 10
were well distributed with greatest number of respondents scored 19. The interquartile
range (Q3 – Q2) of 37.9% was defined between a score of eight and five. Refer to Table
15 for information security preparedness scores for all consenting respondents.
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Table 15. Information Security Preparedness Index, Protect Function
Frequency of
Score (f)

Relative
Frequency (f/n)

Percentage
Frequency (%f)

Cumulative Percentage
Frequency (c.%f)

10

7

0.04

4.43

4.43

9

19

0.12

12.03

16.46

8

16

0.10

10.13

26.58

7

16

0.10

10.13

36.71

6

16

0.10

10.13

46.84

5*

12

0.08

7.59

54.43

4

17

0.11

10.76

65.19

3

12

0.08

7.59

72.78

2

15

0.09

9.49

82.28

1

16

0.10

10.13

92.41

0

12

0.08

7.59

100.00

Total

158

1.00

100.00

Score

*mean (M) and median score

Figure 11 identifies the greatest number of respondents (19) reported close to a
score for the Protect function (10) with a score of nine. Unlike the previous analysis, 12
crisis organizations scored the lowest at zero. Mean (M) and median scores were reported
equal at 5 across the sample.
Information Security Preparedness Index - Protect Function
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Figure 11. Information security preparedness by the Protect function including all survey
respondents.
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5.3.3.2.2 Domestic Violence and Human Trafficking Victims
The frequency analysis was also conducted for survey questions that mapped to
the NIST CSF Protect function across organizations servicing victims of domestic
violence and human trafficking. The results observed between the entire sample (N =
158) and organizations servicing victims of domestic violence not including human
trafficking (n = 81) were similar. The highest possible score for information security
preparedness (10) was observed by three respondents. However, the majority of
respondents (12) scored a preparedness of six; close to the mean (M) of 5 (see Table 16).
The interquartile range (Q3 – Q2) of 34.5% was defined between a score of seven and
five with no visible outliers.
Table 16. Information Security Preparedness Index – Protect Function
Frequency of
Score (f)

Relative
Frequency (f/n)

Percentage
Frequency (%f)

Cumulative Percentage
Frequency (c.%f)

10

3

0.04

3.70

3.70

9

9

0.11

11.11

14.81

8

7

0.09

8.64

23.46

7

8

0.10

9.88

33.33

6

12

0.15

14.81

48.15

5*

8

0.10

9.88

58.02

4

9

0.11

11.11

69.14

3

8

0.10

9.88

79.01

2

5

0.06

6.17

85.19

1

6

0.07

7.41

92.59

0

6

0.07

7.41

100.00

Total

81

1.00

100.00

Score

*mean (M) and median score

In Figure 12, the mean (M) and median are equal with eight organizations
reporting a preparedness score of 5. In addition, scores span across the index between 10
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and zero, with six crisis organizations reporting the lowest score. The greatest number of
respondents (12) was reported close the mean (M) (5) with a score of six.
Information Security Preparedness Index - Protect Function
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Figure 12. Information security preparedness by the Protect function including crisis
organizations servicing victims of domestic violence and human trafficking.

5.3.3.2.3 Domestic Violence not including Human Trafficking
Last, the gap analysis examined the organizations who service domestic violence
and not human trafficking against questions mapping to the Protect function. The total
number of respondents for this analysis was n = 70 and an information security
preparedness score of 10. As with the gap analysis conducted for organization services
domestic violence and human trafficking victims above, the highest possible score (10)
was observed with three respondents with the lowest score (0) reported being four. The
number of respondents by preparedness score varied across the sample with 10
respondents scoring a two and nine respondents scoring a nine on the index (see Table
17). The interquartile range similar to the sample of all respondents (Q3 – Q2) of 44.2%
was defined between a score of eight and 4.5
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Table 17. Information Security Preparedness Index – Protect Function
Frequency of
Score (f)

Relative
Frequency (f/n)

Percentage
Frequency (%f)

Cumulative Percentage
Frequency (c.%f)

10
9

3
9

0.04
0.13

4.29
12.86

4.29
17.14

8

8

0.11

11.43

28.57

7

7

0.10

10.00

38.57

6

4

0.06

5.71

44.29

5*

4

0.06

5.71

50.00

4

8

0.11

11.43

61.43

3

4

0.06

5.71

67.14

2

10

0.14

14.29

81.43

1

9

0.13

12.86

94.29

0

4

0.06

5.71

100.00

Total

70

1.00

100.00

Score

*mean (M) and median score

The mean (M) and median were both reported at a score of five. However, as
illustrated in Figure 13, the greatest number of respondents (10) reported a score of two.
Four crisis organizations reported a score of zero.
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Figure 13. Information security preparedness by the Protect function including crisis
organizations servicing victims of domestic violence not including human trafficking.
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In conclusion of the frequency analysis for the Protect function, the boxplot
diagram in Figure 14 illustrates the upper and lower bounds of the interquartile range for
each of the three data sets discussed above. The lower bounds, upper bounds, and mean
(M) of the all respondents and organizations servicing domestic violence and human
trafficking were identical with no outliers were reported.

Figure 14. Interquartile range of the information security preparedness index based on
the NIST CSF Protect function.
5.3.4

Discussion

For discussion purposes, as a result of the lack of research in this area and
inaugural use of the information security preparedness index, organizations who scored
above the mean (M) in each section below were considered, from an applied perspective,
as being within the realm of information security preparedness. A number of
organizations across the various areas of analysis scored above the mean (M) offering the
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potential for continued and applied research in this area to bring more organizations in
the ideal state of information security preparedness.
Further analysis on the mean (M) was conducted through an independent sample
t-test to compare the information security preparedness scores of organizations servicing
domestic violence and human trafficking, and organizations servicing domestic violence
and not human trafficking victims. There was not a significant difference in the scores for
organizations servicing domestic violence and human trafficking (M = 13.7, SD = 4.79),
and organizations servicing domestic violence and not human trafficking victims (M =
12.11, SD = 5.38) conditions; t (149) = 1.902, p = .059. These results suggest that the
information security preparedness scores of the category of organizations in this study do
not affect each other. However, since the p value = .059 is very close to .05, analysis of
the data should continue in future research. Refer to Table 17 for detailed results of the t
test conducted between the information security preparedness scores of organizations
servicing victims of domestic violence and human trafficking and organizations servicing
domestic violence not including human trafficking victims.
Table 18. Detailed Results of the t Test
Category

All Respondents

Domestic Violence
and Human
Trafficking

Domestic Violence not
including Human
Trafficking

M

SD

n

M

SD

n

t

df

Sig.
(2-tailed)

13.70

4.789

70

12.11

5.385

81

1.902*

149

.0.59

* p < .05.

Last, the information security preparedness indices for the six organizations not
included in the categories above reported range of scores between 20 and 4. Four out of
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the six organizations reported scores above the mean (M). These organization service
victims of sexual assault, human trafficking, and stalking as reported in the survey.
Future research would expand the categories for analysis to include these organizations.
5.4

Exploratory Analysis

The exploratory analysis of this study examined information security
preparedness in association with security solutions usage and other pertinent results from
survey respondents. There was a positive correlation between the number of technologies
organizations reported using and the number of the security technologies they are also
using, rpb = .298, n = 158, p = .000. Therefore, as the number of technologies increase
within crisis organizations so should the number of security technologies being used.
This does not, however, indicate that the security technologies that are being used are
appropriate for the risk, a focal point for future research. Refer to Table 19 for the
Pearson’s Correlation for the number of technologies used by all responding crisis
organization with the number of security technologies also used.
Table 19. Pearson’s Correlation for the Number of Technologies Used with the
Number of Security Technologies Used Across All Respondents

Security Technologies Used
Technologies Used
Pearson Correlation

.298*

Sig. (2-tailed)

.000

N

158

rpb (N = 158) = .298, *p ≤ .01
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In addition, there was a positive correlation between the number of security
technologies organizations reported using and their information security preparedness
scores, rpb = .416, n = 158, p = .000 (see Table 20).
Table 20. Pearson’s Correlation for the Number of Security Technologies Used with
the Information Security Preparedness Score Across All Respondents

Information Security
Preparedness
Security Technologies Used
Pearson Correlation

.416*

Sig. (2-tailed)

.000

N

158

rpb (N = 158) = .416, *p ≤ .01

Though a strong association between the number of technologies organizations
reported using and the number of the security technologies they are also using is a
promising start; it was incomplete to frame a clear view of the current state of
information security in these organizations. Further investigation is needed to determine
if the devices being used within the organization are 1) personal or organization issued,
2) up-to-date in terms of hardware, software, and security features, and 3) have known
vulnerabilities.
5.4.1

Other Results

5.4.1.1 Business Environment
The second category, business environment (BE), in the Identify function was
defined as the “organization’s mission, objectives, stakeholders, and activities are
understood and prioritized; this information is used to inform cybersecurity roles,
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responsibilities, and risk management decisions” (NIST, 2014, pg. 6) However, the
question, where is the mission of your organization posted, was perplexing to the pilot
reviewers. Though the results from the survey respondents were not significant for this
study, comments from two pilot reviewers illustrate the importance of this question in
understanding the variance in approaches and paradigms in regards to information
security.
Pilot Reviewer A: Not sure why this question is here… not that you shouldn’t ask
it, but my initial thought was um, why do you want to know? It’s not really about
tech security.
Pilot Reviewer B: Please respond with ‘Because if I change your mission
statement to badger herding you’d be upset (see Appendix I).
In addition, research suggested that organizational websites have become both the
“public face” of the organization and the vehicle through which intense and meaningful
public interactions can take place (Lovejoy & Saxton, 2012). With the increased
complexities in technology and questions raised in the general media regarding
information security breaches, it should not be a surprise that organizations whose
websites protect donors, victims, and other stakeholders would have a competitive edge
(Hoy & Phelps, 2009).
5.4.1.2 Who Manages the Technology
Continuing the exploratory analysis of the survey responses, the question who
primarily manages the computer and information technology (e.g. Internet connection) in
your organization was asked at the start of the survey to help assess the respondents
frame of mind on the topic. The survey question and the results also mapped to the NIST
CSF function, Response. The Response function included five categories addressing
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Response Planning, Communications, Analysis, Mitigation, and Improvements (NIST,
2014). For the purpose of this study, the Response Planning (RS.RP) category responses
a) processes and procedures were executed and maintained, and b) to ensure timely
response to detected cybersecurity events were incorporated into the survey (see
Appendix A). Because this category resides further along the NIST CSF continuum, a
brief analysis was conducted for this initial research helping to identify the current state
of information security within crisis organizations. Sub-category, RS.RP-1, “response
plan is executed during or after an event,” was analyzed (NIST, 2014, pg. 7). Refer to
Table 21 for a summary of responses to the question, who primarily manages the
computer and information technology (e.g. Internet connection) in your organization.
The total number of response was 214 because of respondents being able to select more
than one option.
Table 21. Summary of Survey Responses to Who Primarily Manages the Computer and
Information Technology within the Organization

Full-time employee with information technology as part of their
job
Information technology consultant
Third-party vendor
Full-time information technology employee
Other
Part-time information technology employee
Part-time employee with information technology as part of their
job
Volunteer
Total

# of
Responses
53

% of
Respondents
34%

42
33
30

27%
21%
19%

25
14
11

16%
9%
7%

6
214

4%
100%

The data indicated that full-time employees with information security as part of
their job (34%) is predominant within this sample (see Appendix N for survey details).
Second were information technology consultants at 27% of responses provided (see
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Appendix N for survey details). The number of replies for full-time information
technology employee was 19% (see Appendix N for survey details). Respondents also
offered additional content when responding to “Other” including: “IT company
volunteers,” “nobody manages it,” “Full-time employee with little knowledge not part of
the job,” “Staff who happen to be knowledgeable (kinda) in IT,” ”Intern,” and “Full-time
employee with no information technology as part of their job” (see Appendix N for
survey details). These fill-in responses provided additional insight as to where
information security, as a priority, falls within the resource management of their
organizations.
5.4.1.3 Access to Information Security Resources and Experts
During the 2014 and 2015 NNEDV Tech Summits, the author observed the need
and desire by crisis organizations to understand and learn about information security. As
a result, questions asking survey respondents if they need more help understanding
technology and information security and if they have resources to assist with information
security issues were included. The objective was to observe and document respondents
perceived need in this area. Results showed that 60% of the sample (N = 158) reported
wanting more help understand technology and information security with 64% also
reporting that they have access to external resources and experts to help with information
security. Therefore, the gap that exists is in understanding how, when, and where
organizations use their external resources and why they feel they need more help
understanding information security. Refer to Table 22 and Table 23 for a summary of
survey responses.
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Table 22. Summary of survey responses to if crisis organizations feel they need more
help understanding technology and information security.
Yes
No
Do Not Know
Total

# of Responses
95
36
27
158

% of Respondents
60%
23%
17%
100%

Table 23. Summary of survey responses to if crisis organizations have access to
external resources and experts to assist with information security.
Yes
No
Do Not Know
Total

# of Responses
91
23
29
158

% of Respondents
64%
16%
20%
100%

5.4.1.4 Budget versus Barriers
A 2007 study by Carey-Smith, Nelson, and May from Queensland University of
Technology reported that “non-profit organizations and small to medium enterprises have
many similarities, the major one being lack of resources” (pg. 39) Therefore, it is possible
to conclude that the smaller the organization the less funding they have to put into
information security (Carey-Smith, Nelson, & May, 2007). Funding relationships to
improve information security within crisis organizations was a key component of the
initial vision for this study and corresponds with the research objectives outlined in
Chapter 1. Exploring and identifying the gaps between annual budget of crisis
organizations and barriers to improving information security were included in this
analysis. Refer to Table 24 for a summary of survey responses regarding the barriers to
improving information security within crisis organizations.
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Table 24. Summary of Survey Responses to the Barriers to Improving Information
Security within Crisis Organizations
Lack of funding
Lack of resources (e.g. staff, equipment)
Lack of knowledge or understanding of technology
Lack of time
Focus on other priorities
Resistance by staff or other stakeholders
Other
Do Not Know
No Need
Total

# of Responses
110
92
81
76
63
21
11
9
7
158

% of Respondents
70%
58%
51%
48%
40%
13%
7%
6%
4%
100%

Respondents who selected “Other” provided additional responses relevant for this study,
which are listed as follows:
1. “Lack of quality NM trainers”
2. “Part of a larger org that has different standards for other non-victims’
services programs and lag behind in understanding our unique needs”
3. “I am a branch within a Tribal Nations full computer system, so they don't
understand the need for extreme privacy”
4. “If there is a need I am not aware...that is why we hire IT professional
consultants.”
5. “Slow Broadband connection”
6. “Budget cuts, expensive internet”
7. “Understanding by IT professionals about our confidentiality requirements”
8. “The City's IT department”
9. “Out dated operating systems”
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10. “Addressing confidentiality issues with data storage; finding a software
database program to gather required data for funders that doesn't cost $30,000
a year in user fees and maintains support” (see Appendix N for response
details).
The top barriers for improving information security with crisis organizations as
reported by respondents are:
1. Lack of Funding – 70% of respondents reported
2. Lack of resources (e.g. staff, equipment) – 58% of respondents reported
3. Lack of knowledge or understanding of technology – 51% of respondents
reported.
Refer to Table 25 detailing then number of responses by barrier to improving information
security.
Table 25. Summary of Barriers to Improving Information Security
Lack of funding
Lack of resources (e.g. staff, equipment)
Lack of knowledge or understanding of technology
Lack of time
Focus on other priorities
Resistance by staff or other stakeholders
Other
Do Not Know
No Need
Total

# of Responses
110
92
81
76
63
21
11
9
7
158

% of Respondents
70%
58%
51%
48%
40%
13%
7%
6%
4%
100%

In addition, it is important to consider if funding will always be the number one
barrier for non-profits to improve information security. The options provide in the survey
to report the budget, what is the total annual budget of your organization, ranged from
less than $75,000 to greater than $5,000,000. For this exploratory analysis, a simple
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divide at the $500,000 mark was set to observed responses to the barriers for improving
information security. Respondents with budgets less than $500,000 reported lack of
funding as the primary reason for not being able to improve information security. Also
reported within this subgroup was lack of resources and other priorities as the next
reasons below lack of funding. Concurrent, respondents with budgets greater than
$500,000 also reported of funding as their primary barrier to improving information
security with the lack of resources coming in second. Table 26 illustrates the number of
responses by subgroup with the barriers to improving information security.
Table 26. Summary of Barriers to Improving Information Security with Budgets
Barriers to improving
information security?
Lack of Funding
Lack of Time
Lack of Knowledge
Lack of Resources
Other Priorities
Resistance by Staff
No Need

Respondents with Budgets less
than $500,000

Respondents with budgets
greater than $500,000

32 out of 43 (74%)
23 out of 43
18 out of 43
24 out of 43 (55%)
24 out of 43 (55%)
7 out of 43
3 out of 43

59 out of 89 (66%)
44 out of 89
52 out of 89
54 out of 89 (60%)
36 out of 89
14 out of 89
4 out of 89

5.4.1.5 Attack Knowledge and Preparation
As addressed in Chapter 1, though information security intrusions or attacks on
crisis organizations have not been spotlighted in the media does not mean they have not
or will not occur. Therefore, the results pertaining to knowledge and preparation for a
cyber security attack proved interesting. Looking across the two out of the four questions
relevant to cyber attacks was interesting to see 36% don’t know if they have identified
areas at risk for attack, 60.0% said they have not experienced an attack, 51.0% said they
don’t know if they are prepared for an attack, and last, 49.0% have not conducted
information security workshops or training, all which suggests the important intersections
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of awareness, preparedness, and training (see Appendix N for response details). The most
striking, yet not surprising, evidence suggested that 78.6% who did not experience a
cyber security attack or breach also did not consider themselves prepared to handle an
attack or breach if one were to occur. Also, 45.2% of the organizations who didn’t know
if they had experienced a cyber security attack or breach also do not know if they were
prepared (see Appendix N for response details). In addition, 91.1% of organizations who
responded “Yes” to having policies for physical security also answered “Yes” to having
policies for information security (see Appendix Y for response details).
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CHAPTER 6. FUTURE WORK AND CONCLUSIONS

Organizations working with victims of violence are at risk for intrusion and attack
every day. Information security researchers and security experts have overlooked nonprofit organizations committed to the mission victims of domestic violence, human
trafficking, and stalking long enough. This exploratory study achieved the defined
research objective to identify the current state of information security within a subset
United States based non-profit crisis organizations. Chapter 5 detailed the gaps between a
theoretical maximum level of information security and the observed level of information
security in the organizations participating in the study. These gaps indicated that
information security is evident within crisis organizations, however, below and ideal state
of preparedness. The study measured the gaps by looking at information security
preparedness using three functions of best practices from the NIST CSF. The gap analysis
indicated that preparedness across responses in the Protect function were different then
responses in the Identify function. Last, the study documented characteristics of crisis
organizations associated with the gap and necessary for ongoing research. The gaps
identified throughout the study require future research and investigation to further the
body of knowledge in this area and to help crisis organizations improve their state of
information security.
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The author’s experience in this research process, engagement with the domestic
violence, stalking, and human trafficking crisis organizations, and ongoing conversations
with experts in the security field continue to raise questions and opportunities to narrow
the gap between standards that have been established for industry and the unique
environment of crisis organizations. Also, as these organizations are growing their online
presence and services to clients, it is critical to think proactively through possible attacker
profiles, attack vectors, and monitoring systems. Building a culture of security will make
the organization more defensible and able to assure clients and stakeholders that increase
confidentiality, informed consent, and safety planning. One survey respondent said it
well, “These questions are helpful for my own personal awareness; I need to seek more
information in these areas. Thank you!”
Basic awareness of how technology works and the risks involved is imperative to
safeguarding survivors’ personal information, ensuring survivor safety, and holding
offenders accountable. Researchers, advocates, and security professionals need to
continue to work to help educated crisis organizations change the paradigms around
digital security. As it has been said in another context, it is not about waiting for an
information security attack or breach to occur in a crisis organization––it is a matter of
when. However, the immediacy of the clients’ needs takes precedence over internal
operations. Creating systems of education, awareness, and training to assist these
organizations in improving their internal security infrastructures will have a long term
impact. Also, developing assessment tools to continue to understand the state of
information security in crisis organization concurrent with creating strategic initiatives
will, without a doubt, improve information security for crisis organizations and the
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victims they serve. Last, an information security breach in an environment that is built on
trust can impact far more than just the data or the services compromised––now is not the
time to step back, but step forward with research and action.
6.1

Future Work

As was both hoped and expected, results from the research objectives for this
study have raised several areas for continued research that would serve the crisis
organizations as defined in this study and other non-profit organizations, other
organizations working with victims of violence, and victims and survivors. Several
opportunities for future research and development emerged. Below is a brief outline of
the top priorities that emerged from the results of this study.
6.1.1

Assessment Tool for Crisis Organizations

Crisis organizations do not need a new framework but an assessment tool that
helps to reduce real or imagined fear regarding information security. They need a tool
that is written in a language that promotes engagement and thought. As discussed in the
previous chapters, the NIST CSF maps to other industry respected assessment tools for
information security including COBIT 5 and ISO standards. As the report from Tenable
Network Security reveals, “70% of organizations view NIST’s framework as a security
best practice,” however, 83% still report that they will adopt the framework just not in its
entirety (Dark Reading, 2016, para. 3).
Implementing the parts of the NIST framework that best suit the environment, as
was done with this study, helps to make use of the best practices without the barrier of a
high investment. This concept can be carried forward into future efforts to build an
assessment tool adapted for crisis organizations and non-profit organizations. An
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assessment tool that is based on national standards, yet designed in a language and
methodology that helps crisis organizations improve their information security and gain
confidence to ask questions and seek help when needed is now possible. Also, now that
gaps between the ideal and current state of information security has been identified, core
functions that were not included, Detect and Recovery, along with COBIT 5 and the ISO
standard can be evaluated to underpin future research in this area.
6.1.2

Expanding Gap Analysis Research

Observing the results of the gap analysis conducted for this study highlighted
opportunities for continued work in this area. For example, though two organizations
reported no gap between their current and the ideal state of information security
preparedness, questions regarding the validity of their responses were raised. As a result,
future work could include mechanisms to measure respondents or participating crisis
organization understanding of information security language, concepts, and terminology.
In addition, establishing methodologies to deeper examine the data to determine if crisis
organizations are as far ahead in information security as they reported would provide a
more accurate assessment of the current state across the industry. Next, continued efforts
and conversations with crisis organizations in relationship to information security best
practices offers the possibility to expand the survey and research efforts to include more
functions within the NIST CSF; in particular, for those organizations that reported a score
on the information security preparedness index.
6.1.3

Characteristics of Crisis Organizations

This study has identified, for the first time, core characteristics of crisis
organizations in relationship to information security, including security preparedness as
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associated with information security solutions usage. By documenting funding, lack of
resources, resource dynamics, and other factors associated information security, the
process of understanding the environments in which these organizations function has
been started. However, further investigation into the correlations of these characteristics
to best practices in information security is needed. This research could be expanded to the
larger non-profit sector if the unique characteristics of crisis organizations does not fall
too far from sight.
6.1.4

Gaps in Awareness and Training Processes

As revealed in the research and data for this study, awareness, education, and
training are critical to the success of any efforts toward improving information security.
By arming crisis organizations with comprehensive and customized awareness and
education, these organizations will be armed with the confidence they need to ask
questions of security experts and make even small incremental improvements. There are
some simple steps that may start to raise awareness and set the foundation for training
and further work to improve information security within the organization:
1. Get “buy-in” across the organization including directors, staff, volunteers, and
other stakeholders that information security should be addressed;
2. Create cross-functional teams including external resources such as legal,
victim services, human resources, etc.;
3. Asses the current environment not as a one-time event, but an ongoing process
at a frequency that fits the environment;
4. Design awareness, training, and assessment programs that involve staff,
victims, and stakeholders.
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Areas identified in this study where education could include non-technical users
within crisis organization on remote management features included anti-malware
solutions, browser and application protections, lock and erase functions, password
management, device and software maintenance, and procedures to follow when
anomalies are detected.
6.1.5 Strategic Planning Ongoing
Though the development of assessment tools and processes for awareness and
training are the recommended top priorities for future research, creating a process to help
crisis organizations build strategic plans incorporating information security is critical.
The following are elements to begin that process.
1. Technology Solutions. As reported, crisis organizations are making use of
several different technologies for a variety of purposes, future research would
dive deeper into identifying what technologies are accessible, usable, and
contain the appropriate technical capabilities for support or compromising
privacy and information security the environment. Areas such as HTTPS,
tracking technologies, or spyware should take priority. However, as stated
above, before choices in technology are considered, crisis organizations must
understand what the choices are and if they are at risk by using technologies
with known flaws and vulnerabilities.
2. Foster Ongoing Conversations without Fear. As indicated in Chapter 5, there
is a significant gap in understanding how, when, and where organizations use
their external resources and why they feel they need more help understanding
their vulnerabilities. Designing a strategic approach to information security
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policy and procedure could guide crisis organizations to embrace the concept
that just because a cyber attack has not happened does not mean that one
won’t.
3. Identify Key Characteristics. Research must continue in order to understand
the unique environment of crisis organizations. This study begins to outline
some unique characteristics. However, more work needs to be done that
researches how political and cultural obstacles impact information security.
As stated by a survey respondent, “Addressing confidentiality issues with data
storage; finding a database software program to gather required data for
funders that don't (sic) cost $30,000 a year in user fees and maintains
support.”
4. Ongoing Survey and Research. Further research through the lens of crisis
organizations and small non-profits is needed, such as BYOD, attacker
profiles, cloud services, and data security. Also, as stated throughout this
study, several survey questions need to be analyzed further. It would be
helpful to create an improved repeatable survey based on the one used in this
study; however, enhanced with a scoring feature would provide researchers
with a way to measure improvements (or not) in information security within
this domain over time.
5. Maintain a Holistic View. Technology cannot be the only focus by researchers
and security experts when addressing the information security of crisis
organizations and others. The NIST framework was pivotal to help illustrate
the important intersections of people, process, technology, and policy and the
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co-dependencies of these variables on the success and security. Without a
holistic view, the entire system fails.
6.2

Final Thoughts

This study has set a critical foundation for future research by using a gap analysis
to document the current state of information security in organizations working with
victims of violence. Using the NIST CSF provided a roadmap that gave this study a
foundational place to begin. Now complete, researchers, security experts, and crisis
organizations can work together to address the areas of future work, particularly the
development of an assessment tool for crisis organizations. Crisis organizations, as
evident by conversations with representatives during this study, are ready to learn, to
adopt, and to embrace the challenges of understanding information security.
Working to improve information security within crisis organizations is not about
transforming crisis organization into experts or pillars of information security. This and
future research is intended to raise the bar in awareness and confidence. As seen through
the results of the study, staff, victims, and other stakeholders in the crisis organization
ecosystem use technology every day without a real understanding of the potential for
unintended consequences to actions and the risks to the organization. As technology
advances and mobile devices continue to keep people, data, and systems connected, it is
without question that crisis organizations need to find ways to assess, anticipate, and
minimize the potential for harm to victims, staff, and other stakeholders by securing
confidential communications and data collection, storage, and sharing, thereby arming
them with the knowledge to ask for help.
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This research is one step in a long journey to improve the state of information
security in organizations dedicated to helping victims of violence. There are opportunities
to expand the body of knowledge in this area even further by learning from crisis
organizations and expanding to other non-profit sectors. This research opens the platform
for discourse and ideas in a different context to continue the conversation for research
and application for crisis organizations and other non-profit organizations. This study
accomplished the goal of identifying the current state of information security within crisis
organizations while starting the process of prioritizing actionable next steps.
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Appendix A: NIST Cybersecurity Framework Core
Function

Category

Subcategory

Informative References
CCS CSC 1
COBIT 5 BAI09.01, BAI09.02

ID.AM-1: Physical
devices and systems
within the organization
are inventoried

IDENTIFY (ID)

Asset Management
(ID.AM): The data,
personnel, devices,
systems, and
facilities that enable
the organization to
achieve business
purposes are
identified and
managed consistent
with their relative
importance to
business objectives
and the
organization’s risk
strategy.

Business
Environment
(ID.BE): The

ID.AM-2: Software
platforms and
applications within the
organization are
inventoried

ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.2.3.4
ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 7.8
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.8.1.1,
A.8.1.2
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CM-8
CCS CSC 2
COBIT 5 BAI09.01, BAI09.02,
BAI09.05
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.2.3.4
ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 7.8
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.8.1.1,
A.8.1.2
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CM-8
CCS CSC 1

ID.AM-3:
Organizational
communication and
data flows are mapped

ID.AM-4: External
information systems
are catalogued
ID.AM-5: Resources
(e.g., hardware,
devices, data, and
software) are
prioritized based on
their classification,
criticality, and business
value
ID.AM-6:
Cybersecurity roles and
responsibilities for the
entire workforce and
third-party stakeholders
(e.g., suppliers,
customers, partners)
are established
ID.BE-1: The
organization’s role in
the supply chain is

COBIT 5 DSS05.02
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.2.3.4
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.13.2.1
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AC-4,
CA-3, CA-9, PL-8
COBIT 5 APO02.02
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.11.2.6
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AC-20,
SA-9
COBIT 5 APO03.03, APO03.04,
BAI09.02
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.2.3.6
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.8.2.1
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CP-2,
RA-2, SA-14
COBIT 5 APO01.02, DSS06.03
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.2.3.3
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.6.1.1
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CP-2,
PS-7, PM-11
COBIT 5 APO08.04, APO08.05,
APO10.03, APO10.04,
APO10.05
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organization’s
mission, objectives,
stakeholders, and
activities are
understood and
prioritized; this
information is used
to inform
cybersecurity roles,
responsibilities, and
risk management
decisions.

identified and
communicated

ID.BE-2: The
organization’s place in
critical infrastructure
and its industry sector
is identified and
communicated
ID.BE-3: Priorities for
organizational mission,
objectives, and
activities are
established and
communicated
ID.BE-4:
Dependencies and
critical functions for
delivery of critical
services are established
ID.BE-5: Resilience
requirements to support
delivery of critical
services are established

Governance
(ID.GV): The
policies,
procedures, and
processes to
manage and
monitor the
organization’s
regulatory, legal,
risk, environmental,
and operational
requirements are
understood and
inform the
management of
cybersecurity risk.

ID.GV-1:
Organizational
information security
policy is established

ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.15.1.3,
A.15.2.1, A.15.2.2
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CP-2,
SA-12
COBIT 5 APO02.06, APO03.01
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 PM-8
COBIT 5 APO02.01, APO02.06,
APO03.01
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.2.2.1,
4.2.3.6
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 PM-11,
SA-14
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.11.2.2,
A.11.2.3, A.12.1.3
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CP-8,
PE-9, PE-11, PM-8, SA-14
COBIT 5 DSS04.02
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.11.1.4,
A.17.1.1, A.17.1.2, A.17.2.1
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CP-2,
CP-11, SA-14
COBIT 5 APO01.03, EDM01.01,
EDM01.02
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.2.6
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.5.1.1
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 -1
controls from all families

ID.GV-2: Information
security roles &
responsibilities are
coordinated and
aligned with internal
roles and external
partners
ID.GV-3: Legal and
regulatory
requirements regarding
cybersecurity,
including privacy and
civil liberties
obligations, are
understood and
managed

COBIT 5 APO13.12

ID.GV-4: Governance
and risk management
processes address

COBIT 5 DSS04.02
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.2.3.1,
4.2.3.3, 4.2.3.8, 4.2.3.9, 4.2.3.11,

ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.2.3.3
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.6.1.1,
A.7.2.1
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 PM-1,
PS-7
COBIT 5 MEA03.01, MEA03.04
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.4.3.7
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.18.1
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 -1
controls from all families (except
PM-1)
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cybersecurity risks

ID.RA-1: Asset
vulnerabilities are
identified and
documented

Risk Assessment
(ID.RA): The
organization
understands the
cybersecurity risk
to organizational
operations
(including mission,
functions, image, or
reputation),
organizational
assets, and
individuals.

Risk Management
Strategy (ID.RM):
The organization’s
priorities,
constraints, risk
tolerances, and
assumptions are
established and
used to support
operational risk

ID.RA-2: Threat and
vulnerability
information is received
from information
sharing forums and
sources

4.3.2.4.3, 4.3.2.6.3
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 PM-9,
PM-11
CCS CSC 4
COBIT 5 APO12.01, APO12.02,
APO12.03, APO12.04
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.2.3,
4.2.3.7, 4.2.3.9, 4.2.3.12
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.12.6.1,
A.18.2.3
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CA-2,
CA-7, CA-8, RA-3, RA-5, SA-5,
SA-11, SI-2, SI-4, SI-5
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.2.3,
4.2.3.9, 4.2.3.12
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.6.1.4
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 PM-15,
PM-16, SI-5

ID.RA-3: Threats, both
internal and external,
are identified and
documented

COBIT 5 APO12.01, APO12.02,
APO12.03, APO12.04
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.2.3,
4.2.3.9, 4.2.3.12
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 RA-3,
SI-5, PM-12, PM-16

ID.RA-4: Potential
business impacts and
likelihoods are
identified

COBIT 5 DSS04.02
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.2.3,
4.2.3.9, 4.2.3.12
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 RA-2,
RA-3, PM-9, PM-11, SA-14

ID.RA-5: Threats,
vulnerabilities,
likelihoods, and
impacts are used to
determine risk
ID.RA-6: Risk
responses are identified
and prioritized
ID.RM-1: Risk
management processes
are established,
managed, and agreed to
by organizational
stakeholders
ID.RM-2:
Organizational risk
tolerance is determined
and clearly expressed

COBIT 5 APO12.02
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.12.6.1
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 RA-2,
RA-3, PM-16
COBIT 5 APO12.05, APO13.02
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 PM-4,
PM-9
COBIT 5 APO12.04, APO12.05,
APO13.02, BAI02.03, BAI04.02
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.4.2
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 PM-9
COBIT 5 APO12.06
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.2.6.5
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 PM-9
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decisions.

ID.RM-3: The
organization’s
determination of risk
tolerance is informed
by its role in critical
infrastructure and
sector specific risk
analysis

NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 PM-8,
PM-9, PM-11, SA-14

CCS CSC 16
COBIT 5 DSS05.04, DSS06.03
PR.AC-1: Identities
and credentials are
managed for authorized
devices and users

PR.AC-2: Physical
access to assets is
managed and protected

PROTECT (PR)

Access Control
(PR.AC): Access to
assets and
associated facilities
is limited to
authorized users,
processes, or
devices, and to
authorized activities
and transactions.

PR.AC-3: Remote
access is managed

PR.AC-4: Access
permissions are
managed, incorporating
the principles of least
privilege and
separation of duties

PR.AC-5: Network
integrity is protected,
incorporating network
segregation where
appropriate

ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.3.5.1
ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 1.1, SR
1.2, SR 1.3, SR 1.4, SR 1.5, SR
1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.9.2.1,
A.9.2.2, A.9.2.4, A.9.3.1, A.9.4.2,
A.9.4.3
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AC-2,
IA Family
COBIT 5 DSS01.04, DSS05.05
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.3.3.2,
4.3.3.3.8
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.11.1.1,
A.11.1.2, A.11.1.4, A.11.1.6,
A.11.2.3
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 PE-2,
PE-3, PE-4, PE-5, PE-6, PE-9
COBIT 5 APO13.01, DSS01.04,
DSS05.03
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.3.6.6
ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 1.13, SR
2.6
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.6.2.2,
A.13.1.1, A.13.2.1
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AC-17,
AC-19, AC-20
CCS CSC 12, 15
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.3.7.3
ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 2.1
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.6.1.2,
A.9.1.2, A.9.2.3, A.9.4.1, A.9.4.4
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AC-2,
AC-3, AC-5, AC-6, AC-16
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.3.4
ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 3.1, SR
3.8
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.13.1.1,
A.13.1.3, A.13.2.1
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AC-4,
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SC-7
CCS CSC 9
COBIT 5 APO07.03, BAI05.07
PR.AT-1: All users are
informed and trained

Awareness and
Training (PR.AT):
The organization’s
personnel and
partners are
provided
cybersecurity
awareness
education and are
adequately trained
to perform their
information
security-related
duties and
responsibilities
consistent with
related policies,
procedures, and
agreements.

PR.AT-2: Privileged
users understand roles
& responsibilities

PR.AT-3: Third-party
stakeholders (e.g.,
suppliers, customers,
partners) understand
roles & responsibilities

ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.7.2.2
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AT-2,
PM-13
CCS CSC 9
COBIT 5 APO07.02, DSS06.03
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.2.4.2,
4.3.2.4.3
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.6.1.1,
A.7.2.2
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AT-3,
PM-13
CCS CSC 9
COBIT 5 APO07.03, APO10.04,
APO10.05
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.2.4.2
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.6.1.1,
A.7.2.2
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 PS-7,
SA-9
CCS CSC 9
COBIT 5 APO07.03

PR.AT-4: Senior
executives understand
roles & responsibilities

PR.AT-5: Physical and
information security
personnel understand
roles & responsibilities

Data Security
(PR.DS):
Information and
records (data) are
managed consistent
with the
organization’s risk
strategy to protect
the confidentiality,

ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.2.4.2

PR.DS-1: Data-at-rest
is protected

ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.2.4.2
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.6.1.1,
A.7.2.2,
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AT-3,
PM-13
CCS CSC 9
COBIT 5 APO07.03
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.2.4.2
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.6.1.1,
A.7.2.2,
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AT-3,
PM-13
CCS CSC 17
COBIT 5 APO01.06, BAI02.01,
BAI06.01, DSS06.06
ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 3.4, SR
4.1
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.8.2.3
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 SC-28

PR.DS-2: Data-in-

CCS CSC 17
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integrity, and
availability of
information.

transit is protected

PR.DS-3: Assets are
formally managed
throughout removal,
transfers, and
disposition

PR.DS-4: Adequate
capacity to ensure
availability is
maintained

COBIT 5 APO01.06, DSS06.06
ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 3.1, SR
3.8, SR 4.1, SR 4.2
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.8.2.3,
A.13.1.1, A.13.2.1, A.13.2.3,
A.14.1.2, A.14.1.3
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 SC-8
COBIT 5 BAI09.03
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4. 4.3.3.3.9,
4.3.4.4.1
ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 4.2
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.8.2.3,
A.8.3.1, A.8.3.2, A.8.3.3,
A.11.2.7
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CM-8,
MP-6, PE-16
COBIT 5 APO13.01
ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 7.1, SR
7.2
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.12.3.1
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AU-4,
CP-2, SC-5
CCS CSC 17
COBIT 5 APO01.06

PR.DS-5: Protections
against data leaks are
implemented

PR.DS-6: Integrity
checking mechanisms
are used to verify
software, firmware, and
information integrity

Information
Protection
Processes and

ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 5.2
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.6.1.2,
A.7.1.1, A.7.1.2, A.7.3.1, A.8.2.2,
A.8.2.3, A.9.1.1, A.9.1.2, A.9.2.3,
A.9.4.1, A.9.4.4, A.9.4.5,
A.13.1.3, A.13.2.1, A.13.2.3,
A.13.2.4, A.14.1.2, A.14.1.3
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AC-4,
AC-5, AC-6, PE-19, PS-3, PS-6,
SC-7, SC-8, SC-13, SC-31, SI-4
ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 3.1, SR
3.3, SR 3.4, SR 3.8
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.12.2.1,
A.12.5.1, A.14.1.2, A.14.1.3
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 SI-7

PR.DS-7: The
development and
testing environment(s)
are separate from the
production
environment

COBIT 5 BAI07.04

PR.IP-1: A baseline
configuration of
information

CCS CSC 3, 10
COBIT 5 BAI10.01, BAI10.02,
BAI10.03, BAI10.05

ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.12.1.4
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CM-2
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Procedures
(PR.IP): Security
policies (that
address purpose,
scope, roles,
responsibilities,
management
commitment, and
coordination among
organizational
entities), processes,
and procedures are
maintained and
used to manage
protection of
information systems
and assets.

technology/industrial
control systems is
created and maintained

PR.IP-2: A System
Development Life
Cycle to manage
systems is implemented

PR.IP-3:
Configuration change
control processes are in
place

PR.IP-4: Backups of
information are
conducted, maintained,
and tested periodically

PR.IP-5: Policy and
regulations regarding
the physical operating
environment for
organizational assets
are met

PR.IP-6: Data is
destroyed according to
policy

ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.4.3.2,
4.3.4.3.3
ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 7.6
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.12.1.2,
A.12.5.1, A.12.6.2, A.14.2.2,
A.14.2.3, A.14.2.4
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CM-2,
CM-3, CM-4, CM-5, CM-6, CM7, CM-9, SA-10
COBIT 5 APO13.01
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.4.3.3
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.6.1.5,
A.14.1.1, A.14.2.1, A.14.2.5
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 SA-3,
SA-4, SA-8, SA-10, SA-11, SA12, SA-15, SA-17, PL-8
COBIT 5 BAI06.01, BAI01.06
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.4.3.2,
4.3.4.3.3
ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 7.6
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.12.1.2,
A.12.5.1, A.12.6.2, A.14.2.2,
A.14.2.3, A.14.2.4
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CM-3,
CM-4, SA-10
COBIT 5 APO13.01
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.4.3.9
ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 7.3, SR
7.4
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.12.3.1,
A.17.1.2A.17.1.3, A.18.1.3
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CP-4,
CP-6, CP-9
COBIT 5 DSS01.04, DSS05.05
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.3.3.1
4.3.3.3.2, 4.3.3.3.3, 4.3.3.3.5,
4.3.3.3.6
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.11.1.4,
A.11.2.1, A.11.2.2, A.11.2.3
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 PE-10,
PE-12, PE-13, PE-14, PE-15, PE18
COBIT 5 BAI09.03
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.4.4.4
ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 4.2
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.8.2.3,
A.8.3.1, A.8.3.2, A.11.2.7
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 MP-6
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PR.IP-7: Protection
processes are
continuously improved
PR.IP-8: Effectiveness
of protection
technologies is shared
with appropriate parties
PR.IP-9: Response
plans (Incident
Response and Business
Continuity) and
recovery plans
(Incident Recovery and
Disaster Recovery) are
in place and managed
PR.IP-10: Response
and recovery plans are
tested

PR.IP-11:
Cybersecurity is
included in human
resources practices
(e.g., deprovisioning,
personnel screening)

Maintenance
(PR.MA):
Maintenance and
repairs of industrial
control and
information system
components is
performed
consistent with
policies and
procedures.

PR.IP-12: A
vulnerability
management plan is
developed and
implemented
PR.MA-1:
Maintenance and repair
of organizational assets
is performed and
logged in a timely
manner, with approved
and controlled tools
PR.MA-2: Remote
maintenance of
organizational assets is
approved, logged, and
performed in a manner
that prevents
unauthorized access

COBIT 5 APO11.06, DSS04.05
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.4.3.1,
4.4.3.2, 4.4.3.3, 4.4.3.4, 4.4.3.5,
4.4.3.6, 4.4.3.7, 4.4.3.8
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CA-2,
CA-7, CP-2, IR-8, PL-2, PM-6
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.16.1.6
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AC-21,
CA-7, SI-4
COBIT 5 DSS04.03
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.2.5.3,
4.3.4.5.1
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.16.1.1,
A.17.1.1, A.17.1.2
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CP-2,
IR-8
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.2.5.7,
4.3.4.5.11
ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 3.3
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.17.1.3
NIST SP 800-53 Rev.4 CP-4, IR3, PM-14
COBIT 5 APO07.01, APO07.02,
APO07.03, APO07.04,
APO07.05
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.3.2.1,
4.3.3.2.2, 4.3.3.2.3
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.7.1.1,
A.7.3.1, A.8.1.4
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 PS
Family
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.12.6.1,
A.18.2.2
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 RA-3,
RA-5, SI-2
COBIT 5 BAI09.03
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.3.3.7
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.11.1.2,
A.11.2.4, A.11.2.5
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 MA-2,
MA-3, MA-5
COBIT 5 DSS05.04
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.3.6.5,
4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.6.7, 4.4.4.6.8
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.11.2.4,
A.15.1.1, A.15.2.1
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 MA-4
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CCS CSC 14

PR.PT-1: Audit/log
records are determined,
documented,
implemented, and
reviewed in accordance
with policy

PR.PT-2: Removable
media is protected and
its use restricted
according to policy
Protective
Technology
(PR.PT): Technical
security solutions
are managed to
ensure the security
and resilience of
systems and assets,
consistent with
related policies,
procedures, and
agreements.

PR.PT-3: Access to
systems and assets is
controlled,
incorporating the
principle of least
functionality

PR.PT-4:
Communications and
control networks are
protected

DETECT (DE)

Anomalies and
Events (DE.AE):

DE.AE-1: A baseline
of network operations

COBIT 5 APO11.04
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.3.3.9,
4.3.3.5.8, 4.3.4.4.7, 4.4.2.1,
4.4.2.2, 4.4.2.4
ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 2.8, SR
2.9, SR 2.10, SR 2.11, SR 2.12
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.12.4.1,
A.12.4.2, A.12.4.3, A.12.4.4,
A.12.7.1
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AU
Family
COBIT 5 DSS05.02, APO13.01
ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 2.3
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.8.2.2,
A.8.2.3, A.8.3.1, A.8.3.3,
A.11.2.9
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 MP-2,
MP-4, MP-5, MP-7
COBIT 5 DSS05.02
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.3.5.1,
4.3.3.5.2, 4.3.3.5.3, 4.3.3.5.4,
4.3.3.5.5, 4.3.3.5.6, 4.3.3.5.7,
4.3.3.5.8, 4.3.3.6.1, 4.3.3.6.2,
4.3.3.6.3, 4.3.3.6.4, 4.3.3.6.5,
4.3.3.6.6, 4.3.3.6.7, 4.3.3.6.8,
4.3.3.6.9, 4.3.3.7.1, 4.3.3.7.2,
4.3.3.7.3, 4.3.3.7.4
ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 1.1, SR
1.2, SR 1.3, SR 1.4, SR 1.5, SR
1.6, SR 1.7, SR 1.8, SR 1.9, SR
1.10, SR 1.11, SR 1.12, SR 1.13,
SR 2.1, SR 2.2, SR 2.3, SR 2.4,
SR 2.5, SR 2.6, SR 2.7
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.9.1.2
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AC-3,
CM-7
CCS CSC 7
COBIT 5 DSS05.02, APO13.01
ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 3.1, SR
3.5, SR 3.8, SR 4.1, SR 4.3, SR
5.1, SR 5.2, SR 5.3, SR 7.1, SR
7.6
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.13.1.1,
A.13.2.1
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AC-4,
AC-17, AC-18, CP-8, SC-7
COBIT 5 DSS03.01
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.4.3.3
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Anomalous activity
is detected in a
timely manner and
the potential impact
of events is
understood.

and expected data
flows for users and
systems is established
and managed

DE.AE-2: Detected
events are analyzed to
understand attack
targets and methods

DE.AE-3: Event data
are aggregated and
correlated from
multiple sources and
sensors
DE.AE-4: Impact of
events is determined
DE.AE-5: Incident
alert thresholds are
established

DE.CM-1: The
network is monitored
to detect potential
cybersecurity events
Security
Continuous
Monitoring
(DE.CM): The
information system
and assets are
monitored at
discrete intervals to
identify
cybersecurity
events and verify
the effectiveness of
protective
measures.

DE.CM-2: The
physical environment is
monitored to detect
potential cybersecurity
events
DE.CM-3: Personnel
activity is monitored to
detect potential
cybersecurity events

NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AC-4,
CA-3, CM-2, SI-4
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.4.5.6,
4.3.4.5.7, 4.3.4.5.8
ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 2.8, SR
2.9, SR 2.10, SR 2.11, SR 2.12,
SR 3.9, SR 6.1, SR 6.2
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.16.1.1,
A.16.1.4
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AU-6,
CA-7, IR-4, SI-4
ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 6.1
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AU-6,
CA-7, IR-4, IR-5, IR-8, SI-4
COBIT 5 APO12.06
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CP-2,
IR-4, RA-3, SI -4
COBIT 5 APO12.06
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.2.3.10
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 IR-4, IR5, IR-8
CCS CSC 14, 16
COBIT 5 DSS05.07
ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 6.2
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AC-2,
AU-12, CA-7, CM-3, SC-5, SC7, SI-4
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.3.3.8
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CA-7,
PE-3, PE-6, PE-20
ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 6.2
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.12.4.1
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AC-2,
AU-12, AU-13, CA-7, CM-10,
CM-11
CCS CSC 5
COBIT 5 DSS05.01

DE.CM-4: Malicious
code is detected

ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.4.3.8
ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 3.2
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.12.2.1
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 SI-3
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DE.CM-5:
Unauthorized mobile
code is detected
DE.CM-6: External
service provider
activity is monitored to
detect potential
cybersecurity events
DE.CM-7: Monitoring
for unauthorized
personnel, connections,
devices, and software is
performed
DE.CM-8:
Vulnerability scans are
performed

ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 2.4
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.12.5.1
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 SC-18,
SI-4. SC-44
COBIT 5 APO07.06
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.14.2.7,
A.15.2.1
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CA-7,
PS-7, SA-4, SA-9, SI-4
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AU-12,
CA-7, CM-3, CM-8, PE-3, PE-6,
PE-20, SI-4
COBIT 5 BAI03.10
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.2.3.1,
4.2.3.7
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.12.6.1
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 RA-5
CCS CSC 5

DE.DP-1: Roles and
responsibilities for
detection are well
defined to ensure
accountability

Detection
Processes
(DE.DP): Detection
processes and
procedures are
maintained and
tested to ensure
timely and adequate
awareness of
anomalous events.

DE.DP-2: Detection
activities comply with
all applicable
requirements

COBIT 5 DSS05.01
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.4.3.1
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.6.1.1
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CA-2,
CA-7, PM-14
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.4.3.2
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.18.1.4
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CA-2,
CA-7, PM-14, SI-4
COBIT 5 APO13.02
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.4.3.2

DE.DP-3: Detection
processes are tested

ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 3.3
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.14.2.8
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CA-2,
CA-7, PE-3, PM-14, SI-3, SI-4
COBIT 5 APO12.06

DE.DP-4: Event
detection information is
communicated to
appropriate parties

ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.4.5.9

DE.DP-5: Detection
processes are
continuously improved

COBIT 5 APO11.06, DSS04.05

ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 6.1
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.16.1.2
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AU-6,
CA-2, CA-7, RA-5, SI-4
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.4.3.4
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.16.1.6
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NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4, CA-2,
CA-7, PL-2, RA-5, SI-4, PM-14
Response Planning
(RS.RP): Response
processes and
procedures are
executed and
maintained, to
ensure timely
response to detected
cybersecurity
events.

COBIT 5 BAI01.10
CCS CSC 18
RS.RP-1: Response
plan is executed during
or after an event

RESPOND (RS)

Analysis (RS.AN):
Analysis is
conducted to ensure
adequate response
and support
recovery activities.

ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.16.1.5
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CP-2,
CP-10, IR-4, IR-8

RS.CO-1: Personnel
know their roles and
order of operations
when a response is
needed

Communications
(RS.CO): Response
activities are
coordinated with
internal and
external
stakeholders, as
appropriate, to
include external
support from law
enforcement
agencies.

ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.4.5.1

RS.CO-2: Events are
reported consistent
with established criteria

RS.CO-3: Information
is shared consistent
with response plans
RS.CO-4:
Coordination with
stakeholders occurs
consistent with
response plans
RS.CO-5: Voluntary
information sharing
occurs with external
stakeholders to achieve
broader cybersecurity
situational awareness

RS.AN-1:
Notifications from
detection systems are
investigated

RS.AN-2: The impact
of the incident is
understood

ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.4.5.2,
4.3.4.5.3, 4.3.4.5.4
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.6.1.1,
A.16.1.1
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CP-2,
CP-3, IR-3, IR-8
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.4.5.5
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.6.1.3,
A.16.1.2
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AU-6,
IR-6, IR-8
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.4.5.2
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.16.1.2
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CA-2,
CA-7, CP-2, IR-4, IR-8, PE-6,
RA-5, SI-4
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.4.5.5
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CP-2,
IR-4, IR-8

NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 PM-15,
SI-5

COBIT 5 DSS02.07
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.4.5.6,
4.3.4.5.7, 4.3.4.5.8
ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 6.1
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.12.4.1,
A.12.4.3, A.16.1.5
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AU-6,
CA-7, IR-4, IR-5, PE-6, SI-4
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.4.5.6,
4.3.4.5.7, 4.3.4.5.8
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.16.1.6
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RS.AN-3: Forensics
are performed

RS.AN-4: Incidents are
categorized consistent
with response plans

RS.MI-1: Incidents are
contained
Mitigation
(RS.MI): Activities
are performed to
prevent expansion
of an event,
mitigate its effects,
and eradicate the
incident.

RECOVER (RC)

Improvements
(RS.IM):
Organizational
response activities
are improved by
incorporating
lessons learned
from current and
previous
detection/response
activities.
Recovery Planning
(RC.RP): Recovery
processes and
procedures are
executed and
maintained to
ensure timely
restoration of
systems or assets
affected by
cybersecurity
events.

RS.MI-2: Incidents are
mitigated
RS.MI-3: Newly
identified
vulnerabilities are
mitigated or
documented as
accepted risks

NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CP-2,
IR-4
ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 2.8, SR
2.9, SR 2.10, SR 2.11, SR 2.12,
SR 3.9, SR 6.1
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.16.1.7
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 AU-7,
IR-4
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.4.5.6
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.16.1.4
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CP-2,
IR-4, IR-5, IR-8
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.4.5.6
ISA 62443-3-3:2013 SR 5.1, SR
5.2, SR 5.4
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.16.1.5
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 IR-4
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.4.5.6,
4.3.4.5.10
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.12.2.1,
A.16.1.5
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 IR-4
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.12.6.1
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CA-7,
RA-3, RA-5

RS.IM-1: Response
plans incorporate
lessons learned

COBIT 5 BAI01.13
ISA 62443-2-1:2009 4.3.4.5.10,
4.4.3.4
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.16.1.6
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CP-2,
IR-4, IR-8

RS.IM-2: Response
strategies are updated

NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CP-2,
IR-4, IR-8
CCS CSC 8
COBIT 5 DSS02.05, DSS03.04
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.16.1.5

RC.RP-1: Recovery
plan is executed during
or after an event

NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CP-10,
IR-4, IR-8
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Improvements
(RC.IM): Recovery
planning and
processes are
improved by
incorporating
lessons learned into
future activities.
Communications
(RC.CO):
Restoration
activities are
coordinated with
internal and
external parties,
such as
coordinating
centers, Internet
Service Providers,
owners of attacking
systems, victims,
other CSIRTs, and
vendors.

(NIST, 2014)

RC.IM-1: Recovery
plans incorporate
lessons learned
RC.IM-2: Recovery
strategies are updated
RC.CO-1: Public
relations are managed
RC.CO-2: Reputation
after an event is
repaired
RC.CO-3: Recovery
activities are
communicated to
internal stakeholders
and executive and
management teams

COBIT 5 BAI05.07
ISA 62443-2-1 4.4.3.4
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CP-2,
IR-4, IR-8
COBIT 5 BAI07.08
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CP-2,
IR-4, IR-8
COBIT 5 EDM03.02
COBIT 5 MEA03.02

NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 CP-2,
IR-4
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Appendix B: Crisis Organizations Website Review
The preliminary research conducted for this a study included a review of the websites of
20 crisis organizations and document the social media platforms being used.
Organization

A21 Campaign

Website

Facebook

Twitter

YouTube

Other

X

X

X

X

Instagram

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

(A21 Campaign, n.d.)

Arizona League to End
Regional Trafficking
(Arizona League to End
Regional Trafficking, n.d.)

Asian Shelter and
Advocacy Project (Shelter

LinkedIN

Program Improvement Fund,
n.d.)

California Against Slavery
(California Against Slavery, n.d.)

Casa Myrna Vazquez
(Casa Myrna, n.d.)

Cyber Angels

X

(CyberAngels, n.d)

Elizabeth Stone House

X

(Elizabeth Stone House, n.d.)

FINEX House

X

(Finex House, n.d.)

Harbor COV

X

Tumblr,
Google+

(HarborCOV, n.d.)

National Human
Trafficking Resource
Center

X

(National Human Trafficking
Resource Center, n.d.)

National Network to End
Domestic Violence including the Safety Net
Project
(National Network to End
Domestic Violence, n.d.)

New York State Coalition
Against Domestic Violence

X

Google+,
Flickr,
Pinterest
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Organization

Website

Facebook

Twitter

YouTube

Other

X

X

X

X

LinkedIN

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

(New York State Coalition
Against Domestic Violence, n.d.)

Not for Sale

X

(Not For Sale, n.d.)

REACH Beyond Domestic
Violence (Reach Ma, n.d.)

X

Renewal House

X

(Renewal House, n.d.)

Respond
(Respond!, n.d.)

Stalking Resource Center
(Stalking Resource Center, n.d.)

Transition House
(Transition House, n.d.)

Wired Safety
(Wired Safety, n.d.)

Working to Halt Abuse
(Working to Halt Online Abuse,
n.d.)

X

X
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Appendix C: Survey Development
The final survey was developed using both the 2012 NNEDV survey and the NIST CSF
(NIST, 2014). Below maps each survey question to the source.
Question
Q1: Consent Form

NNEDV

NIST

n/a

n/a

Q2: What type(s) of victims or survivors does your
organization serve?
Q3: What is the size of your organization?
Q4: Who primarily manages the computers and
information technology (e.g. Internet connection) in
your organization?

RS.RP-1

Q5: What is the total annual budget of your
organization?
Q6: Where is the mission of your organization
posted?

ID.BE-3

Q7: What technologies does your organization use?
Q8: What computer operating systems does your
organization use?
Q9: Does your organization currently use any of the
following security technologies?

n/a

n/a

Q10: How does your staff access the Internet?

ID.GV-1

Q11: Does your staff access organizational electronic
documents from outside the premises?

ID.AM-3
ID.GV-1

Q12: What social media does your organization use?
Q13: Who in your organization is responsible for

141
Question

NNEDV

NIST

n/a

n/a

managing the organization's social media channel(s)?
Q14: For what purpose(s) does your organization use
social media? (check all that apply)
Q15: Does your organization have human resources
policies regarding social media use by the following?
Q16: Do you feel you need more help understanding
technology and information security?
Q17: In general, what type(s) of training are most
effective in your organization?
Q18: What do you perceive are barriers to improving
your organization's information security?
Q19: Do you know if your organization has a
complete list (inventory) of all computers, laptops,
cell phones, and other technologies in belonging to
the organization?

ID.AM-1
ID.AM-2
ID.AM-5

Q20: Do you know if these items are insured against
theft or loss?

ID.AM-1

Q21: Is the software used by your organization
inventoried?

ID.AM-2

Q22: Has your organization identified what hardware
and software are critical to your operations?

ID.AM-5

Q23: Does your organization have policies or
documented plans for power or Internet outages?

ID.BE-4

Q24 Does your organization have policies for
physical security?

ID.BE-4
ID.GV-1
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Question

NNEDV

NIST

Q25: Does your organization have policies for
information security?

ID.AM-3
ID.BE-4
ID.GV-1
PR.AC-1

Q26: If yes, which technologies do these policies
include?

ID.BE-4
ID.GV-1

Q27: Who is responsible for information security
within the organization?

ID.AM-6
ID.GV-2

Q28: Who in your organization is responsible for the
legal requirements for information security? (e.g.
GLBA, HIPPA compliance, protective orders, etc.)

PR.AT-2

Q29: Are the legal requirements listed in Question 28
regarding information security understood by those
responsible?

PR.AT-2

Q30: Has your organization identified areas or
practices that may be attractive targets or vulnerable
for a cyber attack or breach?

ID.RM-1

Q31: Has your organization experienced a
cybersecurity attack or breach?

ID.RM-1
RS.RP-1

Q32: Does your organization consider itself prepared
to handle a cybersecurity breach or attack?

ID.RM-1

Q33: Has your organization conducted information
security workshops or training with staff, volunteers,
and other stakeholders?

ID.RM-1
PR.AT-1

Q34: If yes or plan to soon, who will conduct the
training?

ID.RM-1

Q35: Does your organization document who has
access to sensitive files, databases, and other

PR.AC-1
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Question

NNEDV

NIST

electronic information?
Q36: Does your organization inform or train new
employees about information security policies and
procedures?

PR.AT-1

Q37: Does your organization inform third-party
vendors, partners, and external stakeholders about
your information security policies and procedures?

ID.AM-6
PR.AT-1

Q38: If your organization does use third-party
vendors do they inform you of their information
security policies and procedures?

PR.AT-1

Q39: How is access to electronic files containing
sensitive information stored within your organization
protected?

PR.AC-1

Q40: Does your organization have policies and
procedures for the destruction of electronic
documents?

PR.IP-6

Q41: Does your organization have policies and
procedures for the destruction storage devices? (e.g.
DVDs, CDs, thumbdrives, etc.)

PR.IP-6

Q42: Does your organization have access to external
resources and experts to help with cyber security?

n/a

n/a

Q43 Please provide any additional information
regarding the current state of information security
within your organization.

n/a

n/a

Q44 If you would like to receive a statistical
summary of this survey at the conclusion of this
study, please provide your contact information.

n/a

n/a

(NIST, 2014), (NNEDV, 2012)
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Appendix D: IRB Application and Amendment
Institutional Review Board
1.

Project Title: Identifying the Current State of Information Security within Crisis

Organizations
2.

Full Review

Expedited Review X

3.

Anticipated Funding Source: None

4.

Principal Investigator [ See Policy on Eligibility to serve as a Principal Investigator
for Research Involving Human Subjects]:
Dr. Eugene Spafford
Professor of Computer Science
Lawson Building, Room 1183
(765) 494-7825
spaf@purdue.edu

5. Co-investigators and key personnel [See Education Policy for Conducting Human
Subjects Research]:

6.
7.

Kelley Kathleen Misata Nybakken
PhD Candidate
Lawson Building, Room 1183
(617) 650-0601
kmisata@purdue.edu
Consultants [See Education Policy for Conducting Human Subjects Research]:
N/A
The principal investigator agrees to carry out the proposed project as stated in the
application and to promptly report to the Institutional Review Board any proposed
changes and/or unanticipated problems involving risks to subjects or others participating
in the approved project in accordance with the HRPP Guideline 207 Researcher
Responsibilities, Purdue Research Foundation-Purdue University Statement of Principles
and the Confidentiality Statement. The principal investigator has received a copy of the
Federal-Wide Assurance (FWA) and has access to copies of 45 CFR 46 and the Belmont
Report. The principal investigator agrees to inform the Institutional Review Board and
complete all necessary reports should the principal investigator terminate University
association.
_________________________________________
Principal Investigator Signature

8.

Date

The Department Head (or authorized agent) has read and approved the application. S/he
affirms that the use of human subjects in this project is relevant to answer the research
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question being asked and has scientific or scholarly merit. Additionally s/he agrees to
maintain research records in accordance with the IRB’s research records retention
requirement should the principal investigator terminate association with the University.
___________________________________
_________________________________________
Department Head (printed)

Department Name

___________________________________
_________________________________________
Department Head Signature

Date

9. This project will be conducted at the following location(s): (please indicate city &
state)
Purdue West Lafayette Campus
Purdue Regional Campus (Specify):
X
Other (Specify): Online - survey participants will review the survey and/or
fill-out the evaluation form at his/her place of employment, all of which
are located throughout the United States.
10. If this project will involve potentially vulnerable subject populations, please check all
that apply.
Minors under age 18
Pregnant Women
Fetus/fetal tissue
Prisoners Or Incarcerated Individuals
University Students (PSYC Dept. subject pool ___)
Elderly Persons
Economically/Educationally Disadvantaged Persons
Mentally/Emotionally/Developmentally Disabled Persons
Minority Groups and/or Non-English Speakers
Intervention(s) that include medical or psychological treatment
11.

Indicate the anticipated maximum number of subjects to be enrolled in this protocol as
justified by the hypothesis and study procedures: 20 – Pilot Review

12.

This project involves the use of an Investigational New Drug (IND) or an Approved
Drug For An Unapproved Use.
YES
X NO
Drug name, IND number and company:
13.

This project involves the use of an Investigational Medical Device or an Approved
Medical Device For An Unapproved Use.
YES
X NO
Device name, IDE number and company:
14.

The project involves the use of Radiation or Radioisotopes:
YES
X NO
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15.

Does this project call for: (check-mark all that apply to this study)
Use of Voice, Video, Digital, or Image Recordings?
Subject Compensation? Please indicate the maximum payment amount to subjects.
Purdue’s Human Subjects Payment Policy
Participant Payment Disclosure
Form
VO2 Max Exercise?
More Than Minimal Risk?
Waiver of Informed Consent?
Extra Costs To Subjects?
The Use of Blood?
Total Amount of Blood
Over Time Period (days)
The Use of rDNA or Biohazardous materials?
The Use of Human Tissue or Cell Lines?
The Use of Other Fluids that Could Mask the Presence of Blood (Including Urine and
Feces)?
The Use of Protected Health Information (Obtained from Healthcare Practitioners or
Institutions)?
The Use of academic records?

16.

Does investigator or key personnel have a potential financial or other conflict of interest
in this study?
YES
X NO
APPLICATION NARRATIVE

A.

PROPOSED RESEARCH RATIONALE
This research is intended to improve the current state of information
security within organizations working with victims of violence. The study
will identify the intersection of technology, policies, and people in
information security as it pertains to the unique environment of crisis
organizations against a recognized and respect framework for information
security. It will advance the current state of research by establishing an
overdue foundation for future research in information security for crisis
and other non-profit organizations. The problem this research will address
is to establish a much-needed baseline for which crisis organizations to
build effective cyber security strategies and improvement initiatives.

B. SPECIFIC PROCEDURES TO BE FOLLOWED
Pilot Survey Review:
o 20 subject matter experts will be recruited to review the survey.
o The pilot survey review will be conducted in two rounds.
o Round one will commence by sending an email a group of highlevel executives with subject matter knowledge who will be
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identified by the research team to answer the pilot survey
reviewers. The email will include instructions regarding their role
and responsibilities as a pilot survey reviewer, a link to the online
survey in Qualtrics, and an evaluation sheet attachment in
MSWord to record their feedback. These individuals will be
identified by authorship of journals, prior identification of
expertise in this field (for example).
o After acknowledging agreement to the consent form, the
participant will take the short survey. Participants will fill out the
evaluation form during or immediately following their review of
the online survey.
o Participants will send all feedback forms back to the coinvestigator for compiling.
o Once the data compiled, in round two, participants will receive an
emailed with the results of round one and an opportunity to
provide any additional thoughts or feedback on the survey, based
on the responses of the other participants.
o At the end of the survey and completion of the evaluation forms,
the participant’s involvement will be complete.
o The data collected from both rounds will be the final comments
and suggestions provided by the participants.
o The survey will be updated based on the feedback received and
submitted to IRB as an amendment to this application.
General Survey
o An invitation to participate and a link in the online survey will be
sent to the crisis organization from the National Network to End
Domestic Violence, Thorn, and Demand Abolition.
o 700 – 1000 direct service and coordinated crisis organizations will
receive the invitation and the online survey link.
o The respondent from each organization will be considered the
participant.
o At the start of the survey on Qualtrics, each participant will be
required to read and agree to an online consent form.
o After acknowledging agreement to the consent form, the
participant will take the short survey.
o At the end of the survey, the participant’s involvement will be
complete.
o The data collected will be the answers provided to the survey
questions by the participants.
C.

SUBJECTS TO BE INCLUDED
Describe:
Pilot Survey Review:
o The inclusion criteria are to be high or executive level people with
expertise in crisis organizations, information security, and non-

148
profit organizations.
o There will be no special population involvement.
o The number of participants that are sought to be included is 15 20.
General Survey:
o The inclusion criteria are to be people employed by direct or
coordinated service crisis organizations working with victims of
violence identified by the National Network to End Domestic
Violence (NNEDV), Thorn, and Demand Abolition.
o Invitations to participate and the link to the survey will be sent
directly to the contacts from the National Network to End
Domestic Violence (NNEDV), Thorn, and Demand Abolition.
o There will be no special population involvement.
o The number of participants that will be invited to participate is 700
– 1000
D.

RECRUITMENT OF SUBJECTS AND OBTAINING INFORMED
CONSENT
Pilot Survey Review:
o Participants will be recruited based on their expertise in crisis
organizations, information security, and non-profit organizations.
o Participants will be high or executive level decision makers in their
organizations; thereby not requiring additional permission to
participate as a pilot survey reviewer.
o Participants will be individually invited via email and phone
conversations to participate as a pilot survey reviewer.
o There will be no special population involvement.
o The number of participants that are sought to be included is 15 20.
General Survey:
o Participants will be direct and coordinated service crisis
organizations identified by the National Network to End Domestic
Violence (NNEDV), Thorn, and Demand Abolition.
o Invitations to participate and link for the survey will be sent
directly to the contacts from the National Network to End
Domestic Violence (NNEDV), Thorn, and Demand Abolition.
o An initial email with survey details and links will be provide to
NNEDV, Thorn, and Demand for Abolition for distribution to their
contacts.
o Two reminder emails will be provided to to NNEDV, Thorn, and
Demand for Abolition for distribution to their contacts.
o There will be no special population involvement.
o The number of participants that will be invited to participate is 700
- 1000.
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E.

PROCEDURES FOR PAYMENT OF SUBJECTS
No compensation will be paid to any participating agency.

F.

CONFIDENTIALITY
No personal identifying information will be collected. Also, only
individuals previously invited will participate in the study.
Research records will be stored in .docx (MSWord) or .xls (Excel) format
on a dedicated hard drive located at the co-investigators address in
Brookline, MA. A de-identified hard-copy of the results will be held on
campus at Purdue University. The data will be deleted from Qualtrics
when the survey is completed.
Access will be limited initially to only the principal investigator and key
personnel.
After two years, the principal investigator will determine whether the data
should be shared with others outside the study for future research
purposes.
Three years after the initial collection, the principal investigator will
determine whether the data should be destroyed.
There will be a virtual consent form that the participants will be required
to review and agree to before completing the survey. They will accept the
consent form by clicking on the “I agree” button.

G.

POTENTIAL RISKS TO SUBJECTS
Pilot survey reviewers will be invited to participate, therefore, this
research poses minimal risk and no greater than everyday activities.
The identities of the general survey participants will not be known as the
invitation to participate and the online survey link will be sent directly
from the NNEDV, Thorn, and Demand Abolition. Therefore, this research
poses minimal risk and no greater than everyday activities.
There is a potential risk to participants of a data breach, which will be
minimized by storing all responses and research results on a dedicated
hard drive resulting in minimal risk.

H.

BENEFITS TO BE GAINED BY THE INDIVIDUAL AND/OR SOCIETY
There are no direct benefits to the participants involved in this study.
There are potential benefits to the participants that they may better
understand the current state of information security within organizations
working with victims of violence.
The benefits to society are creating a comprehensive survey being used in
the next phase of this research in identifying the risks, opportunities, and
priorities crisis organizations can address to improve their current state of
information security; with the possibility of keeping the survivors they
service safer in the process.
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I.

INVESTIGATOR’S EVALUATION OF THE RISK-BENEFIT RATIO
The research does not pose greater than minimal risk to participants than
everyday activities.
The benefits of the research outweigh any potential risks.
There are no direct benefits to the participants but the potential benefits to
society in analyzing the gaps in the current state of information security in
organizations working with victims of violence against a recognized
framework far outweighs the minimal risks.

J.

WRITTEN INFORMED CONSENT FORM
Informed Consent Form is attached to this application.

K.

WAIVER OF INFORMED CONSENT OR SIGNED CONSENT
There is no request for a Waiver of Consent Request for this study.
This study is requesting a Waiver of Signed Consent.
The research does not pose greater than minimal risk to
participants than everyday activities.
A breach of confidentiality does constitute the principal risk to
participants.
The signed consent form and email correspondence with the coinvestigator would be the only record linking the participant and
the research.
The research does not include any activities that would require
signed consent in a non-research context.
The participants will be provided a written statement via email and
online through Qualtrics about the research. The consent form will
consist of an information sheet that contains all the elements of the
consent form but without the signature lines that will require the
participant to agree to the terms prior to reviewing any survey
questions.
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Appendix E: Pilot Reviewers

Name

Position

Ed Moyle Director of Emerging Business and Technology,
Tim Casey
Michael Diamond

Risa Mednick
Laura Van Zandt
Lauren
Montanaro
Kaofeng Lee
Cindy Southworth
Erica Olsen
Ebony Tucker, JD
Tori Placona
Leah Treitman
Becky Bace
Delaney
Workman
Dhakir Warren
Greg Virgin
Diana Kelley
Jenny Backus
Stacy Martin
Teri Gilbert

ISACA
Cyber Risk Systems Architect at Intel
Board Member (Secretary) at International
Association of Security Awareness Professionals
(IASAP) and Training and Awareness Manager
of Information Security and Privacy at Intel
Executive Director, Transition House
Executive Director, Reach Beyond Domestic
Violence
Shelter Coordinator, Reach Beyond Domestic
Violence
Deputy Director of the Safety Net Project at the
National Network to End Domestic Violence
Executive Vice President National Network to
End Domestic Violence
Technology Safety Specialist for the Safety Net
Project
Executive Director, LaFASA
Outreach Coordinator LaFASA
Program Coordinator at We Are Thorn
Chief Strategist, Center for Forensics,
Information Technology, and Security (CFITS)
at University of South Alabama
Demand Abolition Social Innovation
Coordinator
Demand Abolition Senior Manager
President and CEO RedJacket
Executive Security Advisor, IBM Security
Senior Policy Officer, Google
Senior Manager, Privacy and Engagement at
Mozilla Corporation
Chief Technology Officer, Verdafero, Inc.

Pilot
Reviewer
Yes
Yes

Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
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Appendix F: Pilot Review Evaluation Form

1. Type of Program
2. Organization Size
3. Budget Size
4. Where is the organization’s website posted?
5. What computer operating system does your
organization use?
6. What types of technology does your organization
use?
7. Does your organization currently use any of the
following security products?
8. Who manages and maintains your technology,
computer systems, cyber security?
9. How does your staff access the Internet?
10. What social media does your organization use?
11. Why does your organization use social media?
12. Who in your organization manages and monitors
the organization’s social media?
13. Does your organization have policies and
procedures regarding social media use for the
following?
14. Do you feel you need more information regarding
technology and cyber security?
15. What type(s) of training are most effective for your
organization?
16. What are some barriers to improving your

Other*

Does Not Fit
Objective

Confusing

Question

No Change
Needed
Language Too
Technical

As outlined in the methodology section above, the pilot group reviewed the general
survey for clarity, consistency, and ease of use for the organizations identified in this
study. The pilot review used the Delphia approach with two rounds of review (Hsu &
Sandford, 2007). The evaluation form below was used for only the first round of review.
The second round allowed pilot reviews to adjust their comments and suggestions based
on a detailed report of the round one results.
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organization’s cyber security and understanding of
technology in general?
17. Are all computers, laptops, cellphones, and other
technologies inventoried and documented?
18. Do you have an inventory of all software
applications being used by the organizations?
19. If yes, do the inventories of both hardware and
software prioritize the technology based on criticality
or value to the organization?
20. Does staff within the organization have specific
cyber security duties or responsibilities?
21. Do you have a back-up policy, procedure, and
system for power or Internet outages?
22. Do you have policies regarding cyber security?
23. Which technologies do these policies include?
24. Who in you organization is responsible for
maintenance and the security of the organization’s
technology?
25. Who in your organization is responsible for legal
and regulatory requirements for cyber security
including privacy rights and civil liberties?
26. Are the legal and regulatory requirements regarding
cyber security understood by those responsible?
27. Has your organization experienced a cyber security
attack or breach?
28. Has your organization identified areas that may be
attractive or vulnerable for cyber attack or breach?
29. Have you conducted conversations with staff, board
members, volunteers, and others regarding cyber
security?
30. Have you documented the identities and credentials
of the staff members that access to files, databases, and
other electronic information?
31. Do you inform staff about cyber security policies,
practices, and procedures?
32. Do you inform third-party vendors and partners
about cyber security policies, practices, and
procedures?
33. With survivor and other sensitive information
stored in digital files, is this information protected by
any of the following?
34. Do you have a policy for the destruction of digital
files and information?
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35. Has your organization experienced a cyber security
breach or attack?
36. If yes, was the situation clearly understood by all?
37. Did you feel or do you feel adequately prepared for
a cyber security breach or attack
38. Do you have access to resources and experts to
help your organization with cyber security?
39. Contact Information (optional)
1. The survey is intended to take participants 10 minutes or less to complete, do you
think the length of the survey and complexity of the questions will meet this
objective?
o Yes
o No
o Do Not Know
2. Does the order of the questions make sense?
o Yes
o No
If no, please provide suggestions:
3. If you have suggestions on a specific survey question(s) please provide it below.
4. Please feel free to provide additional comments or suggestions regarding the survey,
any feedback is appreciated.
Thank you for filling out this evaluation form. The information you provide is the first
step in helping organizations working with victims of violence stay safe in a digital
world.
Please be advised, the names and organizations of those participating in this pilot are
anonymous, unless otherwise requested. Results from round one of this review will be
shared with the group allowing an opportunity to update your comments and feedback in
the second round.
If you would like a copy of the final report at the conclusion of this study or have any
questions, please contact Kelley Misata (kmisata@purdue.edu).
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Appendix G: Pilot Review Round One – Email Script
On December 10, 2015, the members of the pilot group were individually contact to
launch the first stage of the survey review process. The following is the email template
used for this initial outreach.
Dear [name]:
You are invited to participate in the “pilot” phase of a research study aimed at identifying
the current state of information security within organizations working with victims of
violence. The goal of the "pilot" review is to gather input from industry experts, such as
you, on the survey for crisis organizations in the study. Experts in crisis organizations
and information security are being invited to participate in this study.
This review process consists of two rounds:
First, round one... in this round you will be asked to review the survey titled
"Information Security in Crisis Organizations" and provide your feedback using the
attached evaluation form. You may access the survey either online using the link below
OR using the attached survey file. Time: less than 45 minutes.
Please return the feedback form via email to me at kmisata@purdue.edu on or
before December 20, 2015.
Second, round two... once the results from Round One have been compiled, a complete
report will be sent to all pilot group participants. At this time, you will be invited (though
not required) to update your feedback from the first round. Time: approx. 30 minutes.
To get started:
1. Download the attached evaluation form;
2. Click https://purdue.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=SV_d1qdm7N4rZlAGuF to enter the
online survey – note: you will need to click “I Agree” to begin. You are NOT required to
fill out the survey to do the evaluation. You may also use the attached survey file;
3. Return the completed evaluation form on or before December 20th.
If you choose to participate your input will be invaluable in helping organizations
working with victims of violence to navigate the complexities of
cybersecurity. Participation is entirely voluntary, and you can stop participating at any
time with no consequences.
Also, if you have questions, please contact me at kmisata@purdue.edu or (617) 6500601.
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Appendix H: Pilot Review Survey
The following survey was used for the pilot group as the initial reviewers prior to the
survey being conducted with the larger population outlined in this study. Once feedback
is received the survey was updated based on the suggestions provided by the pilot group
then re-submitted to the IRB as an amendment for approval. This survey was designed
using the National Network to End Domestic Violence survey executed in 2012 and the
NIST CSF (NNEDV, 2012) (NIST, 2014).
1. Type of Program (check all that apply)
Domestic Violence
Sexual Assault
Human Trafficking
Stalking
Other (fill-in)
2. Organization Size
Number of Full-Time Employees: (fill-in)
Number of Part-Time Employees
Number of Volunteers: (fill-in)
3. Budget Size
o Less than $75,000
o $75,000 - $149,000
o $150,000 - $349,000
o $350,000 - $499,999
o $500,000 - $999,999
o >$1,000,000
o Do Not Know
4. Where is the organization’s mission posted? (check all that apply)
Website
Hardcopy Marketing
Social Media
Other (fill-in)
5. What computer operating system does your organization use? (check all that apply)
Apple / Mac OS
Microsoft Windows
Linux
Other (fill-in)
6. What types of technology does your organization use? (check all that apply)
Desktop Computers
Laptops / Notebooks
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iPad / Tablets
iPhones
Android Phones
Other Cell Phones
Land-line Phones
Fax Machines
Cameras
Surveillance Monitoring Cameras
Other (fill-in)
7. Does your organization currently use any of the following security products? (check
all that apply)
Firewall
Anti-Virus Software
Password Protection
VPNs
Proxy Services
Cloud Storage
Do Not Know
8. Who manages and maintains your technology, computer systems, cyber security?
o Dedicated IT Person
o Full-Time Employee
o Part-Time Employee
o Volunteer
o IT Consultant
o Third-Party Vendor
o Do Not know
9. How does your staff access the Internet? (check all that apply)
High-Speed Internet (connected via a wire)
Wireless Internet
Mobile HotSpot
Other (fill-in)
Do Not Know
10. What social media does your organization use? (check all that apply)
Website
Blog
Facebook
Twitter
Instagram
LinkedIN
YouTube
Flickr
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None
Other (fill-in)
11. Why does your organization use social media? (check all that apply)
Awareness
Education
Fundraising
Outreach
No Defined Purpose
Other (fill-in)
12. Who in your organization manages and monitors the organization’s social media?
(check all that apply)
Dedicated full-time employee
Dedicated part-time employee
Shared responsibility with multiple employees in the organization
Contractor
Volunteer
Third-Party Communications
Do Not Know
13. Does your organization have policies and procedures regarding social media use for
the following? (check all that apply)
Staff
Volunteers
Victims / Survivors
Do Not Know
Others (fill-in)
14. Do you feel you need more information regarding technology and cyber security?
o Yes
o No
o Do Not Know
15. What type(s) of training are most effective for your organization? (check all that
apply)
In-person Training
Onsite Training
Web-based Training
Hardcopy Materials
Other (fill-in)
16. What are some barriers to improving your organization’s cyber security and
understanding of technology in general? (check all that apply)
Lack of funding
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Lack of time
Lack of knowledge / understanding of technology
Lack of resources
Focus on other priorities
Resistance by staff or others
No need
17. Are all computers, laptops, cellphones, and other technologies inventoried and
documented?
o All and documented
o Some and documented
o All but not documented
o Some but not documented
o None
o Do Not Know
18. Do you have an inventory of all software applications being used by the
organizations?
o Yes
o No
o Do Not Know
19. If yes, do the inventories of both hardware and software prioritize the technology
based on criticality or value to the organization?
o Yes
o No
o Do Not Know
20. Does staff within the organization have specific cybersecurity duties or
responsibilities?
o Yes
o No
o Do Not Know
21. Do you have a back-up policy, procedure, and system for power or Internet outages?
o Yes
o No
o Do Not Know
22. Do you have policies regarding cyber security?
o Yes
o No
o Do Not Know
23. Which technologies do these policies include? (check all that apply)
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Use of laptops and organization issued computers.
Use of cellphones issued by the organization.
Use of personal cell phones and other technologies.
Use of social media for organizational purposes.
Use of personal social media in reference to working at the organization.
Use of public Wi-Fi
Protection of passwords.
Others (fill-in)
24. Who in your organization is responsible for maintenance and the security of the
organization’s technology? (check all that apply)
o Executive Director
o Manager / Director
o Staff Member
o Consultant
o Volunteer
o Third-Party Service Provider
o Other (fill-in)
25. Who in your organization is responsible for legal and regulatory requirements for
cyber security including privacy rights and civil liberties?
o Executive Director
o Manager / Director
o Staff Member
o Consultant
o Volunteer
o Third-Party Legal Service Provider
o Other (fill-in)
26. Are the legal and regulatory requirements regarding cyber security understood by
those responsible?
o Yes
o No
o Do Not Know
27. Has your organization experienced a cybersecurity attack or breach?
o Yes
o No
o Do Not Know
28. Has your organization identified areas that may be attractive or vulnerable for cyber
attack or breach?
o Yes
o No
o Plan to soon
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o Do Not Know
29. Have you conducted conversations with staff, board members, volunteers, and others
regarding cyber security?
o Yes
o No
o Plan to soon
o Do Not Know
30. Have you documented the identities and credentials of the staff members that access
to files, databases, and other electronic information?
o Yes
o No
o Plan to soon
o Do Not Know
31. Do you inform staff about cybersecurity policies, practices, and procedures?
o Yes
o No
o Plan to soon
o Do Not Know
32. Do you inform third-party vendors and partners about cybersecurity policies,
practices, and procedures?
o Yes
o No
o Plan to soon
o Do Not Know
33. With survivor and other sensitive information stored in digital files, is this
information protected by any of the following? (check all that apply)
Secure Passwords
Limited Staff Access
Secure Software
Third-Party
Do Not Know
Other (fill-in)
34. Do you have a policy for the destruction of digital files and information?
o Yes
o No
o Plan to soon
o Do Not Know
35. Has your organization experienced a cybersecurity breach or attack?
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o Yes
o No
o Do Not Know
36. If yes, was the situation clearly understood by all?
o Yes
o No
o Do Not Know
37. Did you feel or do you feel adequately prepared for a cybersecurity breach or attack?
o Yes
o No
o Do Not Know
38. Do you have access to resources and experts to help your organization with cyber
security?
o Yes
o No
o Do Not Know
39. Contact Information (optional)
Name:
Organization Name:
State:
Phone:
Email:
An online version of this survey is available. Go to [LINK]
The identities of participating organization and their responses to this survey will be
anonymous and kept in a secure location. Results reported in the final analysis will not
include any identifying information about any organization participation in this study.
Thank you for filling out this survey. The information you provide is the first step in
helping organizations working with victims of violence stay safe in a digital world. If
you would like to receive the final report from this survey, please indicate is the first step
in helping organizations like yours address the complex landscape of cyber security.
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Appendix I: Pilot Review Round Two – Email Script
On January 5, 2016, round two of the pilot review began with the following email
to each participant.
Dear Pilot Group Happy New Year! Thank you again for participating in the “pilot” phase of this research
study aimed at identifying the current state of information security within organizations
working with victims of violence.
I'm happy to report that Round One is now complete. Attached is a full report. Thank
you all for providing helpful comments, feedback, and suggestions - the final survey will
be significantly improved thanks to you.
We are now moving onto Round Two. If you have a moment to continue simply:
1. Open or download the attached results report;
2. Take a moment to review the comments from all the respondents;
3. Send new or additional comments/suggestions by January 15, 2016.
What's coming next?
At the end of Round Two, comments will be incorporated into the survey then submitted
to the IRB for final approval. Once approved the goal is to launch the final survey, with
the help of the NNEDV, Thorn, and Demand Abolition, on or before February 1, 2016.
Thank you again for your time and support of this study. Your input continues be
invaluable in helping to find new and efficient ways for organizations working with
victims of violence to navigate the complexities of cybersecurity. As a reminder, your
participation is entirely voluntary, and you can stop participating at any time with no
consequences.
Questions: please contact me at kmisata@purdue.edu or (617) 650-0601.
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Appendix J: Pilot Review – Final Results
The following report includes all comments and reccomenations received from
the pilot group particpating in this study. Results have been compiled from two rounds of
feedback from 13 pilot respondents.
Round One Results
Q1: Consent Statement
Language Too
No Change
Technical
6
Comments:

Confusing

Does Not Fit
Objective

Other

Q2: What type(s) of victims or survivors does your organization serve? (check all
that apply)
• Domestic Violence
• Sexual Assault
• Human Trafficking
• Stalking
• Other (fill-in) ____________________
Language Too
Confusing
Does Not Fit
Other
No Change
Technical
Objective
6
Comments:
If you send this out to our lists, then some of them are going to want to
answer: all crime victims.
May want to consider adding “refugee” since it is common these days
(sadly). Political refugees in particular are often hunted by governments.
I think you should have separate item regarding cyber security to
determine whether IT security is managed by someone explicitly trained
and tasked to take on those duties, or if this gets lumped into general IT
management duties. Also, as you allude later to surveillance cameras,
should physical security monitoring/surveillance management be included
in this item (or have a question of its own).
Q3: What is the size of your organization?
• Number of Full-Time Employees ____________________
• Number of Part-Time Employees ____________________
• Number of Volunteers ____________________
Language Too
Confusing
Does Not Fit
No Change
Technical
Objective
5

Other

165
Comments:
Not sure if folks (or I) know the difference between IT consultant or thirdparty vendor.
(Round Two) Do you want to include consultants?
Q4: Who manages your technology, computer systems, cyber security?
1. Full-time information technology employee
2. Part-time information technology employee
3. Full-time employee with information technology as part of their job
4. Part-time employee with information technology as part of their job
5. Volunteer
6. Information technology consultant
7. Third-party vendor
8. Other ____________________
9. Do Not Know
Language Too
Confusing
Does Not Fit
Other
No Change
Technical
Objective
1
1
3
Comments:
Use of security, information security and cyber security throughout the
survey feels inconsistent. Also, what is the difference between InfoSec and
CyberSec? I'm not sure even those of us who do this for a living are in
agreement, seems like this would be very confusing for a non-security
professional to sort out. Even an innocuous question like #4 could cause
confusion: Who manages your technology, computer systems, cyber
security? If I were answering I'd be wondering - what is the difference
between tech, computers and cybersec? What is a respondent thinks since
it's multiple, things, there must be multiple people managing them? In a
bigger organization this would be true, one team would do ops (computer
systems) and another would focus on security (security/risk) and there
might even be a third for sec-ops. But in a small org, it may all be lumped
into a single group/person - so asking "Who manages the computers and
IT" may be an easier one for people to answer.
The answer could be a few of these. Not sure if you want to say “check all
that apply” or provide some additional options. Some places have a
volunteer IT person, some have a part-time IT person, and others have a
part-time or full-time third party company that is essentially IT
people/person with their own business. So I could see people unsure of
what to answer or wanting to check multiple options.
Add “primarily” before manages.
Our technology is split between 3 soon to be 2 vendors. We trust that they
can assess risk and prevent hacks to our system, however I don’t know
enough about cyber security to ensure they are fully protecting us.
(Round Two) I would encourage a “check all that apply.” I think that
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would minimize the confusion between the three different areas one of the
respondents was concerned about.
Q5: What is your annual budget?
10. Less than $75,000
11. $75,000 - $149,999
12. $150,000 - $349,999
13. $350,000 - $499,999
14. $500,000 - $999,999
15. Greater than $1,000,000
16. Do Not Know
Language Too
Confusing
Does Not Fit
Other
No Change
Technical
Objective
1
4
Comments:
Confirm if this is the annual budget of the IT department or the entire
organization.
Maybe add one more level $5,000,000+
Q6: Where is the mission of your organization posted? (check all that apply)
• Organization website
• Hardcopy materials - marketing, promotional, recruiting, educational,
etc.
• Social media
• Other ____________________
Language Too
Confusing
Does Not Fit
Other
No Change
Technical
Objective
1
4
Comments:
Not sure why this question is here…not that you shouldn’t ask it, but my
initial thought was um, why do you want to know? It’s not really about
tech security.
Unclear why this is asked. If needed for your reference, suggest asking
this as part of the survey request, not in the survey itself.
I'd ask whether it is accessible as part of public record (e.g., state or
federal filing as non-profit, etc.) separate from organization marketing
collateral.
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Q7: What computer operating systems does your organization use? (check all
that apply)
• MAC (Apple)
• Microsoft Windows (PC)
• Linux (PC)
• Other ____________________
• Do Not Know
Language Too
Confusing
Does Not Fit
Other
No Change
Technical
Objective
1
4
Comments:

Q8: What technologies does your organization use? (check all that apply)
• Desktop computers
• Laptop, notebook computers
• iPads, tablets
• Smart-phones (e.g. iPhone, Android, Galaxy, etc.)
• Land-line phones
• Fax machines
• Digital cameras
• Surveillance / monitoring Cameras
• Other ____________________
• Do Not Know
Language Too
Confusing
Does Not Fit
Other
No Change
Technical
Objective
1
4
Comments:
Landline phones are pretty specific. Did you want to include VoIP/landline
phone or perhaps add VoIP as another option?
Smartphones is specific. Did you want to include just regular cell phones?
Do you want to include VOIP services? A lot of program are using basic
cell phones because of the additional privacy risks they have to think about
with smartphones so that might be good to add too.
Might say “What device technologies…” to differentiate from security
technologies, services, etc. This question should come before 7 since it
establishes whether they have computers with operating systems. Would
be nice if it was contextual, so if someone did not check
desktops/laptops/tablets they would not get the operating system question.
Maybe add printers, external hard-drives to the choices
(Round Two) I have no idea what VoIP means. But if it means basic cell
phones (like flip phones?) I would include that as an option. It’s very
popular among advocates to use.
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Q9: Does your organization currently use any of the following security
technologies? (check all that apply)
• Firewall (e.g. Comodo Internet Security, IPFilter, Netfilter, Norton360,
Online Armor, etc.)
• Anti-virus software (e.g. Webroot SecureAnywhere Antivirus, McAfee
AntiVirus, Kaspersky AntiVirus, etc.)
• Password protection software (e.g. Dashlane 3, Sticky Password,
Password Boss, LogMeOnce, etc.)
• VPN - virtual private network (e.g. Private Internet Access, Hotspot
Shield Elite, PureVPN, etc.)
• Other proxy services (e.g. Tor, HideMyAss, CyberGhost, BTGuard, etc.)
• Cloud storage services (e.g. Google Drive, Dropbox, Apple iCloud,
Microsoft OneDrive, etc.)
• Other ____________________
• Do Not Know
Language Too
Confusing
Does Not Fit
Other
No Change
Technical
Objective
4
1
1
Comments:
I’m not sure folks would consider cloud storage services as a security
thing?? More like a software service alternative??
2 things re: the mention of cloud storage services: 1) It doesn’t seem to fit
as a security technology and I’m not sure I would want programs to see it
that way. We don’t tell programs not to use cloud services, but we do ask
that they carefully think through what data they store within cloud
services and to be very cautious about their contracts when storing
survivor data. Depending on what data they are including and what
contract & features they have on the service, it could be more of a security
risk to survivor data. 2) the examples provided of cloud services are one
type – but I could see these confusing programs because they also regularly
use cloud services that are stand-alone business to store and back-up their
data. I think this is different because some programs may use Google
Drive or Dropbox to share non-sensitive work files, but the cloud services
that is housing their database is holding all of their agency files. If a
program just checks this without further detail, I’m not sure you’d be able
to assess from the answer the level of potential security.
May not be too technical depending on who is filling this out. But I think
it’s OK to mention getting technical help from IT support in the question.
It is a little technical and we don’t full know what services we use to
protect our organization.
I’d include an item for file encryption separate from storage solutions (e.g.
PGP, Silent Circle, etc.).
This may require some explanation; respondents may not know what these
things are.
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Maybe add follow-up asking which specifically.
Q10: How does your staff access the Internet? (check all that apply)
• Wired connection (Ethernet)
• Internal wireless internet
• External mobile hotspot
• Public Wi-Fi
• Home Wi-Fi
• Other ____________________
• Do Not Know
Language Too
Confusing
Does Not Fit
Other
No Change
Technical
Objective
5
Comments:
I’d add an item for non-Wi-Fi mobile telephone access (cell data link).
Q11: Does your staff access internal electronic documents from outside the
organization?
17. No
18. Yes
19. Do Not Know
Language Too
Confusing
Does Not Fit
Other
No Change
Technical
Objective
2
3
Comments:
I think “outside the organization” should be defined. Maybe to say
“outside of the office,” or “remotely.”
Do you want to know about accessing any types of documents outside of
the office or sensitive data specifically?
Maybe add outside physical location.
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Q12: What social media does your organization use? (check all that apply)
• Twitter
• Facebook
• LinkedIn
• Google+
• Snapchat
• Tumblr
• Instagram
• Pinterest
• YouTube
• Vine
• WhatsApp
• Flickr
• Other ____________________
• None
• Do Not Know
Language Too
Confusing
Does Not Fit
Other
No Change
Technical
Objective
5
Comments:
Add “kik” (messenger)
Q13: Who in your organization is responsible for managing the organization's
social media channel(s)?
20. Dedicated full-time employee
21. Dedicated part-time employee
22. Shared across several employees
23. Contractor
24. Volunteer
25. Third-party vendor
26. Other ____________________
27. Do Not Know
Language Too
Confusing
Does Not Fit
Other
No Change
Technical
Objective
4
Comments:
I was a bit confused why employees was split into full-time, part-time and
shared. It could be all of the above. Are you trying to assess if programs
have staff whose entire job is to do social media?
(Round Two) Might be helpful to make this a “check all that apply.” We
have multiple people who are responsible for social media.
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Q14: For what purpose(s) does your organization use social media? (check all that
apply)
• Awareness
• Education
• Fundraising
• Outreach
• Employee or volunteer recruiting
• Event announcements
• No defined purpose
• Other ____________________
Language Too
Confusing
Does Not Fit
Other
No Change
Technical
Objective
2
3
Comments:
Do some orgs use social media as a tool to directly communicate to victims
for support/counseling? I bet they do. Might be a good to include.
Add “programs”
Q15: Does your organization have policies regarding social media use by the
following? (check all that apply)
• Staff
• Volunteers
• Victims / survivors
• External partners (individuals or organizations)
• Other stakeholders (e.g. board members, advisors, etc.)
• Other ____________________
• Do Not Know
Language Too
Confusing
Does Not Fit
Other
No Change
Technical
Objective
5
Comments:
I think programs can get really confused by this. Many will have policies in
place – but various policies. There could be policies on staff’s appropriate
use of social media (reminders not to share identifying information or to
friend survivors) or policies on staff’s personal use of social media during
work hours. There can also be policies on survivor’s use of social media
that restricts their use completely that just asks that they avoid “checking
in” and sharing location and photos, or other variations. I think there is a
big difference between staff use when they have sensitive information and
survivor’s use.
Our policies only cover employees because we are a statewide sexual
assault coalition.
Specify “HR” policies might make this more clear.
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Q16: Do you feel you need more information regarding technology and cyber
security?
28. No
29. Yes
30. Do Not Know
Language Too
Confusing
Does Not Fit
Other
No Change
Technical
Objective
2
3
Comments:
Pretty high-level question opens to all sorts of interpretation. Even though
you may be getting at a need for more education with this question, I’d be
tempted to phrase it as “more help” since information and education can
overwhelm (do I need it? I don’t know, or know what to do with it, or have
time to take or process the info), but they know they need help.
Q17: What type(s) of training are most effective in your organization? (check all
that apply)
• On-site in-person training
• Off-site in-person training
• Web-based training
• Hardcopy training materials
• Other ____________________
• Do Not Know
Language Too
Confusing
Does Not Fit
Other
No Change
Technical
Objective
1
3
Comments:
We know that regardless of the org, in-person training is most effective, we
know that web-based training has terrible retention, we know that
everyone throws printed stuff away. I’d be more interested in whether they
had any training and what type, so phrase it like “What form of training
does your organization use? (check all that apply)”, with an option for
“None”, and then ask if it was useful/improved security behavior.
(Round Two) I disagree with the other review. I think this question makes
sense the way it is.
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Q18: What are barriers to improving your organization's cyber security? (check
all that apply)
• Lack of funding
• Lack of time
• Lack of knowledge or understanding of technology
• Lack of resources
• Focus on other priorities
• Resistance by staff or other stakeholders
• No need
• Other ____________________
• Do Not Know
Language Too
Confusing
Does Not Fit
Other
No Change
Technical
Objective
1
1
3
Comments:
So a lack of funding/time and lack of resources might be the same thing –
just a thought.
Q19: Are the computers, laptops, cell phones, and other technologies in your
organization inventoried?
31. All
32. Some
33. None
34. Do Not know
Language Too
Confusing
Does Not Fit
Other
No Change
Technical
Objective
1
1
3
Comments:
Add “belonging to”.
Define “inventoried”.
(Round Two) I still think “inventoried” needs to be identified.
Q20: If inventoried, is it documented?
35. No
36. Yes
37. Do Not Know
Language Too
Confusing
Does Not Fit
Other
No Change
Technical
Objective
5
1
Comments:
Not sure what the difference is between inventoried & documented. I
would think they’re the same??
Not sure what “criticality” means.
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This doesn’t make sense to me.
Wouldn’t inventorying imply documenting? Might not need this question
if the one above just includes “inventoried and documented”.
Can you differentiate between document and inventory?
The "it" is unclear here. Do you mean is the inventory documented? or do
you mean that there's a document describing the inventory? Might be
helpful to use a proper noun rather than "it" here.
(Round Two) If you expand on this just a little it would be clearer. For
example. “If inventoried, is it documented and stored?”
Q21: Is the software used by your organization inventoried?
38. No
39. Yes
40. Do Not Know
Language Too
Confusing
Does Not Fit
No Change
Technical
Objective
1
2
4
Comments:

Other

Q22: Has your organization assigned a criticality to the hardware and software
being used within the organization?
41. No
42. Yes
43. Do Not Know
Language Too
Confusing
Does Not Fit
Other
No Change
Technical
Objective
3
2
2
Comments:
I’m not sure what this means and I think programs may not fully
understand.
Might have to explain it a bit, call it assign levels of criticality to the
various hardware, software and infrastructure used by the organization.
Then possibly an example: e.g. a list such as: support phones are top tier
critical to our org, volunteer database is 2nd tier, etc.).
Criticality????
(Round Two) I agree with the other comments.
Q23: Does your organization have policies for power or Internet outages?
44. No
45. Yes
46. Do Not Know
Language Too
Confusing
Does Not Fit
Other
No Change
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Technical

Objective

1
5
Comments:
Just a thought about the word policy – when most agencies think of
policies, it’s written down policies or something official. In some cases,
they’ll have a general plan of what should be done even if it’s not written
down. The reason I bring this up is that an agency might have a plan on
what to do if they lose power/internet (everyone works from home! Or we
light candles!) but may not have an actual policy around this. Depending
on what you’re trying to ask for, you may want to wordsmith this a bit.
This is such an interesting question. I don’t know if we have a policy on
this!! I’m curious, if assessing for security, why this question is here over
one asking about policies for maintaining access levels or something. But I
may be ignorant to something important here re: power outages and
security.
Q24: Does your organization have written policies for security at your
organization?
47. No
48. Yes
49. Do Not Know
Language Too
Confusing
Does Not Fit
Other
No Change
Technical
Objective
3
1
3
Comments:
I’d clarify what “security” means. It could mean a lot of different things.
Someone answering this could say: yes, we have a security plan because we
know what to do when an abuser shows up. Or we have security because
the local police drive by every now and then? I’d define or describe more
what you mean?
This is a huge question. Programs will have a ton of policies that could be
defined as security. I would narrow this and make it more specific to what
you want to know. A lot of shelters have policies about how you answer the
door (one shelter comes to mind that I’ve visited that has 2 entrances. Both
bullet proof. Both mirrored so you can’t see in. Only one opens at a time.
You show yourself to the camera and announce who you are and they open
the first set of doors. Only after they close behind you do the second set of
doors open. At one of the shelters I worked at, you had to have a pin to get
in and we had strict rules on what to do if someone came knocking who
didn’t have the pin.) These are all in the name of security. So are policies
around communicating with police, contacting a survivor at a home phone
number, etc. All about “security” but not specific to their technology or
data.
Does your organization have written, accessible policies…”
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I’d have two separate questions about this, one for physical security,
another for IT security.
Need to specify if security is “technical” or “physical” security.
Base on the survey content it feels like you meant cyber security in Q24.
(Round Two) Defining security would definitely be helpful.
Q25: Do your polices include cyber security?
50. No
51. Yes
52. Do Not Know
Language Too
Confusing
Does Not Fit
Other
No Change
Technical
Objective
1
1
1
3
Comments:
Not in the online survey version.
Reword questions “Do your policies defined cyber security?
Maybe give examples folks might say no before they get to the question if
they answered yes, but seeing the options they would have answered yes.
Q26: If yes, which technologies do these policies include? (check all that apply)
• Use of computers, laptops, and tablets issued by the organization
• Use of cell phones issued by the organization
• Use of personal cell phones, laptops and other technologies
• Use of social media for organizational purposes
• Use of personal social media in reference to working for the organization
• Use of public Wi-Fi
• Protection of passwords
• Accessing files and sensitive electronic documents
• Protection of backups, disks, tapes, software, manual
• Other ____________________
• Do Not Know
Language Too
Confusing
Does Not Fit
Other
No Change
Technical
Objective
1
1
1
3
Comments:
Not in the online survey version.
Would include “cyber security” before “policies” to remind people of the
context.
(Round Two) I think this is fine.
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Q27: Who in your organization is responsible for cyber security for the
organization? (check all that apply)
• Executive Director
• Manager / Director
• Staff Member
• Consultant
• Volunteer
• Third-Party Vendor
• Other ____________________
• Do Not Know
Language Too
Confusing
Does Not Fit
Other
No Change
Technical
Objective
5
Comments:
This is going to be a bit confusing because of different understanding what
cyber security means. I’m not quite sure how to answer this.
Not sure what the difference between a consultant and a Third-Party
vendor – maybe clarify or eliminate one.
Q28: Who in your organization is responsible for the legal requirements for cyber
security, such as privacy rights? (check all that apply)
• Executive Director
• Manager / Director
• Staff Member
• Consultant
• Volunteer
• Third-Party Vendor
• Other ____________________
• Do Not Know
Language Too
Confusing
Does Not Fit
Other
No Change
Technical
Objective
1
3
Comments:
I’m not sure what you mean by privacy rights.
I think this needs to be explained more.
Add “Board of Directors”
Might be happening at multiple levels.
Q29: Are the legal requirements regarding cyber security understood by those
responsible?
53. No
54. Yes
55. Do Not Know
Language Too
Confusing
Does Not Fit
Other
No Change
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Technical

Objective

1
4
Comments:
Not sure what you mean by legal requirements.
Legal requirements are unclear here.
Q30: Has your organization identified areas that may be attractive or vulnerable
for a cyber attack or breach?
56. No
57. Yes
58. Not yet, but will soon
59. Do Not Know
Language Too
Confusing
Does Not Fit
Other
No Change
Technical
Objective
1
4
Comments:
Perhaps also add “identified areas or practices”??
Would love feedback on this.
This could be scary to some people who are responding.
Maybe add follow-up asking to describe.
Q31: Has your organization experienced a cybersecurity attack or breach?
60. No
61. Yes
62. Do Not Know
Language Too
Confusing
Does Not Fit
Other
No Change
Technical
Objective
5
Comments:
Q32: If yes, was the situation understood by your organization?
63. No
64. Yes
65. Do Not Know
Language Too
Confusing
Does Not Fit
Other
No Change
Technical
Objective
1
2
Comments:
I’m not sure that this will be clear. Do you mean that the org understood
how it happened in the first place? Or how it was fixed? How it’s been
addressed so it won’t happen again? Or how it impacted survivor data?
“understood” is pretty vague. If you’re trying to find out if they believe
they now know how to prevent it from happening again, it could be more

179
directly asked. Maybe give a few options. If yes, what is your new level of
preparedness should this kind of attack reoccur? We learned a great deal
from it and are ready to defend against it - We learned somewhat from it
and can reduce the chance of lost information or time before we’re back in
operation -We learned very little but are at least more aware of and alert
to the problem -We are as helpless as ever to this attack.
Not clear what is being asked here. Probably also more complicated than
yes/no response.
Understood?
(Round Two) Not sure what is meant by understood.
Q33: Does your organization consider itself prepared to handle a cybersecurity
breach or attack?
• No
• Yes
• Do Not Know
Language Too
Confusing
Does Not Fit
Other
No Change
Technical
Objective
2
4
Comments:
May be redundant depending on what changes you make to previous
questions based on my comments. Otherwise no change.
May want to score this on a scale of how well prepared.
Q34: Has your organization conducted cybersecurity workshops or trainings with
staff, volunteers, and other stakeholders?
66. No
67. Yes
68. Plan to Soon
69. Do Not Know
Language Too
Confusing
Does Not Fit
Other
No Change
Technical
Objective
5
Comments:
I’d change “trainings” to “training.”
I’d add a questions – if answer is yes, who conducted this training.
Q35: Does your organization document who has access to files, databases, and
other electronic information?
70. No
71. Yes
72. Do Not Know
Language Too
Confusing
Does Not Fit
Other
No Change
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Technical
4
Comments:

Objective
1

1

Q36: Does your organization inform new employees about cybersecurity policies
and procedures?
73. No
74. Yes
75. Do Not Know
Language Too
Confusing
Does Not Fit
Other
No Change
Technical
Objective
5
Comments:

Q37: Does your organization inform third-party vendors, partners, and external
stakeholders about cybersecurity policies and procedures?
76. No
77. Yes
78. Do Not Know
Language Too
Confusing
Does Not Fit
Other
No Change
Technical
Objective
1
1
4
Comments:
Whose policies, the vendor’s or yours?
Q38: Regarding the storage of sensitive information, how are these electronic files
protected within your organization? (check all that apply)
• Dedicated hardware (e.g. dedicated computer)
• Secure passwords
• Limited access
• Secure software
• Third-party storage (e.g. cloud storage)
• Encryption
• Biometrics
• Other ____________________
• Do Not Know
Language Too
Confusing
Does Not Fit
Other
No Change
Technical
Objective
2
1
3
Comments:
I’m not sure all these answers help you assess the question. If the question

181
is about ways in which files are protected, then dedicated hardware, thirdparty storage, secure software, doesn’t really make sense to me. They’re
products, not necessarily protection mechanisms or ways. Does that make
sense? I’m also not sure I understand what you mean by dedicated
hardware – I think what you’re getting at is files are on a dedicated
computer or server with no outside access or something…but I think that
needs to be defined. I’m also not sure what secure software means either. I
also think someone can read this as: yes, my software is secure.
Same concern as above with referring to cloud storage as a protection
strategy.
May need to explain encryption and biometrics to some people.
Q39: Does your organization have policies and procedures for the destruction of
electronic documents?
79. No
80. Yes
81. Do Not Know
Language Too
Confusing
Does Not Fit
Other
No Change
Technical
Objective
1
1
4
Comments:
I’d add an additional question pertaining to destruction of disks and
storage devices taken out of service (including
DVDs/CDs/thumbdrives/SDcards).
Q40: Does your organization have access to external resources and experts to help
with cyber security?
82. No
83. Yes
84. Do Not Know
Language Too
Confusing
Does Not Fit
Other
No Change
Technical
Objective
1
5
Comments:

Q41: Please provide any additional information regarding the current state of
information security within your organization.
Language Too
Confusing
Does Not Fit
Other
No Change
Technical
Objective
5
Comments:

182

Q42: If you would like to receive the results of this survey at the conclusion of this
study, please provide your contact information.
Language Too
Confusing
Does Not Fit
Other
No Change
Technical
Objective
5
Comments:

1. The survey is intended to take participants 10 minutes or less to complete, will the
length of the survey and complexity of the questions meet this objective?
o
o
o

Yes = 4
No = 2
Do Not Know = 1

Other Comments:
The survey itself is very quick and a tech/IT guru at the organization
might be able to complete it in 10 minutes - but it's too dense for a nontech. And some questions - like how is the Internet accessed may really
trip non-techs up.
I definitely think that it will take people longer than 10 minutes to
complete.
Depends on the person’s knowledge and comfort level. I think this is
probably a 15-20-minute survey.
Although questions were simple, I did not know some of the information
and I had to consult with my Executive Director to answer the questions.
In general, I think the time will be sufficient. There are going to be some
who will probably require more time than 10 minutes.
Might add some clarification and/or examples to questions so that
respondents aren’t spending time trying to figure out what the question is
asking.
(Round Two) I think it will take at least 15 minutes.
2. Does the order of the questions make sense?
o
o
o

Yes = 5
No
Do Not Know = 1

Other Comments:
I didn’t take the online version, so I’m not sure if there’s contextual
asking, like the comment I made on question 8 above. I think overall it
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flowed, but there was one instance (26) where social media cybersec
policy was in a list and yet social media policy was asked about prior.
It took me a moment to consider that the first instance of the question
was around general social media policy, which could include tone and
types of conversations, identifying yourself as a member of your org,
etc.
3. Please provide suggestions or comments to a specific survey question(s) – ensure to
include the question number.
Overall the level of many of these questions seems pretty deep/tech for
non-tech respondents. Which would result in a lot of "Don't Knows" or
attempts to answer that aren't accurate.
Use of security, information security and cybersecurity throughout the
survey feels inconsistent. Also, what is the difference between InfoSec and
CyberSec? I'm not sure even those of us who do this for a living are in
agreement, seems like this would be very confusing for a non-security
professional to sort out. Even an innocuous question like #4 could cause
confusion: Who manages your technology, computer systems, and cyber
security? If I were answering I'd be wondering - what is the difference
between tech, computers and cybersec? What is a respondent thinks since
it's multiple, things, there must be multiple people managing them? In a
bigger organization this would be true, one team would do ops (computer
systems) and another would focus on security (security/risk) and there
might even be a third for secops. But in a small org, it may all be lumped
into a single group/person - so asking, "Who manages the computers and
IT" may be an easier one for people to answer. (NOTE: this response was
also added to comments under Q4).
Can provide more details on all the questions I didn't mark as "No
Change" - but the top level points are all the same. Please do let me know
if you'd like expansion on any specific question though.
Answers to questions 4 and 13 may be multiple people, the answers are all
singular.
4. Please provide any additional comments or suggestions regarding the survey or the
process.
You ask quite a bit of social media questions – particularly around the purpose of
social media, and I’m not sure how it fits w/ an security assessment. In a way, it
could be a security issue, but whether an org uses it, how many and why may not
necessarily translate to better or worse security. So I guess my feedback is what
information are you trying to learn here?
Not a lot of people are going to be able to understand these questions. I think you
might want include a definitions/terms document? For example, cyber security
isn’t really defined anywhere, and I think folks are each going to have a different
understanding of what that means. This may skew what you get.
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One of the things we do when we ask a question that we think will confuse people
is we define or explain or describe it within the question so it’s clearer.
Over the years of doing lots of survey to the field I have found 2 things helpful.
For each question:
o I think, if I was not very bright, or I was too bright and for every question
I have 3 answers for you that could be correct based on how I read your
question, does this question, in any way, confuse me?
o I pretend that I have the answers to them and decide how I would
report/analyze/describe the result based on those pretend answers. If I can,
then it usually means I have a good question. If it doesn’t then I need to
work on the question a bit more.
Starting at Q12 there are a lot of questions on social media and I think it might be
worth thinking through what you want to get out of this. A lot of programs have
social media accounts but most of them are using them to share non-sensitive
data. I’m not sure that the security risks are clearly identified just by knowing the
answers to some of this. You may have a very concrete goal that you want to get
out of this and I’m just not seeing it, but I couldn’t help but wonder about what
the security risks were that would be assessed with these. There are definitely
programs who may not follow all the best practices with how to use social media
appropriately, but we see way more concerns with how programs are collecting,
storing, and retaining victim information without understanding security risks
than with how they are using social media.
I think it could be helpful to define some of the terms and make the goal of this
very clear. It could also help to identify who you think would be best to fill this
out. If it’s not the right person, I think you could end up with A LOT of Do Not
Knows, which can make the data a lot less useful.
For any question regarding technology that is deployed (8 9 at a minimum), I
would recommend also asking the % deployment of the technology.
I would recommend asking both whether the organization has experienced an
“attack” (DDoS) or a data breach.
I think even without my comments, it was a solid survey and will inform your
objectives nicely. In your opening introduction to the survey on the agree page, it
may be useful to include a statement about the desired outcome of the research,
even though it’s implied, something like— Our hope is that we’ll be able to assist
these support organizations in better protecting themselves from data breaches
and in doing so, safeguarding victims of violence from fraud or further abuse.
Questions 7-11 and 28 are very technical and that’s fine, but the survey or
instructions should note the responder should consult the IT Department for those
answers.
Great job.
You should spend more time on the introduction to help people feel comfortable
before they start the survey. Some people may be put off or scared by the
questions so helping them feel that it’s “OK” to respond with “Don’t Know”
should be stated upfront. Also helping people understand how this will really
help them will inspire them to contribute to the survey – we get surveyed all the
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time and often I don’t answer them because there isn’t enough time. If you make
the survey easy with a solid reason for filling out, then people will participate.
Results Round Two
After reviewing the survey and feedback, I think that my biggest takeaway would
be to possibly include some additional language up from about the content of the
survey so that the recipient of the survey can determine who the right person is to
actually complete the survey.
I agree with other comments that a terminology sheet would be very helpful,
especially for those who are not tech people.
FYI: Information Security (InfoSec) is the practice of protecting information
wherever it exists, in networks, on paper, even in people’s minds. Cybersecurity
(or sometimes computer security) is a subset of that, which deals with just
computing security and digital information. The two are often incorrectly used
synonymously, but the distinction is important because cyber folks often forget
about the places where information exists other than computers. An example:
discarded paper patient records taken from a dumpster and used for Medicare
fraud. Make sure you’re clear on what’s being asked about.
The comment about cloud security raises another potential question: “Do you
evaluate your vendors and contractors for their [info/cyber] security?” Many
organizations blindly trust vendors, and it’s turning out most of the breaches
today are coming through unsecure or even malicious vendors.
What a great bunch of response! Lots of good feedback. Excited to see the next
revision.
I laughed at the comment “Not sure why this question is here… it’s not really
about tech security.” For “Where is the mission of your organization posted?”
Please respond with “Because if I change your mission statement to ‘badger
herder’ you’d be upset.” No comments to add or change. Well done.
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Appendix K: General Survey – Email Scripts
To: NNEDV, Thorn, Demand Abolition
From: Kelley Misata kmisaa@purdue.edu
Subject: Purdue University Research Study on Information Security In Crisis
Organizations
You are invited to participate in a research study aimed at identifying the current state of
information security within organizations working with victims of violence. The goal is
distributing the following summary including survey link to crisis organizations in your
database.
If you choose to participate your role in facilitating this survey will be invaluable.
However, please know that your participation is completely voluntary, and you can stop
participating at any time with no consequences.
To participate
1. Initial Email to Crisis Organizations: send the following summary and survey link
to all crisis organizations in your database;
2. Reminder Email #1: in approximately 10 business days, send reminder email #1 –
we will send you a reminder regarding this at least 2 business days prior;
3. Reminder Email #2: approximately 20 business days after step 1, send reminder
email #2 – we will send you a reminder regarding this at least 2 business days
prior.
Please note participation in the survey is also voluntary therefore crisis organizations
participation will have the opportunity to opt out at any time with no penalty or
consequence.
If you have questions please contact Kelley Misata at kmisata@purdue.edu, (617) 6500601, or Eugene Spafford at spaf@purdue.edu.

1. Email Invitation to Crisis Organizations
From: Kelley Misata
Reply-to Email: kmisata@purdue.edu
Subject: Purdue University Research on Information Security In Crisis Organizations
You are invited to participate in a survey that is being conducted by researchers at Purdue
University, to analyze the current state of information security within organizations
working with victims of domestic violence, stalking, and human trafficking in the United
States. Your participation in this survey is completely voluntary, and you can stop
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participating at any time with no consequences. This survey will assist in understanding
the current state of information security within crisis organizations working victims of
violence, and your assistance is greatly appreciated. You must be 18 years of age to
participate, and all results will be maintained in an encrypted system at Purdue
University.
If you have questions please contact Kelley Misata at kmisata@purdue.edu, 617-6500601, or Eugene Spafford at spaf@purdue.edu. The survey should take less than 10
minutes for you to complete.
Follow this link to the Survey: [LINK]
Or copy and paste the URL below into your internet browser: [URL}
Thank you for your time and for participating in this important survey.
Kelley Misata
2. Reminder Email #1 to Crisis Organizations
From: Kelley Misata
Reply-to Email: kmisata@purdue.edu
Subject: Survey Reminder: Purdue University Research on Information Security In Crisis
Organizations
Following up on our email a few days ago, regarding an invitation to participate in a
survey that is being conducted by researchers at Purdue University, to analyze the current
state of information security within organizations working with victims of domestic
violence, stalking, and human trafficking in the United States.
If you have completed the survey, thank you! Your input in this study is invaluable.
If you have not yet completed the survey, we need your help. Simply, follow this link to
the Survey: [LINK]
or copy and paste the URL below into your internet browser: [URL}
As a reminder, your participation in this survey is completely voluntary, and you can stop
participating at any time with no consequences. This survey will assist in understanding
the current state of information security within crisis organizations working victims of
violence, and your assistance is greatly appreciated. You must be 18 years of age to
participate, and all results will be maintained in an encrypted system at Purdue
University.
If you have questions please contact Kelley Misata at kmisata@purdue.edu, 617-6500601, or Eugene Spafford at spaf@purdue.edu. The survey should take less than 10
minutes for you to complete.
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Thank you for your time and for participating in this important survey.
Kelley Misata
3. Reminder Email #2 to Crisis Organizations
From: Kelley Misata
Reply-to Email: kmisata@purdue.edu
Subject: Final Reminder: Purdue University Research on Information Security In Crisis
Organizations
Following up on our email a few days ago, regarding an invitation to participate in a
survey that is being conducted by researchers at Purdue University, to analyze the current
state of information security within organizations working with victims of domestic
violence, stalking, and human trafficking in the United States.
If you have completed the survey, thank you! Your input in this study is invaluable.
If you have not yet completed the survey, we need your help. Simply, follow this link to
the Survey: [LINK]
or copy and paste the URL below into your internet browser: [URL} Please note, the
survey will close in 5 business days.
As a reminder, your participation in this survey is completely voluntary, and you can stop
participating at any time with no consequences. This survey will assist in understanding
the current state of information security within crisis organizations working victims of
violence, and your assistance is greatly appreciated. You must be 18 years of age to
participate, and all results will be maintained in an encrypted system at Purdue
University.
If you have questions please contact Kelley Misata at kmisata@purdue.edu, 617-6500601, or Eugene Spafford at spaf@purdue.edu. The survey should take less than 10
minutes for you to complete.
Thank you for your time and for participating in this important survey.
Kelley Misata
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Appendix L: Final Survey
The following is the general survey based on the feedback provided by the pilot group
and approved by the IRB.
Q1: Thank you for participating in a research study conducted by Purdue
University. The objective of this study is to identify the current state of
information security (risks, opportunities, and priorities) within organizations
working with victims of violence. These identifications will be achieved by
analyzing the current state of information security of crisis organizations against a
recognized cyber security framework.
Our intention is that we will be able to assist these organizations in better
protecting themselves from information security breaches and in doing so,
safeguard victims of violence.
To help you, we wanted to give you a few important messages about the survey:
The survey should take less than 15 minutes to complete.
Answering “Do Not Know” is a good thing if you find yourself unable to
answer a question.
The terms “Information Security” and “Cyber Security” are used
throughout – to help keep things clear, “information security” is used and
defined as the practice of protecting information wherever it exists
including cyber space.
Some of the questions in the survey use some technical language, we have
tried to provide definitions and examples where possible to help you –
however, if you do not know an answer remember selecting “Do Not
Know” is appropriate.
No information identifying your organization will be captured, therefore,
please feel comfortable with answering “Do Not Know” or skipping a
question.
If you choose not to participate, you can withdraw at any time during the
survey without penalty or consequence. If you wish to withdraw, you may
stop answer the online survey by closing out of the Qualtrics survey
window or by choosing "Do Not Agree" below.
If your organization has international operations, please fill out the survey based
on operations within the United States only.
Thank you again for your participation and time. If you have questions,
comments or concerns about this study, please contact:
Dr. Eugene Spafford: (765) 494-7825 or spaf@purdue.edu
Kelley Misata: (617) 650-0601 or kmisata@purdue.edu
85. I Agree
86. Do Not Agree
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Q2: What type(s) of victims or survivors does your organization serve? (check all that
apply)
• Domestic Violence
• Sexual Assault
• Human Trafficking
• Stalking
• Refugees
• Other (fill-in) ____________________
Q3: What is the size of your organization?
• Number of Full-Time Employees ____________________
• Number of Part-Time Employees ____________________
• Number of Volunteers ____________________
Q4: Who primarily manages the computers and information technology (e.g. Internet
connection) in your organization? (check all that apply)
Full-time information technology employee
Part-time information technology employee
Full-time employee with information technology as part of their job
Part-time employee with information technology as part of their job
Volunteer
Information technology consultant
Third-party vendor
Other ____________________
Do Not Know
Q5: What is the total annual budget of your organization?
87. Less than $75,000
88. $75,000 - $149,999
89. $150,000 - $349,999
90. $350,000 - $499,999
91. $500,000 - $999,999
92. $1,000,000 - $4,999,999
93. Greater than $5,000,000
94. Do Not Know
Q6: Where is the mission of your organization posted? (check all that apply)
• Organization website
• Hardcopy materials - marketing, promotional, recruiting, educational, etc.
• Social media
• Other ____________________
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Q7: What technologies does your organization use? (check all that apply)
• Desktop computers
• Laptop, notebook computers
• External hardrives
• iPads, tablets
• Smart-phones (e.g. iPhone, Android, Galaxy, etc.)
• Cellphones (e.g. flip-phones)
• Land-line phones
• VoIP (e.g Voice over Internet)
• Fax machines
• Printers
• Digital cameras
• Surveillance / monitoring Cameras
• Other ____________________
• Do Not Know
Q8 What computer operating systems does your organization use? (check all that apply)
• MAC (Apple)
• Microsoft Windows (PC)
• Linux (PC)
• Other ____________________
• Do Not Know
Q9: Does your organization currently use any of the following security
technologies? (check all that apply)
• Firewall (e.g. Comodo Internet Security, IPFilter, Netfilter, Norton360, Online
Armor, etc.)
• Anti-virus software (e.g. Webroot SecureAnywhere Antivirus, McAfee
AntiVirus, Kaspersky AntiVirus, etc.)
• Password protection software (e.g. Dashlane 3, Sticky Password, Password
Boss, LogMeOnce, etc.)
• VPN - virtual private network (e.g. Private Internet Access, Hotspot Shield
Elite, PureVPN, etc.)
• File encryption (e.g. GPG, PGP, Trucrypt, etc.)
• Other proxy services (e.g. Tor, HideMyAss, CyberGhost, BTGuard, etc.)
• Other ____________________
• Do Not Know
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Q10: How does your staff access the Internet? (check all that apply)
• Wired connection (Ethernet)
• Internal wireless internet
• External mobile hotspot
• Cellular data connection
• Public WiFi
• Home WiFi
• Other ____________________
• Do Not Know
Q11: Does your staff access organizational electronic documents from outside the
premises?
95. No
96. Yes
97. Do Not Know
Q12: What social media does your organization use? (check all that apply)
• Twitter
• Facebook
• LinkedIn
• Google+
• Snapchat
• Tumblr
• Instagram
• Pinterest
• YouTube
• Vine
• WhatsApp
• Flickr
• Kik messenger
• Other ____________________
• None
• Do Not Know
Q13: Who in your organization is responsible for managing the organization's social
media channel(s)? (check all that apply)
Dedicated full-time employee
Dedicated part-time employee
Shared across several employees
Contractor
Volunteer
Third-party vendor
Other ____________________
Do Not Know
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Q14: For what purpose(s) does your organization use social media? (check all that apply)
• Awareness
• Education
• Fundraising
• Outreach
• Employee or volunteer recruiting
• Communicating directly with victims
• Programs
• Event announcements
• No defined purpose
• Other ____________________
Q15: Does your organization have human resources policies regarding social media use
by the following? (check all that apply)
• Staff
• Volunteers
• Victims / survivors
• External partners (individuals or organizations)
• Other stakeholders (e.g. board members, advisors, etc.)
• Other ____________________
• Do Not Know
Q16: Do you feel you need more help understanding technology and information
security?
98. No
99. Yes
100.
Do Not Know
Q17: In general, what type(s) of training are most effective in your organization? (check
all that apply)
• On-site in-person training
• Off-site in-person training
• Web-based training
• Hardcopy training materials
• Other ____________________
• Do Not Know
Q18: What do you perceive are barriers to improving your organization's information
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security? (check all that apply)
• Lack of funding
• Lack of time
• Lack of knowledge or understanding of technology
• Lack of resources (e.g. staff, equipment)
• Focus on other priorities
• Resistance by staff or other stakeholders
• No need
• Other ____________________
• Do Not Know
Q19: Do you know if your organization has a complete list (inventory) of all computers,
laptops, cell phones, and other technologies in belonging to the organization?
101.
All
102.
Some
103.
None
104.
Do Not know
Q20: Do you know if these items are insured against theft or loss?
105.
Yes, they are.
106.
No, they are not.
107.
Some are.
108.
Do Not know
Q21: Is the software used by your organization inventoried?
109.
No
110.
Yes
111.
Do Not Know
Q22: Has your organization identified what hardware and software are critical to your
operations?
112.
No
113.
Yes
114.
Do Not Know
Q23: Does your organization have policies or documented plans for power or Internet
outages?
115.
No
116.
Yes
117.
Do Not Know
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Q24: Does your organization have policies for physical security?
118.
No
119.
Yes
120.
Do Not Know
Q25: Does your organization have policies for information security?
121.
No
122.
Yes
123.
Do Not Know
Q26: If yes, which technologies do these policies include? (check all that apply)
• Use of computers, laptops, and tablets issued by the organization
• Use of cell phones issued by the organization
• Use of personal cell phones, laptops and other technologies
• Use of social media for organizational purposes
• Use of personal social media in reference to working for the organization
• Use of public WiFi
• Protection of passwords
• Accessing files and sensitive electronic documents
• Protection of backups, disks, tapes, software, manual
• Other ____________________
• Do Not Know
Q27: Who is responsible for information security within the organization? (check all that
apply)
• Executive Director
• Manager / Director
• Staff Member
• Consultant
• Volunteer
• Third-Party Vendor
• Other ____________________
• Do Not Know
Q28: Who in your organization is responsible for the legal requirements for information
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security? (e.g. GLBA, HIPPA compliance, protective orders, etc.) (check all that apply)
• Executive Director
• Manager / Director
• Board of Directors
• Staff Member
• Consultant
• Volunteer
• Third-Party Vendor
• Other ____________________
• Do Not Know
Q29: Are the legal requirements listed in Question 28 regarding information security
understood by those responsible?
124.
No
125.
Yes
126.
Do Not Know
Q30: Has your organization identified areas or practices that may be attractive targets or
vulnerable for a cyber attack or breach?
127.
No
128.
Yes
129.
Not yet, but will soon
130.
Do Not Know
Q31: Has your organization experienced a cybersecurity attack or breach?
131.
No
132.
Yes, within the past 2 years.
133.
Yes, within the past 10 years.
134.
Do Not Know
Q32: Does your organization consider itself prepared to handle a cybersecurity breach or
attack?
135.
No
136.
Yes
137.
Do Not Know
Q33: Has your organization conducted information security workshops or training with
staff, volunteers, and other stakeholders?
138.
No
139.
Yes
140.
Plan to Soon
141.
Do Not Know
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Q34: If yes or plan to soon, who will conduct the training? (check all that apply)
• Executive Director
• Manager / Director
• Staff Member
• Consultant
• Volunteer
• Third-Party Vendor
• Other ____________________
• Do Not Know
Q35: Does your organization document who has access to sensitive files, databases, and
other electronic information?
142.
No
143.
Yes
144.
Do Not Know
Q36: Does your organization inform or train new employees about information security
policies and procedures?
145.
No
146.
Yes
147.
Do Not Know
Q37: Does your organization inform third-party vendors, partners, and external
stakeholders about your information security policies and procedures?
148.
No
149.
Yes
150.
Do Not Know
Q38: If your organization does use third-party vendors do they inform you of their
information security policies and procedures?
151.
No
152.
Yes
153.
Do Not Know
Q39: How is access to electronic files containing sensitive information stored within your
organization protected? (check all that apply)
• Dedicated hardware (e.g. dedicated computer)
• Secure passwords
• Encryption software (e.g. Trucrypt)
• Smartcard
• Third-party storage (e.g. cloud storage)
• Biometrics (e.g. finger print reader)
• Other ____________________
• Do Not Know
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Q40: Does your organization have policies and procedures for the destruction of
electronic documents?
154.
No
155.
Yes
156.
Do Not Know
Q41: Does your organization have policies and procedures for the destruction storage
devices? (e.g. DVDs, CDs, thumbdrives, etc.)
157.
No
158.
Yes
159.
Do Not Know
Q42: Does your organization have access to external resources and experts to help with
cyber security?
160.
No
161.
Yes
162.
Do Not Know
Q43: Please provide any additional information regarding the current state of information
security within your organization.
Q44: If you would like to receive a statistical summary of this survey at the conclusion of
this study, please provide your contact information.
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Appendix M: Survey Question Analysis Map to NIST CSF
Question
Q2
Q3

What type(s) of victims or survivors does your
organization serve?
What is the size of your organization?

Response
Type
Check All

NIST

Fill-In

n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
RS.RP-1
n/a
n/a
ID.BE-3
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a

n/a

Q4

Who primarily manages the computer and information
technology (e.g. Internet connection) in your
organization?

Check All

Q5

What is the total annual budget of your organization?

Select One

Q6
Q7

Where is the mission of your organization posted?
What technologies does your organization use?

Check All
Check All

Q8

What computer operating systems does your
organization use?
Does your organization currently use any of the
following security technologies?

Check All

Q10

How does your staff access the Internet?

Check All

Q11

Does your staff access internal electronic documents
from outside the premises?

Yes/No

Q12

What social media does your organization use?

Check All

Q13

Who in your organization is responsible for managing
the organization's social media channel(s)?
For what purpose(s) does your organization use social
media?
Does your organization have human resources policies
regarding social media use by the following?
Do you feel you need more help understanding
technology and information security?
In general, what type(s) of training are most effective
in your organization?
What do you perceive are barriers to improving your
organization's information security?
Do you know if your organization has a complete list
(inventory) of all computers, laptops, cell phones, and
other technologies belonging to the organization?

Check All

n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
ID.GV-1
ID.GV-1
ID.AM-3
ID.GV-1
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a

Check All

n/a

Check All

n/a

Yes/No

n/a

Check All

n/a

Check All

n/a

All/Some/None

ID.AM-1
ID.AM-2
ID.AM-5

Q9

Q14
Q15
Q16
Q17
Q18
Q19

Check All
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Do you know if these items are insured against theft
or loss?
Is the software used by your organization inventoried?
Has your organization identified what hardware and
software are critical to your operations?
Does your organization have policies or documented
policies for power or Internet outages?
Does your organization have policies for physical
security?

Yes/No/Some

ID.AM-1

Yes/No
Yes/No

ID.AM-2
ID.AM-5

Yes/No

Q25

Does your organization have policies for information
security?

Yes/No

Q26

If yes, which technologies do these policies include?

Check All

Q27

Who is responsible for information security for the
organization?
Who in your organization is responsible for the legal
requirements for information security?
Are the legal requirements listed in Question 28
regarding information security understood by those
responsible?
Has your organization identified areas or practices that
may be attractive targets or vulnerable for attack or
breach?

Check All
Check All

ID.BE-4
n/a
ID.BE-4
ID.BE-4
ID.GV-1
ID.BE-4
ID.GV-1
ID.AM-3
ID.GV-1
n/a
ID.BE-4
ID.GV-1
ID.BE-4
ID.GV-1
PR.AC-1
ID.BE-4
ID.GV-1
ID.BE-4
ID.GV-1
ID.AM-6
ID-GV-2
PR.AT-2

Yes/No

PR.AT-2

Yes/No/Not
Yet

Q31

Has your organization experienced a cybersecurity
attack or breach?

Yes/No

Q32

Does your organization consider itself prepared to
handle a cybersecurity breach or attack?

Yes/No

Q33

Has your organization conducted information security
workshops or training with staff, volunteers, and other
stakeholders?

Yes/No

ID.RM-1
ID.RM-1
ID.RM-1
ID.RM-1
RS.RP-1
n/a
ID.RM-1
ID.RM-1
ID.RM-1
ID.RM-1
ID.RM-1
ID.RM-1
ID.RM-1
ID.RM-1
ID.RM-1
ID.RM-1
ID.RM-1

Q20
Q21
Q22
Q23
Q24

Q28
Q29
Q30

Yes/No
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Q34

If yes or plan to soon, who will conduct the training?

Check All

Q35

Does your organization document who has access to
sensitive files, databases, and other electronic
information?
Does your organization inform or train new
employees about information security policies and
procedures?
Does your organization inform third-party vendors,
partners, and external stakeholders about your
information security policies and procedures?

Yes/No

If your organization does use third-party vendors do
they inform you of their information security policies
and procedures?
How is access to electronic files containing sensitive
information stored within your organization
protected?
Does your organization have policies and procedures
for the destruction of electronic documents?
Does your organization have policies and procedures
for the destruction of storage devices? (e.g. DVDs,
CDs, thumbdrives, etc.)
Does your organization have access to external
resources and experts to help with information
security?

Yes/No

Q36
Q37

Q38
Q39
Q40
Q41
Q42

Yes/No

ID.RM-1
PR.AT-1
PR.AT-1
PR.AT-1
ID.RM-1
ID.RM-1
ID.RM-1
ID.RM-1
PR.AC-1
PR.AC-1

Check All

PR.AT-1
PR.AT-1
PR.AT-1
ID.AM-6
PR.AT-1
PR.AT-1
PR.AT-1
PR.AT-1
PR.AT-1
PR.AT-1
PR.AC-1

Yes/No

PR.IP-6

Yes/No

PR.IP-6

Yes/No

n/a

Yes/No
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Appendix N: Survey Results
Q1: Consent

#
1
2

Answer
I Agree
Do Not
Agree
Total

Statistic
Min Value
Max Value
Mean
Variance
Standard Deviation
Total Responses

Response
221

%
100%

1

0%

222

100%
Value
1
2
1.00
0.00
0.07
222

Q2: What type(s) of victims or survivors does your organization serve? (check all that
apply)
#
Answer
Response
%
Domestic
1
96%
151
Violence
Sexual
2
73%
116
Assault
Human
3
54%
86
Trafficking
4
Stalking
70%
111
5
Refugee
23
15%
6
Other
20
13%
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Other
Adult Protective Services
child sexual abuse
child abuse
elder and disabled
Elder Abuse
sex industry
Robbery, child abuse, stalking, threats, harassment, etc.
Childhood sexual abuse, Elder Abuse
homeless, hungry
immigrant
victims of any violent crime
Survivors of Homicide Victims, Kidnapping, Aggravated Assault
U-Visa's
Child Abuse
crime victims, all types
Comprehensive victim services (includes child abuse and other serious crimes)
substance abuse/addiction
homeless
All violent and non violent state charges in Denver
Statistic
Min Value
Max Value
Total Responses
Q3. What is the size of your organization?
#
Answer
Number of
1
Full-Time
Employees
Number of
2
Part-Time
Employees
Number of
3
Volunteers

Value
1
6
158
Response

%

152

97%

129

83%

137

88%

Statistic
Min Value
Max Value
Total Responses
Q4: Who primarily manages the computer and information technology (e.g. Internet

Value
1
3
156
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connection) in your organization? (check all that apply)
#
Answer
Full-time information technology
1
employee
Part-time information technology
2
employee
Full-time employee with information
3
technology as part of their job
Part-time employee with information
4
technology as part of their job
5
Volunteer
6
Information technology consultant
7
Third-party vendor
8
Other
9
Do Not Know

Response

%

30

19%

14

9%

53

34%

9

6%

6
42
33
25
0

4%
27%
21%
16%
0%

Other
I do
Director
We’re part of a larger org that contracts with an IT company to provide support
IT company volunteers
Agency just started with outside firm
Nobody manages it.
full time department
Full time employee with little knowledge not part of job
IT people supplied through the department we are under
Executive Director
Our program is part of a City Police Dept. Where the city employees IT managers, etc.
Executive Director
Staff who happen to be knowledgeable (kinda) in IT
County
We all handle our own databases
Intern
Executive Director
Full time employee with no information technology as part of their job
Program Director with resources to answers as needed
our foundation
Executive Director
Statistic
Min Value
Max Value
Total Responses

Value
1
8
158
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Q5: What is the total annual budget of your organization?
#
Answer
1
Less than $75,000
2
$75,000 - $149,999
3
$150,000 - $349,999
4
$350,000 - $499,999
5
$500,000 - $999,999
6
$1,000,000 - $4,999,999
7
Greater than $5,000,000
8
Do Not Know
Total

Response
6
11
15
11
25
55
9
26
158

Statistic
Min Value
Max Value
Mean
Variance
Standard Deviation
Total Responses
Q6: Where is the mission of your organization posted? (check all that apply)
#
Answer
Response
1
Organization website
144
Hardcopy materials 2
marketing, promotional,
144
recruiting, educational, etc.
3
Social media
113
4
Other
19

%
4%
7%
9%
7%
16%
35%
6%
16%
100%
Value
1
8
5.34
3.65
1.91
158
%
91%
91%
72%
12%

Other
advocacy and training
Office lobby, in shelter, in client office space
On site
email signature, business cards, etc.
handbooks, everywhere
Throughout Office
At every location
Employee Manuals
Fryers
on the wall in office
all publications
presentations
Every room in our office bldg.
Statistic
Min Value
Max Value
Total Responses

Value
1
4
158

207
Q7: What technologies does your organization use? (check all that apply)
#
Answer
Response
1
Desktop computers
153
Laptop, notebook
2
144
computers
3
External hard drives
74
4
iPads, tablets
60
Smart-phones (e.g. iPhone,
5
102
Android, Galaxy, etc.)
Cellphones (e.g. flip6
83
phones
7
Land-line phones
140
VoIP (Voice over the
8
41
Internet)
9
Fax machines
146
10
Printers
151
11
Digital cameras
90
Surveillance / monitoring
12
98
cameras
13
Other
10
14
Do Not Know
1

%
97%
91%
47%
38%
65%
53%
89%
26%
92%
96%
57%
62%
6%
1%

Other
Bluetooth devices
scanner
Have internet and intranet
Scanners
Audio/Video recording and storage equipment
copier/scanners
other law enforcement investigative tools, case management tools, vision evidence technology
Statistic
Min Value
Max Value
Total Responses

Value
1
14
158

Q8: What computer operating systems does your organization use? (check all that apply)
#
Answer
Response
%
1
MAC (Apple)
18
11%
Microsoft Windows
2
155
98%
(PC)
3
Linux (PC)
3
2%
4
Other
5
3%
5
Do Not Know
1
1%
Other
apple for some
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Statistic
Min Value
Max Value
Total Responses
Q9. Does your organization currently use any of the following security
technologies? (check all that apply)
#
Answer
Response
Firewall (e.g. Comodo
Internet Security, IPFilter,
1
114
Netfilter, Norton360, Online
Armor, etc.)
Anti-virus software (e.g.
Webroot SecureAnywhere
2
Antivirus, McAfee
132
AntiVirus, Kaspersky
AntiVirus, etc.)
Password protection
software (e.g. Dashlane 3,
3
51
Sticky Password, Password
Boss, LogMeOnce, etc.)
VPN - virtual private
network (e.g. Private
4
56
Internet Access, Hotspot
Shield Elite, PureVPN, etc.)
File encryption (e.g. GPG,
5
26
PGP, Trucrypt, etc.)
Other proxy services (e.g.
6
Tor, HideMyAss,
5
CyberGhost, BTGuard, etc.)
Cloud storage services (e.g.
Google Drive, Dropbox,
7
62
Apple iCloud, Microsoft
OneDrive, etc.)
8
Other
5
9
Do Not Know
21

Value
1
5
158

%
72%

84%

32%

35%
16%
3%

39%
3%
13%

Other
Microsoft Intune
RoxioCreatorHome, CyberLincPower
Backblaze
Disaster recovery implementation
Statistic
Min Value
Max Value
Total Responses

Value
1
9
158
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Q10: How does your staff access the Internet? (check all that apply)
#
Answer
Response
Wired connection
1
123
(Ethernet)
2
Internal wireless internet
119
3
External mobile hotspot
20
4
Cellular data connection
44
5
Public WiFi
19
6
Home WiFi
45
7
Other
2
8
Do Not Know
7

%
78%
75%
13%
28%
12%
28%
1%
4%

Other
Home WiFi for social media only. All client data is accessible on Box only via 2-step
verification with Director approval
Statistic
Min Value
Max Value
Total Responses

Value
1
8
158

Q11: Does your staff access internal electronic documents from outside the premises?
#
Answer
Response
%
1
No
62
39%
2
Yes
82
52%
Do Not
3
14
9%
Know
Total
158
100%
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Statistic
Min Value
Max Value
Mean
Variance
Standard Deviation
Total Responses
Q12: What social media does your organization use? (check all that apply)
#
Answer
Response
1
Twitter
83
2
Facebook
142
3
LinkedIn
38
4
Google+
18
5
Snapchat
3
6
Tumblr
6
7
Instagram
29
8
Pinterest
13
9
YouTube
39
10
Vine
4
11
WhatsApp
1
12
Flickr
3
Kik
13
2
messenger
14
Other
1
15
None
10
Do Not
16
6
Know

Value
1
3
1.70
0.39
0.63
158
%
53%
90%
24%
11%
2%
4%
18%
8%
25%
3%
1%
2%
1%
1%
6%
4%

Other
blog
Statistic
Min Value
Max Value
Total Responses

Value
1
16
158

Q13: Who in your organization is responsible for managing the organization's social media
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channel(s)? (check all that apply)
#
Answer
Dedicated full-time
1
employee
Dedicated part-time
2
employee
Shared across several
3
employees
4
Contractor
5
Volunteer
6
Third-party vendor
7
Other
8
Do Not Know

Response

%

63

40%

18

11%

60

38%

4
8
3
21
10

3%
5%
2%
13%
6%

Other
do not use
PT social media liaison and Director work in tandem
We’re part of a larger org with a communications director and dedicated staff
None
the Executive Director
employee, part of her job
n/a
Executive Director
Executive Director
Full time employee with this as part of their job duties
Staff member, but not really a dedicated part of their job
County IT Office
Part time employee with various roles at the agency
No one.
don't have social media
Executive Director
Program Director
Shared across three people (is that several?)
our foundation
Dedicated full-time employee with this as part of the job
Statistic
Min Value
Max Value
Total Responses

Value
1
8
158
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Q14: For what purpose(s) does your organization use social media? (check all that apply)
#
Answer
Response
%
1
Awareness
145
92%
2
Education
130
82%
3
Fundraising
112
71%
4
Outreach
120
76%
Employee or volunteer
5
90
57%
recruiting
Communicating directly
6
41
26%
with victims
7
Programs
57
36%
8
Event announcements
134
85%
9
No defined purpose
6
4%
10
Other
11
7%
Other
building partnerships
Victims reach out to us on social media
n/a
We don't use it.
don't use social media
We discourage use of social media by clients/victims to communicate although we sometimes
will get a services request from a client
research
none
We don't use it.
Statistic
Min Value
Max Value
Total Responses

Value
1
10
158

Q15: Does your organization have human resources policies regarding social media use by
the following? (check all that apply)
#
Answer
Response
%
1
Staff
111
70%
2
Volunteers
78
49%
3
Victims / survivors
22
14%
External partners
4
(individuals or
10
6%
organizations)
Other stakeholders (e.g.
5
board members, advisors,
25
16%
etc.)
6
Other
14
9%
7
Do Not Know
38
24%
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Other
No
In Process
not at this time
working on it
confusing...no outside entity has access to our social media accounts. Our Human Resource
policies can't dictate to outside entities
No.
no policies
No
shelter residents are asked not to use their smart phones until they have been checked out
No
member programs
None
Statistic
Min Value
Max Value
Total Responses

Value
1
7
158

Q16: Do you feel you need more help understanding technology and information security?
#
Answer
Response
%
1
No
36
23%
2
Yes
95
60%
Do Not
3
27
17%
Know
Total
158
100%
Statistic
Min Value
Max Value
Mean
Variance
Standard Deviation
Total Responses

Value
1
3
1.94
0.40
0.63
158

Q17: In general, what type(s) of training are most effective in your organization? (check all
that apply)
#
Answer
Response
%
1
On-site in-person training
128
81%
2
Off-site in-person training
70
44%
3
Web-based training
103
65%
4
Hardcopy training materials
59
37%
5
Other
3
2%
6
Do Not Know
0
0%
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Other
Must be in-state training if in person
local conferences
Statistic
Min Value
Max Value
Total Responses

Value
1
5
158

Q18: What do you perceive are barriers to improving your organization's information
security? (check all that apply)
#
Answer
Response
%
1
Lack of funding
110
70%
2
Lack of time
76
48%
Lack of knowledge or
3
understanding of
81
51%
technology
Lack of resources (e.g.
4
92
58%
staff, equipment)
5
Focus on other priorities
63
40%
Resistance by staff or
6
21
13%
other stakeholders
7
No need
7
4%
8
Other
11
7%
9
Do Not Know
9
6%
Other
Lack of quality NM trainers
Part of a larger org that has different standards for other non-victims services programs and lag
behind in understanding our unique needs
I am a branch within a Tribal Nations full computer system, so they don't understand the need
for extreme privacy
If there is a need I am not aware...that is why we hire IT professional consultants
Slow Broadband connection
Budget cuts, expensive internet
Understanding by IT professionals about our confidentiality requirements
The City's IT department.
Out dated operating systems
Addressing confidentiality issues with data storage; finding a software database program to
gather required data for funders that doesn't cost $30,000 a year in user fees and maintains
support
Statistic
Min Value
Max Value
Total Responses

Value
1
9
158

Q19: Do you know if your organization has a complete list (inventory) of all computers,
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laptops, cell phones, and other technologies belonging to the organization?
#
Answer
Response
1
All
107
2
Some
26
3
None
1
Do Not
4
24
know
Total
158
Statistic
Min Value
Max Value
Mean
Variance
Standard Deviation
Total Responses

Statistic
Min Value
Max Value
Mean
Variance
Standard Deviation
Total Responses

Statistic
Min Value
Max Value
Mean
Variance
Standard Deviation
Total Responses

15%
100%
Value
1
4
1.63
1.16
1.08
158

Q20: Do you know if these items are insured against theft or loss?
#
Answer
Response
1
Yes, they are.
66
2
No, they are not.
6
3
Some are.
14
4
Do Not Know
44
Total
130

Q21: Is the software used by your organization inventoried?
#
Answer
1
No
2
Yes
Do Not
3
Know
Total

%
68%
16%
1%

%
51%
5%
11%
34%
100%
Value
1
4
2.28
1.91
1.38
130

Response
25
77

%
16%
50%

52

34%

154

100%
Value
1
3
2.18
0.47
0.69
154
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Q22: Has your organization identified what hardware and software are critical to your
operations?
#
Answer
Response
%
1
No
22
14%
2
Yes
76
49%
Do Not
3
56
36%
Know
Total
154
100%
Statistic
Min Value
Max Value
Mean
Variance
Standard Deviation
Total Responses

Value
1
3
2.22
0.46
0.68
154

Q23: Does your organization have policies or documented policies for power or Internet
outages?
#
Answer
Response
%
1
No
66
43%
2
Yes
51
33%
Do Not
3
37
24%
Know
Total
154
100%
Statistic
Min Value
Max Value
Mean
Variance
Standard Deviation
Total Responses
Q24: Does your organization have policies for physical security?
#
Answer
Response
1
No
17
2
Yes
123
Do Not
3
13
Know
Total
153

Value
1
3
1.81
0.64
0.80
154
%
11%
80%
8%
100%
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Statistic
Min Value
Max Value
Mean
Variance
Standard Deviation
Total Responses
Q25: Does your organization have policies for information security?
#
Answer
Response
1
No
23
2
Yes
103
Do Not
3
28
Know
Total
154
Statistic
Min Value
Max Value
Mean
Variance
Standard Deviation
Total Responses
Q26: If yes, which technologies do these policies include? (check all that apply)
#
Answer
Response
Use of computers, laptops, and
1
tablets issued by the
89
organization
Use of cell phones issued by
2
73
the organization
Use of personal cell phones,
3
60
laptops and other technologies
Use of social media for
4
73
organizational purposes
Use of personal social media in
5
reference to working for the
52
organization
6
Use of public WiFi
21
7
Protection of passwords
65
Accessing files and sensitive
8
66
electronic documents
Protection of backups, disks,
9
54
tapes, software, manual
10
Other
2
11
Do Not Know
5

Value
1
3
1.97
0.20
0.44
153
%
15%
67%
18%
100%
Value
1
3
2.03
0.33
0.58
154
%
91%
74%
61%
74%
53%
21%
66%
67%
55%
2%
5%
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Other
use of password manager (Dashlane) is a practice, not a policy
Record Retention and Destruction Policy
Statistic
Min Value
Max Value
Total Responses

Value
1
11
98

Q27: Who is responsible for information security for the organization? (check all that
apply)
#
Answer
Response
%
1
Executive Director
81
56%
2
Manager / Director
66
46%
3
Staff Member
49
34%
4
Consultant
24
17%
5
Volunteer
7
5%
6
Third-Party Vendor
25
17%
7
Other
9
6%
8
Do Not Know
10
7%
Other
Director of Finance
IS when it comes to my computer/printer/fax/office phone
University
everyone
Our computer technician
County, City
County IT Office
no one, explicitly
The City's IT department.
Statistic
Min Value
Max Value
Total Responses

Value
1
8
144

Q28: Who in your organization is responsible for the legal requirements for information
security? (e.g. GLBA, HIPPA compliance, protective orders, etc.) (check all that apply)
#
Answer
Response
%
1
Executive Director
89
62%
2
Manager / Director
61
42%
3
Staff Member
30
21%
4
Consultant
5
3%
5
Volunteer
0
0%
6
Third-Party Vendor
5
3%
7
Other
12
8%
8
Do Not Know
22
15%
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Other
Chief Program Officer and Director of Finance
ED in conjunction with board attorney
Larger org has a COO and a compliance committee tasked with ensuring compliance (but just
beginning its work)
board members and pro bono attorneys
Board of Directors
We are exempt from HIPPA compliance. We have internal policies based on our ethical
responsibilities
University
All staff
Legal Counsel
County District Attorney
in consultation with agency counsel
Clinical Director
Statistic
Min Value
Max Value
Total Responses

Value
1
8
144

Q29: Are the legal requirements listed in Question 28 regarding information security
understood by those responsible?
#
Answer
Response
%
1
No
10
7%
2
Yes
82
57%
Do Not
3
52
36%
Know
Total
144
100%
Statistic
Min Value
Max Value
Mean
Variance
Standard Deviation
Total Responses

Value
1
3
2.29
0.35
0.59
144

Q30: Has your organization identified areas or practices that may be attractive targets or
vulnerable for a cyber attack or breach?
#
Answer
Response
%
1
No
41
28%
2
Yes
43
30%
3
Not yet, but will soon
8
6%
4
Do Not Know
52
36%
Total
144
100%
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Statistic
Min Value
Max Value
Mean
Variance
Standard Deviation
Total Responses
Q31: Has your organization experienced a cybersecurity attack or breach?
#
Answer
Response
1
No
87
Yes, within the past 2
2
10
years.
Yes, within the past 10
3
4
years.
4
Do Not Know
43
Total
144
Statistic
Min Value
Max Value
Mean
Variance
Standard Deviation
Total Responses

Value
1
4
2.49
1.55
1.25
144
%
60%
7%
3%
30%
100%
Value
1
4
2.02
1.84
1.36
144

Q32: Does your organization consider itself prepared to handle a cybersecurity breach or
attack?
#
Answer
Response
%
1
No
42
29%
2
Yes
29
20%
Do Not
3
73
51%
Know
Total
144
100%
Statistic
Min Value
Max Value
Mean
Variance
Standard Deviation
Total Responses

Value
1
3
2.22
0.76
0.87
144

Q33: Has your organization conducted information security workshops or training with
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staff, volunteers, and other stakeholders?
#
Answer
1
No
2
Yes
Plan to
3
Soon
Do Not
4
Know
Total

Response
71
48

%
49%
33%

4

3%

21

15%

144

100%

Statistic
Min Value
Max Value
Mean
Variance
Standard Deviation
Total Responses
Q34: If yes or plan to soon, who will conduct the training? (check all that apply)
#
Answer
Response
1
Executive Director
15
2
Manager / Director
16
3
Staff Member
18
4
Consultant
13
5
Volunteer
2
6
Third-Party Vendor
16
7
Other
6
8
Do Not know
31

Value
1
4
1.83
1.08
1.04
144
%
18%
19%
21%
15%
2%
19%
7%
37%

Other
Web based training we take every year
Security officer
NNEDV
n/a
until recently we had IT Manager
Someone trained by NNEDV
Statistic
Min Value
Max Value
Total Responses

Value
1
8
84

Q35: Does your organization document who has access to sensitive files, databases, and
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other electronic information?
#
Answer
1
No
2
Yes
Do Not
3
Know
Total
Statistic
Min Value
Max Value
Mean
Variance
Standard Deviation
Total Responses

Response
25
97

%
17%
67%

22

15%

144

100%
Value
1
3
1.98
0.33
0.57
144

Q36: Does your organization inform or train new employees about information security
policies and procedures?
#
Answer
Response
%
1
No
20
14%
2
Yes
111
77%
Do Not
3
13
9%
Know
Total
144
100%
Statistic
Min Value
Max Value
Mean
Variance
Standard Deviation
Total Responses

Value
1
3
1.95
0.23
0.48
144

Q37: Does your organization inform third-party vendors, partners, and external
stakeholders about your information security policies and procedures?
#
Answer
Response
%
1
No
36
25%
2
Yes
62
43%
Do Not
3
46
32%
Know
Total
144
100%
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Statistic
Min Value
Max Value
Mean
Variance
Standard Deviation
Total Responses

Value
1
3
2.07
0.57
0.75
144

Q38: If your organization does use third-party vendors do they inform you of their
information security policies and procedures?
#
Answer
Response
%
1
No
17
13%
2
Yes
53
41%
Do Not
3
60
46%
Know
Total
130
100%
Statistic
Min Value
Max Value
Mean
Variance
Standard Deviation
Total Responses

Value
1
3
2.33
0.49
0.70
130

Q39: How is access to electronic files containing sensitive information stored within your
organization protected? (check all that apply)
#
Answer
Response
%
Dedicated hardware (e.g.
1
60
42%
dedicated computer)
2
Secure passwords
107
74%
Encryption software (e.g.
3
25
17%
Trucrypt)
4
Smartcard
2
1%
Third-party storage (e.g.
5
28
19%
cloud storage)
Biometrics (e.g. finger6
0
0%
print reader)
7
Other
8
6%
8
Do Not Know
31
22%
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Other
In our victims services program, we have one computer no connected to the internet; this is the
only place PII is entered and is used to provide a number to each person served (that is not
derived from PII)
Non-electronic
security policy in AD
dedicated password protected not connected to internet
drobo units so we don't ever have to use the cloud
Secure database
Firewalls
Statistic
Min Value
Max Value
Total Responses

Value
1
8
144

Q40: Does your organization have policies and procedures for the destruction of electronic
documents?
#
Answer
Response
%
1
No
48
33%
2
Yes
54
38%
Do Not
3
42
29%
Know
Total
144
100%
Statistic
Min Value
Max Value
Mean
Variance
Standard Deviation
Total Responses

Value
1
3
1.96
0.63
0.79
144

Q41: Does your organization have policies and procedures for the destruction of storage
devices? (e.g. DVDs, CDs, thumbdrives, etc.)
#
Answer
Response
%
1
No
47
33%
2
Yes
50
35%
Do Not
3
47
33%
Know
Total
144
100%
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Statistic
Min Value
Max Value
Mean
Variance
Standard Deviation
Total Responses

Value
1
3
2.00
0.66
0.81
144

Q42: Does your organization have access to external resources and experts to help with
information security?
#
Answer
Response
%
1
No
23
16%
2
Yes
91
64%
Do Not
3
29
20%
Know
Total
143
100%
Statistic
Min Value
Max Value
Mean
Variance
Standard Deviation
Total Responses

Value
1
3
2.04
0.36
0.60
143

Q43: Please provide any additional information regarding the current state of information
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security within your organization.
Text Response
personally identifiable or confidential client info is not stored on computers hard drives but is
stored in the cloud - we use Box with 2-step verification that requires a code texted to the
Director for access to client files
Needs improvement
We do not put any sensitive information on our computers or electronic devices due to not
being able to afford appropriate electronic security.
I keep most on paper, some on my computer
Multi use agency not just dv/sa and its complex when its multifaceted agency providing child
care, fitness club etc.
These questions are helpful for my own personal awareness; I need to seek more information
in these areas. Thank you!
Use secure client database that meets HUD standards for security
We could be more secure.
You are scaring us!
It is a top priority and our funders are pushing our limits
We do not keep most sensitive information electronically.
paperwork-security shredding
We believe that we try to stay on top of information security but improvements could be made.
medium
We recently switched from internal IT manager to third party consultant (vendor) -- not sure if
it will work
We have no budget for these issues. If any professional assistance has been offered, it has
been done ad hoc or by volunteers.
Our computers are so old, nobody seems to want to crash in
We have a policy that prohibits use of email to "transmit information identifying...[program]
participants, his/her children or the abusive partner."
Information regarding clients and case management is done verbally. There are no client files
on any computer.
Statistic
Total Responses

Value
19

Q44: If you would like to receive a statistical summary of this survey at the conclusion of
this study, please provide your contact information.
Statistic
Value
Total Responses
51
Q45: Timing
#
1
2
3
4

Answer
First Click
Last Click
Page Submit
Click Count

Average Value
12.61
227.08
236.79
27.88

Standard Deviation
54.40
304.62
306.11
15.76

VITA
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VITA
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